Jones v. Breed
| Decision Date | 05 May 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 71-2907-LTL.,71-2907-LTL. |
| Citation | 343 F. Supp. 690 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Gary Steven JONES, a minor, by and through Lola Mae Jones, his guardian ad litem, Petitioner, v. Allen F. BREED, Director of the California Youth Authority, Robert McKibben, Superintendent of the Southern Regional Center Clinic, California Youth Authority, Respondents. |
Peter Bull, Robert L. Walker, San Francisco, Cal., Donald W. Pike, Beverly Hills, Cal., for petitioner.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Herbert L. Ashby, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Writs Section, S. Clark Moore, Russell Iungerich, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents.
This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on behalf of minor Gary Steven Jones, a prisoner of the State of California committed to the California Youth Authority after his conviction under California law of robbery in the first degree.
The Court has considered the arguments and has reviewed the Petition, the response, the reply and the authorities cited by both parties as well as the complete record of all state court proceedings.
The sole issue before this Court is whether Jones has been placed twice in jeopardy in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by reason of his subjection to those procedures of the Welfare and Institutions Code of the State of California, known otherwise as the Juvenile Court Law, establishing a special treatment for suspected juvenile offenders.1
The question here presented has been previously considered at each stage of the proceedings before the involved state courts and duly submitted to the Court of Appeal, Second District, and Supreme Court of the State of California, on habeas corpus.2
Briefly stated, the facts are that on February 9, 1971 a petition was filed with the juvenile court in Los Angeles, alleging that Jones was a person described by Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code in that he had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a violation of Section 211 of the Penal Code of the State of California (robbery). After a detention hearing, the minor was detained pending a hearing on the petition. A second hearing, pursuant to Section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, was held on March 1, 1971 and resulted in a finding that the allegations of the petition were true and that the minor was a person described by Section 602. The proceedings were continued for dispositional hearing pursuant to Section 702. At that hearing, the Court announced its intention to find, pursuant to Section 707, that the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court and that the court intended under that section to dismiss the petition and direct that the minor be prosecuted as an adult in the Superior Court. After an adjournment, sought by the minor's counsel, such an order was made. Jones was thereafter prosecuted as an adult in the Superior Court and convicted as above noted.
It is the second hearing before the juvenile court under Section 701 on which this Court has been asked by petitioner to focus its attention and to find that such hearing was tantamount to a criminal trial wherein jeopardy attached at its commencement thus foreclosing any later criminal prosecution.
Such finding cannot be made. That hearing was but one step in a comprehensive program developed by the State of California for the handling of delinquent youth. That program, representing the combined efforts of the California legislature and judiciary, is a thoughtful and in this Court's view entirely constitutional effort to strike a realistic balance between the public's right to order and its interest in the proper care and handling of juveniles.
The preliminary procedures of the California Juvenile Courts Law, civil rather than criminal in nature, provide to a minor accused of a crime a means to escape some of the consequences which...
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Bretz v. Crist, s. 76-1572 and 76-1169
...a continuation of the first proceedings, see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 532, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975); Jones v. Breed, 343 F.Supp. 690, 692 (D.C.1972).17 Although Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 172, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1873), indicated in dictum that "(i)t is the punishmen......
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Breed v. Jones 8212 1995
...proceedings . . . it is clear that no new jeopardy arose by the juvenile proceeding sending the case to the criminal court.' 343 F.Supp. 690, 692 (1972). The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that applying double jeopardy protection to juvenile proceedings would not 'impede the juvenile......
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Juvenile, In re
...have also applied the concept of a single, continuing jeopardy to the transfer of a minor for criminal prosecution. Jones v. Breed, 343 F.Supp. 690, 692 (C.D.Cal.1972); Bryan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal.3d 575, 580--584, 102 Cal.Rptr. 831, 498 P.2d 1079 (1972); People v. ......
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Jones v. Breed
...if it had, no new jeopardy arose by the procedure of certifying Jones to be tried and ultimately convicted as an adult. Jones v. Breed, 343 F.Supp. 690 (C.D.Cal. 1972). We must first resolve whether the protection of the Fifth Amendment "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense ......