Davis v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 107-74,SAAB-SCANIA,107-74 |
| Citation | 133 Vt. 317,339 A.2d 456 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Richard E. DAVIS v.OF AMERICA, INC., and Saab-Scania Aktiebolag. |
Thomas F. Heilmann, Richard E. Davis Assoc., Barre, for plaintiff.
Stephen C. Walke, Jr., Paterson, Gibson, Noble & Brownell, Montpelier, for defendants.
Before BARNEY, C. J., and SMITH, KEYSER, DALEY and LARROW, JJ.
By permission, defendants appeal from an order of the Washington Superior Court denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Saab-Scania of America, Inc., is a Connecticut corporation distributing Saab automobiles. There are at least six Saab dealerships in Vermont. It is a successor corporation to Saab Motors, U.S.A., Inc. Saab-Scania Aktiebolag is a Swedish corporation which manufactures Saabs and is parent corporation to the other two companies. For purposes of brievity, they are hereinafter termed the Connecticut corporation, its predecessor, and the Swedish corporation. The case is one of claimed products liability.
In 1971 one Robert Wheale and wife bought a new Saab, in Connecticut, from a Connecticut dealer. They were then residents of Virginia. Subsequently, they sued the predecessor corporation in Washington County Court, by process served on the Vermont Secretary of State under 12 V.S.A. § 855. In substance, the action was for false representations, breach of warranty and negligent manufacture, all in connection with the Connecticut sale. On motion, that action was dismissed on December 12, 1972, on the stated grounds of insufficient minimal contacts to establish jurisdiction under the substituted service, the plaintiffs being residents of Virginia, the injury being caused outside the State of Vermont, and any wrongful activities not being related to the State of Vermont or any resident thereof. The ruling was made as a matter of law, and assumed as true the allegation that defendant was doing business in Vermont. The dismissal was not appealed.
Subsequently, the Wheale's assigned their claim to the plaintiff, who is related to them, and he brought suit anew, in the now Washington Superior Court. The cause of action is set up in virtually identical terms, and service was made against both defendants in the same manner. The trial court took evidence and made findings of fact. In addition to those above recited, it also found extensive contacts between the Connecticut corporation and several Vermont dealerships operating under it, who are contractually bound to honor its warranties. It found such warranty was made to the original purchasers, that some repair work under it was done by a Vermont dealer and reimbursed by the Connecticut corporation, that the now plaintiff is a Vermont resident, and that the Connecticut corporation 'has substantial connection' with Vermont, actively participated in the Vermont market, and intentionally conducted business in Vermont. It concluded, on this basis, that the Connecticut corporation had 'sufficient contacts' with Vermont to support jurisdiction obtained by service under 12 V.S.A. § 855, that plaintiff 'as a new real party in interest' was not bound by the prior judgment, and took jurisdiction, denying defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and on grounds of res adjudicata. We reverse.
Plaintiff argues, in substance, that he is not bound by the prior order, unappealed from, because the dismissal order was not on the merits. This argument misapprehends the scope of the rule asserted for. The prior order would not preclude recovery on the merits in a second action against the Connecticut corporation, brought in Connecticut, because the merits were not adjudicated. But the issue which was adjudicated in the prior action was the validity of service under 12 V.S.A. § 855 against the predecessor of the Connecticut corporation. The cause of action is substantially the same, the prior judgment assumed defendant doing business in Vermont, the type of service was the same, and there was substantial identity of parties. As against the Connecticut corporation, the bar of res adjudicata applies. Hill v. Grandey, 132 Vt. 460, 321 A.2d 28 (1974); Trapeni v. Walker, 120 Vt. 510, 515, 144 A.2d 831 (1958). See also Orleans Village v. Union Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Vt., 335 A.2d 315 (1974). It was not the merits of the claim which were adjudicated, but the merits of the issue of personal jurisdiction. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (19...
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...identity" must exist between the parties in the first and second actions, placing the two in privity. Davis v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc., 133 Vt. 317, 320, 339 A.2d 456, 458 (1975). Here the Bond Resolution itself, executed by Continental with the Agency, provides that substantial identi......
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...446 F.2d 1382, 1383 (C.A.3, 1971); Acree v. Air Line Pilots Association, 390 F.2d 199, 203 (C.A.5, 1968); Davis v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc., 133 Vt. 317, 339 A.2d 456 (1975). In the conflict of laws area, Michigan cases also hold that the erroneous decision of a court that it has jurisd......
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