Brunner v. State of Minnesota, 49412.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1979
• Docket Number: No. 49412.,49412.
• Citation: 285 NW 2d 74
• Parties: Mary BRUNNER, Appellant, v. STATE OF MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Respondent, and Hennepin County Welfare Board, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

285 N.W.2d 74 (1979)

Mary BRUNNER, Appellant, v. STATE OF MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Respondent, and Hennepin County Welfare Board, Respondent.

No. 49412.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

September 21, 1979.

Rehearing Denied November 13, 1979.

Randall Smith, Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis, Inc., Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Allyn, Sol. Gen., Paul G. Zerby, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ellen C. Dubuque, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Charles F. Sweetland, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondents.

Heard by OTIS, PETERSON, and KELLY, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

OTIS, Justice.

This is an appeal by Mary Brunner, a Minneapolis resident and recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), from an order reducing her monthly maintenance grant from $404 to $286 because two of her three children were enrolled in a child welfare long-term residential treatment center in Duluth, Minnesota. The order issued by William B. Christensen, Acting Judge of the District Court of Hennepin County, affirmed a reduction sustained by the Commissioner of Public Welfare after a de novo hearing by the state welfare referee.

Judicial review is authorized by Minn.St. 256.045, subds. 7-9. The district court applied the scope of review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, Minn.St. 15.0425, and concluded the order was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious or affected by error of law. We apply the same scope of review. See, Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 826 (Minn.1977).

The issues are whether the boys were living with their mother, within the meaning of Minn.St. 256.12, subd. 14, to qualify her for aid to care for them, or were away from home for special educational needs, to qualify them for an exception to the state's "physical presence in the home" requirement provided in Minn.Reg. DPW 44(D)(3)(a) 12 MCAR § 2.044(D)(3)(a). As the boys' needs were essentially eliminated with respect to their dependence on appellant for their daily food, shelter, supervision, we conclude they were not living with her for purposes of any AFDC eligibility based upon their dependency. Because we also conclude that no special educational needs required the boys' enrollment at the center, which focuses instead on behavioral problems affecting more than their schooling, we hold that the reduction of AFDC benefits reflected a change in need not excepted by the welfare regulation, and was therefore proper.

Mary Brunner, divorced, was living in Minneapolis with her three children and receiving AFDC funds from the Hennepin County Welfare Department in 1976 and 1977 when she sent her two sons to Northwood Residential Treatment Center for children with emotional, behavioral, and adjustment problems.

David, age 9 at the time of the state hearing, had begun having behavior problems during the divorce several years earlier, setting fires at home and school and threatening to kill his mother and himself. While he was under psychiatric care, he was placed unsuccessfully in two foster homes and underwent treatment at Abbott Hospital. His psychiatrist recommended the center and a county social worker placed him there in August 1976. He is two years behind in school.

Clayton was 11 at the time of the hearing, and his problems involved aggressiveness and unruly behavior in school, and breaking into neighborhood buildings. He was doing his school assignments, although, like David, he had difficulty learning. At the suggestion of another social worker, the family moved to a new neighborhood and school, but the problems persisted and included one incident with the juvenile court. Northwood personnel suggested Clayton also attend the center.

David came home on weekends at two- to four-week intervals late in 1977 and Clayton came home at Christmas. Alternate weekend trips followed, and Mary and her daughter visited the center as well. The Northwood program is designed to involve the family, uses the home as a base, and is geared toward returning the children to their own home and school.

Lora Guidera, the primary social case-worker for the family since September 1977, testified at a county hearing that both school and home problems were treated at Northwood and that the unique educational needs could not be met by a public school.

The $1,200 monthly cost per child, including clothing and expenses, is paid from county welfare funds. Moreover, it was undisputed in affidavits submitted to this court at our request that the county reimbursed appellant at fixed rates for costs of food and transportation incurred by the visits.

It was also undisputed that those funds were not available for any portion of the $225 rent or the more than $45 utility costs for her present three-bedroom home which includes a room for the boys.

Except for the finding that the agency contended the boys were not living with their mother, the commissioner's decision did not address that threshold issue. It rested on the ground that the placement did not meet the exception for special educational needs in the department's regulation. The conclusions stated in part:

"2. There is no evidence that the placement of the children at Northwood was the direct result of the public school not being able to meet their educational needs. We would conclude that both children have serious emotional problems that no doubt are evidenced in their school experiences as well as all of their other relationships. However, we cannot conclude that the purpose of placement at Northwood was because the public school system had failed them or that their primary difficulty was in school."

1. For purposes of AFDC eligibility, a "`dependent child' * * * means a child * * * who is living with a specified relative in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their home." Minn.St. 256.12, subd. 14.

Further, AFDC is a joint federal-state program and a state must determine eligibility for a class of persons by reference to federal standards. Steere v. State, Dep't. of Public Welfare, 308 Minn. 390, 391, note 1, 243 N.W.2d 112, 114 (1976); Meagher v. Hennepin County Welfare Bd., 300 Minn. 446, 450, 221 N.W.2d 140, 142 (1974), citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972). Since the state definition is essentially identical to the federal definition in the Social Security Act with regard to the "living with" requirement,¹ the question is whether the agency's interpretation and application of the definition comports with federal policy. See, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 note 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2141, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1134 (1968).

The regulation promulgated under the federal statute in furtherance of that policy explains:

"A home is the family setting maintained or in process of being established, as evidenced by assumption and continuation of responsibility for day to day care of the child by the relative with whom the child is living. A home exists so long as the relative exercises responsibility for the care and control of the child, even though either the child or the relative is temporarily absent from the customary family setting. Within this interpretation, the child is considered to be `living with\' his relative even though:

"(1) He is under the jurisdiction of the court (e. g., receiving probation services or protective supervision); or

"(2) Legal custody is held by an agency that does not have physical possession of the child."

45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(v)(B).

In Minnesota, the federal policy has been interpreted by the welfare department to require physical presence in the home, but the agency also permits two exceptions consistent with the temporary absence allowed by the federal regulation. At the time of the reduction, Minn.Reg. DPW 44(D)(3)(a) and (b) provided:

"3. Physical presence in the home.

"a. A child must reside in the same home with an eligible caretaker to be eligible for AFDC unless he/she has special educational needs which require that he/she reside away from home.

"b. If an emergency exists that deprives the child of the care of the relative through whom he has been receiving aid, temporary absences of the caretaker or the child from the home will not defeat AFDC eligibility, for a temporary period necessary to make and carry out plans for the child\'s continuing care and support. No absence may exceed six months and all absences of more than three months shall be referred to the Commissioner for a determination of continued eligibility." 12 MCAR § 2.044(D)(3)(a) and (b) (1976 Supp.).²

As we read the definition of dependent child with the federal regulation, they contemplate that the child be dependent for shelter upon the home of the recipient relative primarily. Temporary absence, court jurisdiction, and legal custody without physical possession are all situations consistent with that premise.

It is significant in our analysis of appellant's eligibility for the higher grant that the only substantial item not reimbursed by the child welfare program is the portion of shelter costs attributable to maintaining a room at home for the boys. Need for shelter is crucial for determining AFDC eligibility based on dependency, and cost of shelter is an obvious factor in determining the appropriate level of benefits. When, except during weekend visits, the need is eliminated and the cost is met by funds from a separate source, eligibility and grant level must be considered in light of those facts.

Although the federal statute was amended in 1950 to provide for needs of the caretaker relatives as well as the dependent children,³ the state standards of need control, provided the federal eligibility requirements are not altered. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291, 92 S.Ct. 502, 508, 30 L.Ed.2d 448, 456 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2142, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1135 (1968); ...