Torrington Company v. METAL PRODUCTS WKRS. U., LOCAL 1645

• Decision Date: 24 June 1965
• Docket Number: Docket 29581.,No. 467,467
• Citation: 347 F.2d 93
• Parties: The TORRINGTON COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METAL PRODUCTS WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO, and International Union UAW-AFL-CIO, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

347 F.2d 93 (1965)

The TORRINGTON COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METAL PRODUCTS WORKERS UNION LOCAL 1645, UAW-AFL-CIO, and International Union UAW-AFL-CIO, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 467, Docket 29581.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued May 4, 1965.

Decided June 24, 1965.

Jay S. Siegel, Hartford, Conn. (William J. Larkin, 2d, Waterbury, Conn., and C. E. Harwood, Torrington, Conn., on the brief), for appellant.

Jerome S. Rubenstein, Rubenstein & Rubenstein, New York City (Richard E. Miller, New York City, of counsel), for appellees.

Before MOORE, SMITH and HAYS, Circuit Judges.

HAYS, Circuit Judge.

In this action plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that three grievances on which defendants demanded arbitration were not arbitrable. The district court granted a motion by the defendants for summary judgment and for an order compelling arbitration of the grievances. 237 F.Supp. 139 (D.Conn.1965). In its order the district court "found" (but did not "order") that "all the disputes between the parties, including the existence, scope and effect of an * * * alleged independent oral agreement between them should be resolved in arbitration rather than by this Court." Since arbitration with respect to the oral agreement was not sought by either party and since both parties appeal from that part of the order which grants this relief, we will disregard the "finding" as mere surplusage.

The plaintiff appeals from all parts of the district court's order. The defendants cross-appeal, not only from the "finding" which we have decided to disregard, but also from the denial of defendants' motions to strike certain parts of the plaintiff's affidavits and from the failure "to declare, that under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, any grievance that is not explicitly excluded from arbitration by a written provision of the agreement is subject to arbitration on the merits."

We reverse the order granting summary judgment for the defendants and compelling arbitration of the defendants' grievances. We dismiss the defendants' cross-appeal on the ground that the points raised are not appealable.

The present controversy arises out of a sixteen week strike at the plaintiff's plant. On January 18, 1964, the plaintiff, (Company) and the defendant Local Union (Union) entered into a collective bargaining agreement and terminated the strike. At that time there were approximately 2000 employees of the Company on strike. One of the problems facing the parties in their task of restoring the plant to its normal operations was the order of recall of employees. According to the Company's affidavits the Union proposed that the procedures provided by the new collective bargaining agreement for recall from layoff be applied to the return of the strikers. The Company rejected this proposal. The Company says that the Union then proposed that the Company permit all strikers to return to work and then lay off the unneeded employees in accordance with the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The Company also rejected this proposal. The Company maintains that it and the Union thereupon agreed that the Company was to recall strikers in accordance with production requirements and without regard to any of the provisions of the new collective bargaining agreement. This agreement, says the Company, contained no provision for the arbitration of disputes arising under it. The Union denies that any such special agreement for the return of strikers was ever entered into.

At various times within a few weeks after the end of the strike, the Union filed three grievances. Each of the grievances had to do with the recall of a striking employee. The parties followed the contractual procedure for the adjustment of grievances but failed to adjust these controversies in the course of that procedure. The Union then demanded arbitration. The Company declined to arbitrate, claiming that it was under no duty to arbitrate controversies over recall of strikers. The Union's position is that the arbitration provisions of the collective agreement are applicable.

The relevant parts of the collective bargaining agreement are:

"ARTICLE IV

Grievance Procedure

Section 1.

Any dispute or question in regard to wages, hours, and working conditions, or in regard to the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this agreement, shall be subject to the following grievance procedure: * * *

ARTICLE V

Arbitration

Section 1.

If a grievance is not settled after it has been processed through the three (3) steps described in Article IV above, and if it is a grievance with respect to the interpretation or application of any provisions in this contract and is not controlled by Section 1 of Article XIV, (Management) it may be submitted to arbitration in the manner herein provided.

* * * * *"

It is obvious that on their face the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement do not purport to provide for arbitration of controversies arising out of recall of strikers. Such controversies may be subject to the grievance procedure, for that provides for using the grievance procedure for any dispute or question in regard to wages, hours, and working conditions. But the arbitration procedure is much more circumscribed. Only if a grievance is not settled in the grievance procedure "and if it is a grievance with respect to the interpretation or application of any provisions in this contract" (emphasis supplied) is it subject to arbitration.

Controversies concerning recall to work after a strike are not prima facie,...