Juvenile, In re

• Decision Date: 31 January 1974
• Parties: In re a JUVENILE, Petitioner.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 822

306 N.E.2d 822

364 Mass. 531

In re a JUVENILE, Petitioner.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Oct. 3, 1973.

Decided Jan. 31, 1974.

Michael J. Addis, Somerville (Robert M. Bloom, Waltham, with him), for petitioner.

James T. Morris, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen. (Edward F. Perlman, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for respondent.

Before TAURO, C.J., and BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The petitioner, who seeks a writ of habeas corpus, was found guilty and sentenced in a District Court on a complaint which was issued following the dismissal of juvenile proceedings against him. See G.L. c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St.1964, c. 308, § 2. He claims that on dismissal of the juvenile complaint under G.L. c. 119, § 61, the District Court had no jurisdiction to try him because G.L. c. 119, § 75, as appearing in St.1964, c. 308, § 7, provides that any trial, after dismissal of juvenile proceedings, must take place, if at all, in the Superior Court. He makes three additional claims. He argues that the statutory standard (see G.L. c. 119, § 61) by which a District Court judge may dismiss a juvenile proceeding is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He next contends that when a juvenile complaint has been dismissed after hearing, as provided in G.L. c. 119, § 61, any subsequent trial on the same charge would violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy. And finally the petitioner asserts that, although he had adequate notice of the hearing on the juvenile charge, he did not have constitutionally adequate notice that juvenile jurisdiction might be declined, resulting in his being held for trial as an adult.

The case, which is here on a reservation and report to the Appeals Court by a judge of the Superior Court, has been presented on a statement of agreed facts. The case in turn was transferred here for direct review by an order of this court pursuant to G.L. c. 211A, § 10.

On September 5, 1972, when he was fifteen, the petitioner was arraigned as a juvenile in the Fourth District Court of Eastern Middlesex. ¹ He was charged with being a delinquent child 'in that he did attempt larceny of a motor vehicle.' The petitioner was found to be indigent, counsel was assigned to represent him, and he was released on personal recognizance. The case was continued to September 18 and later to September 20. On September 20, a hearing was held in the juvenile session where evidence was received from prosecution and defence witnesses and all parties had an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The judge found sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of delinquency on the charge of attempted larceny of a motor vehicle and then requested the probation report. After hearing the probation report and examining the petitioner's record, the judge found that the petitioner was not a fit subject for commitment to the Youth Service Board and dismissed the juvenile complaint. ² That same day an adult complaint was issued, and the same attorney who had represented the petitioner on the juvenile complaint was appointed to represent the petitioner. The petitioner thereupon admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty finding, ³ and trial was held immediately before the same judge who had dismissed the juvenile complaint. The petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to a three-month term in the Middlesex house of correction in Billerica, an adult institution. That sentence was suspended, and the petitioner was placed on probation for a period of one year. No appeal was taken.

On October 25, 1972, after hearing, the petitioner's suspended sentence was revoked for violation of the terms of his probation, and the petitioner was committed to the custody of the sheriff of Middlesex County (respondent). Six days later, pending final determination of this petition, the petitioner was released on $2,000 personal recognizance in the Superior Court.

Jurisdiction of the District Court to Try the Adult Complaint.

The District Court lacked jurisdiction to try the petitioner on the adult complaint. Section 75 of G.L. c. 119, which is set forth in full in the margin, ⁴ provides that in circumstances such as exist in this case, a judge of the District Court 'shall commit . . . or bind . . . (the defendant) over for trial in the superior court according to the usual course of criminal proceedings' (emphasis supplied).

The respondent argues that § 75 should be read so as to permit a trial in the District Court on the adult complaint if the crime is one which is within the final jurisdiction of the District Court, as is the crime charged here (see G.L. c. 218, § 26). He contends that his interpretation is supported by the provision in § 75 that G.L. c. 218, § 30, 'shall apply to any such case.' Section 30 of G.L. c. 218 is concerned (a) with bind-over hearings in the District Courts of cases involving crimes not within that court's final jurisdiction (see MYERS V. COMMONWEALTH, MASS., 298 N.E.2D 819),^A and (b) with the possible binding over for trial in the Superior Court of defendants in cases involving crimes within the final jurisdiction of the District Court (see COREY V. COMMONWEALTH, MASS., 301 N.E.2D 450)^B.

The respondent further contends that his interpretation of § 75 is supported by the provision that 'if the person appears to be guilty of the offense or violation, the court shall commit him or bind him over for trial in the superior court according to the usual course of criminal proceedings' (emphasis supplied). From this the respondent argues that 'the usual course of criminal proceedings' means that the adult complaint should be treated in the usual way under G.L. c. 218, § 30, just as it would be if issued against an adult.

We believe, however, that the provision that the court shall commit the defendant or bind him over for trial in the Superior Court 'according to the usual course of criminal proceedings' is concerned with a hearing on probable cause and not a trial on the merits. Such a conclusion is clearly indicated by the introductory phrase providing for commitment or bind-over 'if the person appears to be guilty of the offense or violation.' That is a 'probable cause' standard and not a standard on which a finding of guilty may be based.

We believe also that the reference in § 75 to G.L. c. 218, § 30, was intended only to incorporate the requirements of § 30 concerning the transmission of information by the clerk of the applicable District Court to the clerk of the appropriate Superior Court. We fail to see how the reference in § 75 to G.L. c. 218, § 30, can be fairly taken to constitute an implied grant of jurisdiction to the District Court where § 75 explicitly provides for a trial in the Superior Court. Where it is possible, as it is here, a statute should be construed so as to avoid rendering words in that statute meaningless. Milton v. Metropolitan Dist. Commn., 342 Mass. 222, 225, 175 N.E.2d 696 (1961). Industrial Natl. Bank v. Leo's Used Car Exch. Inc., Mass., 291 N.E.2d 603. ^c The argument advanced by the respondent in effect asks us to ignore the words 'in the superior court' appearing in § 75.

After a juvenile complaint has been dismissed and an adult complaint has been issued, the only function of a District Court is to hold a probable cause hearing and, if the defendant appears to be guilty, to make an appropriate determination concerning bail. ⁵

The petitioner must be discharged from the custody of the respondent because he is being held pursuant to a sentence imposed in a proceeding which the District Court had no jurisdiction to conduct.

We think it appropriate to comment on other issues argued by the petitioner because they involve the nature of future proceedings, if any, which may be conducted with respect to any adult complaint charging the petitioner with the same offence described in the juvenile complaint.

Constitutionality of the Standard for Declining of Juvenile

Jurisdiction.

The petitioner argues that he can never properly be held on an adult complaint. He contends that the language in G.L. c. 119, § 61, which authorizes a District Court judge to dismiss a juvenile complaint 'if the court is of the opinion that the interests of the public require that . . . (the juvenile) should be tried for said offense or violation' is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The petitioner claims that the standard expressed as 'the interests of the public' deprives him of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. ⁶

The 'void for vagueness' argument usually rests on one or both of two theories, either that there has been a delegation of legislative authority with standards for its exercise which are not sufficient to bar arbitrary or discriminatory administrative action or that the statute is so unclear in what it permits or forbids that a person cannot reasonably know what the law expects of him. Neither of these theories is applicable in its normal form to the facts of this case. There is no statutory delegation to an administrative agency. Nor does not asserted vagueness involve the question whether the petitioner's conduct was criminal under some allegedly obscure statutory description of a crime. See Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1950); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967); COMMONWEALTH V. BRASHER, MASS., 270 N.E.2D 389.^D Here we are concerned with a judicial function relating to the procedure to be selected under which an alleged violation of law will be processed.

The petitioner argues in effect that in the standard of the 'public interest' there is 'so much free play that in the practical course of its operation . . . (the statute) is likely to function erratically--responsive to whim or discrimination.' 109 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 67, 90 (1960). We believe, however, that the general standard expressed in G.L. c. 119, § 61, is...