State v. Shuster

• Decision Date: 08 July 1958
• Citation: 145 A.2d 196,145 Conn. 554
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Van Cleve SHUSTER. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 196

145 A.2d 196

145 Conn. 554

STATE of Connecticut v. Van Cleve SHUSTER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 8, 1958.

Curtiss K. Thompson, New Haven, with whom were H. Donald Harris, New Haven and, on the brief, Joseph J. Mager, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

George R. Tiernan, Pros. Atty., New Haven, for appellee (state).

Before DALY, C. J., and BALDWIN, KING, MURPHY and MELLITZ, JJ.

MELLITZ, Associate Justice.

The defendant was convicted, after a trial to the jury, of selling merchandise on Sunday in violation of § 3302d of the 1955 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes. He has appealed from the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The defendant owns and operates, in Milford, a retail store known as Van Cleve's China and Glass Store. The inventory carried in his store consists of a large variety of china, glassware, tableware, lamps, candles and household furnishings. The great majority of the items are reproductions of antiques. The prosecution was based upon the sale by the defendant of two candles described as snowball candles. They were not antiques or reproductions of antiques. Section 3302d (now Public Acts 1957, No. 614, § 2) prohibits secular business or labor, except works of necessity or mercy, on Sunday, as well as the sale or exposing for sale of any goods, wares or merchandise. Exempted from the operation of the statute is the sale of a number of articles, among which are antiques. The specific claim of the defendant is that because the statute allows the sale of antiques on Sunday but purports to bar the sale of candles it is unconstitutional as a denial to the defendant of the equal protection of the laws in contravention of article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut and § 1, of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.

The constitutionality of the statute as it stood prior to certain amendments enacted in 1955 was considered and upheld in State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 123 A.2d 767. The prosecution in that case was based on a violation which occurred prior to the effective date of the 1955 amendments. Among those amendments was the addition of antiques to the list of articles exempted from the operation of the statute. The claim of the defendant is that he and dealers in antiques are alike in the business of selling household furnishings, the only necessary difference between their merchandise being a matter of age, and that the classification in the statute is unreasonable and renders the statute, in its present form, discriminatory and unconstitutional.

In essence, the claims made by the defendant are the same as those which were presented and disposed of in the Hurliman case, supra. It was there held (143 Conn. at page 505, 123 A.2d at page 768) that the equal protection clauses in article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution and § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution were not violated by reason of the fact that the statute permitted the sale of certain specified articles while prohibiting the sale of all others, so long as the statute accorded the same rights to all who engaged in the same business. None of the defendant's competitors are granted privileges not accorded to him. All are treated alike. Anyone may sell any of the exempted articles. The defendant can be adversely affected only if his competitors are granted privileges he does not have. The statute is uniform in its operation and does not, in this respect, violate constitutional requirements. State v. Hurliman, supra, 143 Conn. 508, 123 A.2d 769; Gundaker Central Motors, Inc., v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 80, 127 A.2d 566; State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash.2d 603, 607, 206 P.2d 1022; State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 858, 219 N.W. 831.

The defendant claims that the classification excluding the sale of antiques from the bar of the statute is unreasonable. He argues that there is no substantial difference between the merchandise of an antique dealer and modern household furnishings, whether or not they are reproductions of antiques, which is germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation and could conceivably constitute a valid reason for permitting the sale of an antique on Sunday while prohibiting the sale of its modern counterpart. If, he says, the sale of any household furnishings is to be allowed on Sunday, the sale of all should be. In the Hurliman case, supra, 143 Conn. 507, 123 A.2d 769, a similar claim was considered in relation to the distinctions made by the statute in permitting the sale of certain foods while prohibiting the sale of others.

In considering the validity of a classification by the legislature of articles it may from time to time see fit to exempt from the bar of the statute, we must bear in mind that the primary purpose of the legislation is not to enforce an institute of religion. Wetherell v. Hollister, 73 Conn. 622, 625, 48 A. 826. Although such statutes as this may be said to have had a religious origin, they are upheld as a valid exercise of the police power in recognition of the fact 'that the first day of the week by general consent is set apart 'for rest', in accord with the general experience of mankind that it is wise and necessary to set apart such a day at stated intervals for both the physical and moral welfare of the members of a State or community.' People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 79, 96 N.E.2d 184, 186, asppeal dismissed 341 U.S. 907, 71 S.Ct. 623, 95 L.Ed. 1345; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710, 5 S.Ct. 730, 28 L.Ed. 1145; Hennington v. State of Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 304, 318, 16 S.Ct. 1086, 41 L.Ed. 166; Petit v. State of Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 165, 20 S.Ct. 666, 44 L.Ed. 716. Such legislation is being increasingly regarded as day-of-rest legislation rather than as Sabbath or Sunday closing laws. State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash.2d 603, 606, 206 P.2d 1022. The Hurliman opinion, supra, 143 Conn. 507, 123 A.2d 769, pointed out that one of the purposes of the statute was to encourage the use of the day for rest and recreation. Rest does...