State v. Anonymous (1976-7)

• Decision Date: 20 February 1976
• Citation: 33 Conn.Supp. 55,364 A.2d 244
• Court: Connecticut Court of Common Pleas
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. ANONYMOUS et al. (1976-7). * . QUINN, Judge. A motion to dismiss has been filed in each of thirty-three arrests made by several police departments for various violations of General Statutes § 53-300 and related statutes collectively known as the 'Sunday Blue Laws.' The motion to dismiss for each and every one of the alleged offenses is based on three grounds: (1) discriminatory enforcement and selective prosecution of § 53-300 violate the due process and equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions; (2) the system of classifications under § 53-300 is so irrational as to comprise a regulatory scheme which arbitrarily discriminates against persons and entities similarly situated; (3) section 53-300 is unconstitutional because it is vague and unenforceable. For purposes of this memorandum and in an attempt to avoid confusion, the decision of this court on the motion to dismiss as filed in the first arrest case shall be dispositive of all of the remaining cases involving those violations. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss in which the defense questioned various police officers, the accused, and representatives from the office of the chief state prosecutor. In addition to witnesses heard by the court, the prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel have stipulated for the record as to the testimony of a number of other parties in this action. This court is not unimindful of the significance of the legal questions involved in reaching its determination, and at this point wishes to thank both the state's attorney and counsel for the accused for the complete and cooperative effort put forth in enabling the court to reach its decision. Although historically the Connecticut Sunday Blue Laws originated in the tradition of setting aside a Sabbath day for religious worship, today the legal significance of the Blue Laws is based on the constitutionally permissible purpose of identifying a co

Page 244

364 A.2d 244

33 Conn.Supp. 55

STATE of Connecticut v. ANONYMOUS et al. (1976-7). ^*

Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut.

QUINN, Judge.

A motion to dismiss has been filed in each of thirty-three arrests made by several police departments for various violations of General Statutes § 53-300 and related statutes collectively known as the 'Sunday Blue Laws.' The motion to dismiss for each and every one of the alleged offenses is based on three grounds: (1) discriminatory enforcement and selective prosecution of § 53-300 violate the due process and equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions; (2) the system of classifications under § 53-300 is so irrational as to comprise a regulatory scheme which arbitrarily discriminates against persons and entities similarly situated; (3) section 53-300 is unconstitutional because it is vague and unenforceable. For purposes of this memorandum and in an attempt to avoid confusion, the decision of this court on the motion to dismiss as filed in the first arrest case shall be dispositive of all of the remaining cases involving those violations.

The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss in which the defense questioned various police officers, the accused and representatives from the office of the chief state prosecutor. In addition to witnesses heard by the court, the prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel have stipulated for the record as to the testimony of a number of other parties in this action. This court is not unimindful of the significance of the legal questions involved in reaching its determination, and at this point wishes to thank both the state's attorney and counsel for the accused for the complete and cooperative effort put forth in enabling the court to reach its decision.

Although historically the Connecticut Sunday Blue Laws originated in the tradition of setting aside a Sabbath day for religious worship, today the legal significance of the Blue Laws is based on the constitutionally permissible purpose of identifying a common day for general rest and recreation. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393. As was stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Shuster, 145 Conn. 554, 557, 145 A.2d 196, 197: '(T)he primary purpose of the legislation is not to enforce an institute of religion. . . . Although such statutes as this may be said to have had a religious origin, they are upheld as a valid exercise of the police power in recognition of the fact 'that the first day of the week by general consent is set apart 'for rest' . . .. Such legislation is being increasingly regarded as day-of-rest legislation rather than as Sabbath or Sunday closing laws.' . . . (O)ne of the purposes of the statute was to encourage the use of the day for rest and recreation.' This court does not feel that any further discussion of the history or rationale for Sunday Blue Laws need be pursued.

The court now addresses itself to the first ground of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the issue of discriminatory enforcement and selective prosecution. At the hearing and on the stipulated evidence, the question of selective prosecution and discriminatory enforcement was raised by the defense in its claim that police officers will not make on-sight arrests for violation of the Blue Laws but will make arrests only as the result of specific complaints. In the instant cases, the court is fully cognizant of the fact that those arrest were made as a result of direct complaints by competitors and not as the result of individual police action. The evidence shows that competitors and employees of competitors made purchases from the accused in alleged violation of the Sunday Blue Laws and then made direct complaints to police departments as a result of those purchases. In none of those matters were defendants arrested by police because of on-sight violations or because of complaints from individuals totally unrelated to the defendants' line of business. Those arrests and subsequent prosecutions offend the equal protection clause of both the state and federal constitutions.

The defense further claims that the state of Connecticut has intentionally adopted a policy of selective enforcement of the Sunday Blue Laws. A memorandum from the office of the chief state's attorney specifically notes that '(p)olice will act only upon complaints for each arrest. They will NOT station themselves inside of the store to insure compliance of this statute except where there has been a refusal to close the offending section.' To buttress its claim of selective enforcement, the defense elicited testimony from one officer who stated that while on patrol he personally made purchases which he knew to be in violation of § 53-300 yet made no arrests of sales personnel. (Although the testimony of that officer is not available in official transcript form at this time, this is the best recollection of the court and of the attorneys as to the content of his remarks.)

The defense also introduced as evidence leases from the state of Connecticut to a restaurant and a gift shop at Bradley International Airport. Those leases require the lessees to remain open seven days a week and require compliance with all the laws of the state of Connecticut. Evidence was produced which clearly show that the restaurant and the gift shop consistently violate § 53-300 by the sale of prohibited articles on Sunday. That was acknowledged in the testimony of the proprietor of the gift shop. This in effect makes the state of Connecticut a recipient of the proceeds of illegal sales, based both on the lease arrangements and on the collection of sales tax.

In addition, the person in charge of renting the state armories testified that it would be impossible to rent the armories if § 53-300 were strictly enforced against concessionaires doing business on Sunday in those armories.

The defense further showed discretionary enforcement and selective prosecution of these laws by referring to sales at the Hartford Civic Center on Sunday. Again, the state tax department is moving against Sunday flea markets, not on the basis of violation of the Sunday Blue Laws, but on the basis of nonpayment of the sales tax as a result of the illegal transactions. The defense further introduced evidence concerning the sale of Connecticut state lottery tickets on Sunday in alleged violation of § 53-300. It is apparent on the face of this detailed record that the standard used for enforcement of the Sunday Blue Laws through the office of the chief state's attorney and other agencies of the state of Connecticut is applied in an inconsistent, prejudicial and discriminatory manner.

To permit the state of Connecticut through its official agencies to condone violations of the Sunday Blue Laws by permitting illegal sales without prosecution is certainly discriminatory in its effect. This court cannot understand any situation where the state of Connecticut may prosecute an individual proprietor on the complaint of a competitor and still permit the sale of goods in violation of statute in its own facilities leased to private concerns.

Discriminatory enforcement of penal statutes has been a subject of concern for other courts as well. The New York Court of Appeals last year found selective prosecution solely at the behest of private interest groups to be impermissible discrimination under the fourteenth amendment. 'The principal issue . . . is whether, with a history of disuse and absent a policy of general enforcement, prosecution at the instance of an interest group for its private purposes constitutes discrimination violative of the equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. We think so and, accordingly, would reverse (the appellants' convictions) on that ground alone.' People v. Acme Markets, Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 326, 328, 372 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591, 334 N.E.2d 555, 556. Even more recently, the New York Appellate Division dealt with the issue of selective enforcement in Playtogs Factory Outlet, Inc. v. County of Orange, App.Div., 379 N.Y.S.2d 859, and stated that: '(N)either the agencies enforcing our criminal laws nor the courts should allow themselves to be thus used as cat's- paws by those who seek to utilize the Sunday closing laws for their selfish competitive advantage. When prosecutors follow a policy with respect to enforcement of the Sunday closing laws of initiating criminal prosecutions for violations only on the complaints of private individuals, they become the tools of the private interest of the complainants and thus prostitute the State's law enforcement power to the service of selfish private goals.'

Federal courts also appear to substantiate the position of state jurists as quoted above. This court first notes the case of United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir.) in which it was held that evidence of selective enforcement shifts the burden of proof to the prosecution to show lack of discrimination. 'The presumption is always that a prosecution for violation of a criminal law is undertaken in good faith and in nondiscriminatory fashion for the purpose of fulfilling a duty to bring violators to justice. However, when a defendant alleges intentional purposeful discrimination and presents facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's purpose, we think a different question is raised.' Furthermore, in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557, 85 S.Ct. 453, 466, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, the United States Supreme Court held that '(i)t is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to . . . engage in invidious discrimination amount persons or groups . . . as in this case . . . by selective enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.'

Based on the record before it, this court has arrived at the conclusion that prosecution in the...