34 OF SPOKANE COUNTY, Maxon v. School Dist. No. 34 of Spokane County

• Decision Date: 01 November 1892
• Citation: 5 Wash. 142,31 P. 462
• Parties: MAXON v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 34 OF SPOKANE COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

31 P. 462

5 Wash. 142

MAXON v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 34 OF SPOKANE COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 1, 1892

Appeal from superior court, Spokane county; R. B. BLAKE, Judge.

Action by Charles Maxon against school district No. 34 of Spokane county, to recover for materials furnished a contractor to build a schoolhouse for said district. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

For dissenting opinion, see 32 P. 110.

Jones, Belt & Quinn, for appellant.

Crow & Richardson, for respondent.

STILES J.

The first point made by the appellant is that a school district of the state of Washington is not a corporation, and cannot be sued as such. In connection with this, it is claimed that no action can be brought against a school district by name but must be brought against the directors in their representative capacity. The position is taken that there can be no corporation without express legislative enactment, and inasmuch as section 783, Gen. St., contains the only reference to school districts which could be taken as an attempt at a definition, it is strongly contended that the language used there does not justify the position that a school district is a corporation. The term "school district" is therein declared to mean the territory under the jurisdiction of a single school board, and all existing school districts are recognized by the act as legally organized districts. From 1877 until the passage of the act containing section 783, in March, 1890, there was no corresponding section in the laws of Washington, unless the section which is found in the earlier school laws of the territory can be taken as having some continuing force notwithstanding the language of the repealing section in the school law of 1877, and similar repealing clauses of subsequent acts. We find in the school law of 1859 (Acts, p 314) this provision: "Sec. 11. When a district is organized it shall be to all intents and purposes a body corporate, capable of suing and being sued, and fully competent to transact all business pertaining to schools or schoolhouses in their own district; and it shall be the duty of the directors to prosecute or defend any demands for or against their district, and notice shall be served upon one of the directors of any suit brought against a district." The foregoing provision was contained in every school law enacted by the legislature until 1877, when for some inexplicable reason it seems to have been dropped. But the elimination of this section from the later school laws does not, we think, conclusively show that it was the intention of the legislature either to disincorporate the old districts, or to organize new ones upon any different system from that which had been theretofore followed. Section 34 of the act of 1877, after giving to the board of directors the custody of all school property belonging to the district, authorized them "in the name of the district, or in their own names, as directors of the district, to convey by deed all the interest of their district in and to any schoolhouse," etc. And section 39 provided that any board of directors shall be liable, as directors, "in the name of the district, for any judgment against the district." These provisions have been perpetuated in all the school laws since that of 1877. It may even be doubted whether that portion of section 11 of the act of 1859 which declares school districts to be a body corporate, capable of suing and being sued, has at any time been repealed. The act of 1877 must in many respects be taken to have been a very incomplete school law if the whole of the previous acts were actually repealed by it, since, so far as organization goes, it entirely ignores existing districts, and provides only for the organization of new districts. Section 27. Subsequent acts until 1890 were equally deficient. In 1886, it was provided that summons in an action against a school district should be served upon the clerk thereof,-a requirement that would have been wholly illogical if the directors and not the district were the defendants. For these reasons we think that a school district is and always has been a corporation.

The second point made is that a school district is not a municipal corporation.

The question here involved has been decided both ways in the various states. Ordinarily, a corporation of this limited character would probably be more strictly termed a "public corporation," but under our school system where the body of inhabitants independent of the directors are invested with certain powers in connection with the directors of the school system of the state under its laws, it would not be a strain of the term to class them as municipal corporations equally with counties. The act which we are called upon to construe is that of January 31, 1888, ^[1]...