Metal Products Workers Union, Local 1645 v. Torrington Co.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1966
• Docket Number: No. 281,Docket 29865.,281
• Citation: 358 F.2d 103
• Parties: METAL PRODUCTS WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The TORRINGTON COMPANY, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

358 F.2d 103 (1966)

METAL PRODUCTS WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The TORRINGTON COMPANY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 281, Docket 29865.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued January 27, 1966.

Decided April 4, 1966.

Jerome S. Rubenstein, New York City (Rubenstein & Rubenstein, New York City, on the brief), for appellant.

Jay S. Siegel, Hartford, Conn. (William J. Larkin, 2d, Waterbury, Conn., and C. E. Harwood, Torrington, Conn., on the brief), for appellee.

Before FRIENDLY and HAYS, Circuit Judges, and BLUMENFELD, District Judge.^*

HAYS, Circuit Judge.

The petitioner-appellant, Metal Products Workers Union, moved under § 10 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10, and § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), for an order vacating an arbitration award. The district court granted a motion by the appellee, The Torrington Company, for summary judgment. We affirm.

The present controversy arises out of a sixteen week strike at The Torrington Company's plant. On January 18, 1964, the Union and Company entered into a collective bargaining agreement and terminated the strike. At that time there were approximateily 2000 employees on strike. One of the problems facing the parties, in their task of restoring the plant to its normal operation, was the establishment of an order of recall for employees.

There was a sharp disagreement between the parties as to the existence and, if it existed, the character of an understanding of the subject of recall.

The Union claims that the Company accepted its proposal that the procedures provided by the new collective bargaining agreement for recall from lay-off be applied to the return of strikers, or its alternative proposal that the Company permit all strikers to return to work and then lay off the unneeded employees in accordance with the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The Company claims that it rejected both of these proposals. The Company maintains that the Union agreed that the Company was to be left free to recall workers in accordance with production requirements.¹ The Union denies that there was such an agreement.

On January 20, 1964, the Union filed a grievance alleging that the Company violated the new agreement by failing to recall, in accordance with the seniority provisions of that agreement, Michael Chiarito, an employee who had been on strike. The parties followed the contractual procedure for the adjustment of grievances, but failed to resolve the controversy in the course of that procedure.

The Union demanded arbitration. The Company asserted that it was under no duty to arbitrate controversies over the recall of strikers.

The issue to be resolved between the parties was therefore one of arbitrability. The Union claimed that, in connection with the agreement to follow the provisions of the new contract in recalling strikers, the Company also impliedly agreed to submit to the provisions of that agreement with respect to arbitration.² The Company denied that there was any agreement to submit questions arising out of the recall of strikers to arbitration.

The first question the parties faced was the question of what tribunal was to resolve the issue of arbitrability. Ordinarily arbitrability is to be decided by the courts. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union, 347 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 940, 86 S.Ct. 394, 15 L.Ed.2d 351 (1965). However, "the parties may voluntarily submit arbitrability to an arbitrator." Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union, supra at 95. The only limitation is that there must be "a clear demonstration" of the purpose to have an arbitrator decide arbitrability. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., supra, 363 U.S. at 583 n. 7, 80 S.Ct. 1347.

In the present case the parties decided that arbitrability should be determined by an arbitrator. They clearly demonstrated that purpose by entering into an agreement on the appointment of an arbitrator and on the following submission:

"The Arbitrator is to rule on the issue of `Arbitrability\'. If the Arbitrator should Rule that the matter is not arbitrable, then the Ruling will be issued as a final Award. If the Arbitrator shall Rule that the matter is arbitrable, then his Ruling will be a Preliminary Ruling and further hearing shall be scheduled on the merits." (Emphasis added.)

The arbitrator chosen by the parties proceeded to hear the dispute. After consideration of the rival contentions he issued his findings and award. His award reads:

"Under the facts of this case there is no Contract clause to interpret or apply and, therefore, the matter is not arbitrable."

No objection is raised to the procedure of the arbitration nor to the conduct of the arbitrator. The arbitrator's findings indicate that he fully reviewed the arguments of the parties and the evidence, including the history of negotiations.³

We find no ground for reversing the decision of the arbitrator. The parties voluntarily and by express agreement submitted to him the very issue which he has decided, the issue of arbitrability. The Union is unhappy with the award because the arbitrator failed to find in its favor. It wants an opportunity to present its case again to another tribunal. We can perceive no reason for giving it this second opportunity, since there is no basis for finding error either in the arbitrator's conclusions or in the procedure by which he reached those conclusions.

The Union argues that "the policy of the national labor laws requires that grievances like the one involved in the present litigation be subject to arbitration upon the merits."

"When public policy is sought to be interposed as a bar to enforcement of or as a reason to vacate an arbitration award, a court must evaluate its asserted content." Local 453, International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, etc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949, 83 S.Ct. 1680, 10 L.Ed.2d 705 (1963). There is no policy which favors forcing a party to arbitrate when he has not agreed to do so.

"A party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1409 (1960).

"Just as an employer has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it has not agreed to arbitrate, so a fortiori, it cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitration clause does not bind it at all." John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547, 84 S.Ct. 909, 913, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964).

See Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union, supra; Proctor & Gamble Independent Union of Port Ivory, N. Y. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830, 83 S.Ct. 1872, 10 L.Ed. 2d 1053 (1963).

The Union also argues that the existence of a "genuine issue as to material fact should preclude the grant of summary judgment to the Company." Taken in its best light, the Union's claim is that there...