De Lonjay v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. et al.
| Decision Date | 03 March 1931 |
| Docket Number | No. 21381.,21381. |
| Citation | 35 S.W.2d 911 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | GEORGE DE LONJAY, RESPONDENT, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY AND GRONE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, DEFENDANTS, GRONE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, APPELLANT. |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. — Hon. Granville Hogan, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Holland, Lashly & Donnell and Harold C. Ackert for appellant.
(1) (a) It is fundamental that before any compensation may be awarded for an injury under the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act both the employee claiming same and the employer from whom such compensation is claimed must have elected to accept the Act. Workmen's Compensation Act, section 3. (b) By the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act itself, an employee of a minor subcontractor is not presumed to have accepted the Act, and there was no testimony in this case tending to show that he was in fact under the Act, or that he had elected to accept the Act. Workmen's Compensation Act, section 5, Fifth. (Making inapplicable provision of Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 2) (c) From the entire Act it is clear that said Act is only intended to apply to employers who have more than ten employees, and to employees who work for employers employing more than ten men. As the testimony in this case conclusively showed that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, Marshall & Sons, who regularly employed less than ten men, therefore the Act was not applicable to the plaintiff in this case. Workmen's Compensation Act, section 5, Fifth; Workmen's Compensation Act, section 4; Industrial Commission v. Everett, as Next Friend, etc., et al., 108 Ohio St. 369. (d) Sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act dealing with acceptance and rejection of the Act, and defining who shall come within its provisions, and the manner in which the Act may become operative as to a particular person are not subject to the rule of liberal construction as provided in section 76 of said Act, but, on the contrary, are subject to the rule of strict construction. Spann v. Jackson, Walker Coal & Mining Co., 16 S.W. (2d) 190. (2) (a) The provisions of Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, section 10C, as limited by section 10D, limit the liability of a general contractor to cases where the immediate employer and his employee are subject to the provisions of the Act. Workmen's Compensation Act, sections 10C and 10D; Workmen's Compensation Act, sections 4 and 5; The Industrial Commission v. Everett as next Friend, etc., et al., 108 Ohio St. 369. (b) The legislative intent as to the meaning of any particular section must be determined from a reading and construction of the whole act, considering its intent and purpose; and different sections should be harmonized and reconciled even though in apparent conflict. Betz v. Columbia Tel. Co., 24 S.W. (2d) 224; State v. Freeland, 318 Mo. 560, 300 S.W. 675; Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 11 S.W. (2d) 1045, 62 A.L.R. 762; State ex rel. Thompson v. Dirckx, 11 S.W. (2d) 38; 25 R.C.L., p. 1006 et seq.
Bartley & Mayfield for respondent.
The action of the court in affirming the award of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission was proper. Laws of 1927, page 497, section 10, sub-sections (c) and (d); Bradbury on Workmen's Compensation (2 Ed.), pages 527, 528. (a) Doubt, if any, respecting the right to compensation, is to be resolved in favor of the employee. Betz v. Columbia Telephone Co., 24 S.W. (2d) 224, l.c. 288. (b) The language of the statute itself being plain and unambiguous, additional words should not be read into it. Span v. Jackson-Walker Coal & Mining Co., 16 S.W. (2d) 190, l.c. 196, point 4.
This is an action under the Workmen's Compensation Act. There is no dispute about the facts. The Grone Construction Company was a general contractor, and as such contractor, it had a contract for the alteration and repair of a building located on Easton Avenue, in St. Louis. It subcontracted the roofing work to Henry A. Marshal. The claimant was accidentally injured while in the employ of said Marshal as subcontractor. The Grone Construction Company was a major employer and within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Marshal was a minor employer and not within the act. The claimant was not employed by the Grone Construction Company. The Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company is the insurer of the employees of the Grone Construction Company. The Compensation Commission awarded the claimant compensation for permanent partial disability for 29.8 weeks, at $20 per week, and for medical expenses $110, against both the Grone Construction Company and the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company. Both companies appeal to the circuit court. In the circuit court the award of the commission was in all respects affirmed. From the judgment of the circuit court affirming the award, the Grone Construction Company has appealed to this court.
Appellant insists here that the court erred in affirming the award of the commission, on the ground that the claimant was employed by a minor employer who had not accepted, and was not subject to, the provisions of the Compensation Act, and the act provides no liability on the part of a general contractor for the payment of compensation to an employee of such a minor employer. This insistence involves the construction of the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) of section 3308 of the Compensation Act, Revised Statues 1929, which are as follows:
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