345 A.2d 504 (Me. 1975), Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson

JudgeBefore DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, and DELAHANTY, JJ.
CourtMaine Supreme Court
Docket Number.
Citation345 A.2d 504
PartiesUNION MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. v. Joseph W. EMERSON et al. and International Union of Elevator Constructors et al.
Date08 October 1975

Page 504

345 A.2d 504 (Me. 1975)

UNION MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

v.

Joseph W. EMERSON et al. and International Union of Elevator

Constructors et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

October 8, 1975

Page 505

Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson by Gregory A. Tselikis, Summer T. Bernstein, Portland, for plaintiffs.

Charles R. Larouche, S. Kirk Studstrup, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for defendants.

Ranger, McTeague & Higbee, P.A. by Patrick N. McTeague, Brunswick, for intervenors.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, and DELAHANTY, JJ.

ARCHIBALD, Justice.

This case is before us on report pursuant to Rule 72(b), M.R.C.P.

Union Mutual Life Insurance Company (Union Mutual) sought a decision from the Board of Elevator Rules and Regulations 1 (the Board) that its home office building is an 'industrial plant' and, therefore, not required to have its elevators serviced by a licensed elevator mechanic as is mandated by 26 M.R.S.A. § 439. 2

Bradley G. Westcott is a party plaintiff and an employee of Union Mutual. Since at the time he did not have requisite experience while employed by an elevator company, he was denied the opportunity to take an examination which would qualify him for an elevator mechanic's license under the provisions of 26 M.R.S.A. § 440. 3

The defendants are the supervising elevator inspector and the director and former director of the Bureau of Labor and Industry. The Internation Union of Elevator Constructors and certain members of the Union moved to intervene in the action and were allowed to do so in accordance with Rule 24(b), M.R.C.P.

In an administrative hearing the Board determined that Union Mutual's home office building was not an industrial plant and also that Mr. Westcott was ineligible to take the requested examination. Union Mutual and Westcott then appealed to the

Page 506

Superior Court pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 403, seeking a reversal of the foregoing orders and a declaration that both sections 439 and 440 were invalid. By agreement of the parties the case was then reported to the Law Court.

The issue raised by Mr. Westcott may be rather summarily disposed of. During the pendency of this litigation, 26 M.R.S.A. § 440 was amended, effective October 1, 1975. 4 Under the amended act an applicant may qualify for the examination if in addition to the qualifications previously existing he 'has had equivalent experience as defined by regulations of the board.' As far as the record now discloses Mr. Westcott is presently eligible to take the examination. Since his challenge to the statute was premised on the invalidity of the provision requiring two years experience while employed by an elevator company, the issue thus raised is no longer viable.

In Berry v. Daigle, 322 A.2d 320, 328 (Me.1974), we held:

'(A) statute passed during the course of litigation, and which obviates the gravamen of the complaint, moots and renders unnecessary a determination of the former controversy.'

See also Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co., Inc. v. Lewiston-Auburn S.P.A., 320 A.2d 247 (Me.1974); Good Will Home Association v. Erwin, 285 A.2d 374 (Me.1971); Cumberland Farms v. Maine Milk Comm., 160 Me. 389, 205 A.2d 158 (Me.1964).

The following questions remain:

(A) Is the Union Mutual office building an industrial plant as that term is used in 26 M.R.S.A. § 439?

(B) If the office building is not an industrial plant as defined in Section 439, does the act violate Union Mutual's right to equal protection under either the United States or the Maine Constitutions?

FACTS

Union Mutual occupies certain premises in Portland as its home office, out of which it conducts an insurance business which is national in scope. The building is three stories in height, has a floor area of approximately 230,000 square feet and is served by one freight and four passenger elevators.

Approximately nine hundred people are employed in the building. Additionally, substantial numbers of business invitees visit the premises on a daily basis. The elevators are in nearly constant use.

Within this structure is also a printing facility operated by Union Mutual which handles the total printing demands of the company. The mail room employs eight persons. Dining facilities are available, staffed by twenty people who serve an average of slightly less than seven hundred customers daily. Also included within the complex is a data processing service which has the second largest computer installation in Maine. Several concerns other than Union Mutual avail themselves of the computer service.

In order to maintain the structure Union Mutual employs a 'plant engineer' 5 who heads a staff of forty-one persons and is responsible for all the necessary in-house maintenance and much of the work involved in the servicing and repair of numerous types of equipment, electrical and otherwise.

These essential facts appeared in testimony and by stipulation in a hearing before the Board. The Board reached the conclusion that

'Union Mutual Life Insurance Company is not an industrial plant within the meaning of Section 439. . . .'

Page 507

A

Was it error by the Board to conclude in light of all of the facts that the building occupied by Union Mutual was not an 'industrial plant'?

It is argued that the Legislature envisioned an industrial plant in the context of Section 439 as one that not only is highly capitalized, has a large labor force, is departmentalized, produces some kind of a product, occupies a building or buildings exclusively for business purposes but also has on its staff skilled personnel competent to maintain the plant with safety for those who occupy it.

We do not agree with the scope of this definition. If the argument advanced were to be adopted, it would seem that any general office building could in theory qualify as an industrial plant.

An elementary rule of statutory construction is that words must be given their...

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