State ex rel. Oil Conservation Commission v. Brand, 6483

• Decision Date: 15 April 1959
• Docket Number: No. 6483,6483
• Citation: 338 P.2d 113,1959 NMSC 38,65 N.M. 384
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico ex rel. OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Edwin L. Mechem, Murray E. Morgan, A. L. Porter, Jr., Members of said Commission, Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, El Paso Natural Gas Company and Permian Basin Pipeline Company, Relators, v. Hon. John R. BRAND, Judge of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of New Mexico, Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 113

338 P.2d 113

65 N.M. 384

STATE of New Mexico ex rel. OIL CONSERVATION COMMISSION Edwin L. Mechem, Murray E. Morgan, A. L. Porter, Jr Members of said Commission, Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, El Paso Natural Gas Company and Permian Basin Pipeline Company, Relators, v. Hon. John R. BRAND, Judge of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of New Mexico, Respondent.

No. 6483.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 15, 1959.

Fred M. Standley, Atty. Gen., Wm. J. Cooley, Oliver E. Payne, Sp. Assts. Atty. Gen., for relator Oil Conservation Commission.

Campbell & Russell, Roswell, for relator Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co.

Cowan & Leach, Hobbs, Hardie, Grambling, Sims & Galatzan, El Paso, Tex., for relator El Paso Natural Gas Co.

Robert W. Ward, Lovington, Patrick J. McCarthy, Lawrence I. Shaw, Omaha, Neb., for relator Permian Basin Pipeline Co.

Atwood & Malone, Hervey, Dow & Hinkle, Howard Bratton, Roswell, Kellahin & Fox, Santa Fe, for respondent.

CARMODY, Justice.

This is a proceeding invoking our original jurisdiction by way of a writ of prohibition. The case was instituted in the name of the State of New Mexico on the relation of the Oil Conservation Commission and its members, and certain companies interested in sustaining an order of the commission. The respondent is The Honorable John R. Brand, District Judge of the Fifth Judicial District, and the proceeding seeks to prohibit him from receiving any evidence in a case involving an appeal from the Oil Conservation Commission other than the record as heard before the commission.

The Oil Conservation Commission held certain hearings involving the question of proration of gas production from the Jalmat Gas Pool in southern Lea County, New Mexico, and following the promulgation of the commission's final order with respect to proration, petitions for review were filed in the Lea County district court under the provisions of Sec. 65-3-22(b), N.M.S.A.1953, by various operators who objected to the commission's order. These petitions for review, eight in all, named the commission and certain other operators as respondents. The cases were consolidated under one docket number in Lea County, and thereafter a pretrial conference was held. At the time of the original pretrial conference, the applicants for the review advised the court that they intended to offer evidence in addition to the record made before the commission. The respondent advised these parties that they should notify their adversaries of the 'gist of the testimony' and that the court on a second pretrial conference would advise counsel whether or not the evidence would be considered.

Prior to the second pretrial conference held on September 23, 1958, the applicants for review submitted what was termed an 'offer of proof' and an amendment to the offer. This was considered by the trial court and, after hearing arguments from both sides, the court stated that the petitioners seeking the review would be permitted to offer proof which was not available to the commission, in order that he might determine whether or not the order of the commission was proper and reasonable and whether or not, in view of later developments after the order, a determination could be made affecting the invalidity, unresonableness or capriciousness of the order in not protecting the correlative rights in the property. Following this announcement by the respondent, the relators, after proper petition to this court, obtained an alternative writ of prohibition.

The case has been extensively briefed by attorneys for the relators and respondent, and is before us for determination on two questions, first, whether the writ of prohibition should be made absolute on the ground that the respondent is about to exceed his jurisdiction, and, second, that if the respondent is held to be within his jurisdiction, whether we should not prohibit, in the exercise of our superintending control over district courts, to prevent error reasonably calculated to work irreparable mischief, great, extraordinary and exceptional hardship, costly delays, and highly unusual burdens of expense. The relief sought will be taken up and considered in the above order.

With respect to relators' right to prohibit, it appears without question that the trial court has jurisdiction of both the parties and subject matter. This is admitted by relators. However, they seriously contend that if respondent allows the admission of the evidence, that it will represent the exercise of an excess of jurisdiction. We feel that this contention is directly answered in State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Service v. Carmody, 1949, 53 N.M. 367, 208 P.2d 1073, and in various other cases, including but not limited to State ex rel. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pacific Co. v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District, 1934, 38 N.M. 451, 34 P.2d 1098. Here, the proposed action, if taken by respondent, would not be void or subject to collateral attack, but would merely be a matter which could be reviewed by this court on appeal.

Referring to State ex rel. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pacific Co. v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District, supra, but making very slight changes in order to fit the particulars of this case, we will paraphrase a part of former Chief Justice Watson's opinion, as follows:

The fact that the district court may be about to decide matters wrongly is of no concern of ours when merely investigating the jurisdiction, nor is it material that we might on review be compelled to reverse the case.

It might be convenient, in this case as in many others, to stop proceedings as soon as it appears that there is a substantial error about to be committed. Such is not the policy of our law. Such a system might develop delays and other inconveniences offsetting entirely the advantages often suggested for it.

Therefore, we do not believe that the present case is one calling for our writ of...