Jackson v. Giurbino

• Decision Date: 26 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-57117.,02-57117.
• Parties: Frederick L. JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. George J. GIURBINO,<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> Warden; California State Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

364 F.3d 1002

Frederick L. JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. George J. GIURBINO,^* Warden; California State Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 02-57117.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 4, 2003.

Filed March 26, 2004.

Laurack D. Bray, Ventura, CA, for the appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Deputy Attorney General, and Michelle J. Pirozzi, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; William D. Keller, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-99-06984-WDK/RZ.

Before BRIGHT,^** O'SCANNLAIN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge BRIGHT; Dissent by Judge O'SCANNLAIN

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted California state prisoner Frederick L. Jackson of rape and first-degree murder with special circumstances following his trial in state superior court. Because Jackson did not personally commit the homicide in this case, his conviction depended on application of California's felony-murder doctrine. Jackson appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Jackson made many allegations of error in the state court proceedings. First, Jackson claims that the state court unreasonably admitted evidence in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ("Miranda"). Second, he argues that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to hear unredacted excerpts of an audiotape alluding to Jackson's criminal history. Third, Jackson alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the state proceedings. Fourth, Jackson alleges prosecutorial misconduct in that the prosecutor commented on Jackson's silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) ("Doyle"), and referred to him as an "animal." Finally, Jackson claims that the sum of the alleged violations amounts to cumulative error.

We do not grant relief on the basis of Doyle error because Jackson did not object at trial to the prosecutor's remarks. However, we agree with Jackson's claim of prejudicial Miranda error. Therefore, we grant his petition for the writ of habeas corpus and vacate his felony-murder conviction. After a careful review of the record, we find Jackson's other claims without merit, and dismiss them without further discussion. We leave Jackson's conviction on the rape charge undisturbed and permit the state court to revoke its suspension of his sentence for that crime.

I. Background Facts

Early Sunday morning on January 26, 1992, two fishermen found the dead body of Genoveva Gonzales in a muddy ditch near the beach in Oxnard, California. The body was uncovered below the waist. Beneath an unbuttoned denim jacket and open yellow blouse, witnesses could see Gonzales' bra pulled up over her breasts. Two bullet holes marked Gonzales' face.

Later investigation showed that Gonzales had died late Saturday night or very early Sunday morning from three¹ gunshot wounds to the head, all at point-blank range. Gonzales had a large bruise on the back of her head, which forensic doctors testified likely reflected a blow strong enough to knock her unconscious. The lack of mud on Gonzales's legs or feet led the police to believe she had been carried into the ditch.

By tracing the bullets to a gun, and the gun to its chain of owners, police identified three suspects: Bobby Rollins, Christopher Sattiewhite, and Jackson. Sattiewhite had borrowed the gun, and later bragged to friends about using it to kill a woman on the Saturday night in question. Rollins, a gang member and leading local drug dealer, made a deal to give evidence for the prosecution in exchange for major reductions in sentences he would receive for unrelated rape and armed robbery convictions.

Rollins testified that he had been present as a completely passive observer at all of the relevant events on the Saturday night of Gonzales's murder. He testified that he had seen Jackson in the back seat of a car with a woman, later identified as the victim, Genoveva Gonzales, earlier that evening. He saw Jackson "continuously" beat her with his fists, and that she spat at him and yelled at him in Spanish. Rollins also testified that he saw Jackson having sex with the woman in the back seat of the car in the parking lot of an apartment complex in the early evening. Rollins told the jury that he later happened to drive up to the road by the beach just in time to see Jackson pushing the woman out of the car into the arms of Sattiewhite, who carried her into the ditch and then shot her three times. Rollins described Jackson, Sattiewhite, and himself discussing the night's events with Lydia Sattiewhite (Rollins' girlfriend and Christopher Sattiewhite's sister) the next morning at breakfast. Rollins also testified to having later told Anna Lanier (the owner of the car Sattiewhite drove) that a crime had happened in the car.

Rollins' testimony formed the very heart of the State's case against Jackson. Other evidence offered by the State at trial included expert medical testimony indicating that Gonzales had suffered rape within twenty-four hours of her murder. The sperm found inside Gonzales matched Jackson's DNA, which tended to prove that he had had intercourse with Gonzales within three days of her death. Further evidence of rape included scratches on Gonzales' abdomen and bruises around her vagina.

However, neither the medical evidence nor testimony from any witnesses other than Rollins tended to prove that Jackson's rape of Gonzales occurred as part of a single transaction including her murder. Only Rollins testified that he saw Jackson having sex with Gonzales and that Jackson and Sattiewhite were with the victim on the road by the beach.

II. Procedural Posture

The State charged Jackson with first-degree murder, rape, and kidnaping. The jury convicted Jackson of first-degree murder, with the special circumstance of rape, on April 19, 1995. The jury also convicted Jackson of the rape charge and acquitted him of kidnaping. Because the special circumstance charge made the felony-murder a capital offense, the jury proceeded to a separate penalty phase and rejected the death penalty, returning a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Jackson appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which denied his claims. The California Supreme Court denied Jackson's petition for review on direct appeal on June 11, 1997. Jackson filed a federal petition for habeas corpus, which the district court dismissed as containing mixed exhausted and unexhausted issues. Jackson returned to the California Supreme Court to seek collateral relief on his unexhausted issues, and again that court denied Jackson's petition.

Jackson then brought a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of California on July 7, 1999. That petition was rejected as time-barred, but we reversed and remanded for consideration on the merits in an unpublished disposition. Jackson v. Galaza, 36 Fed. Appx. 887, 888 (9th Cir.2002). Then, Jackson's case was heard by a United States Magistrate Judge, who issued a report and recommendation denying Jackson's petition, which the district court adopted on October 22, 2002. Jackson properly obtained a certificate of appealability and timely appealed to this court. We now have jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and § 1291.

III. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court's denial of Jackson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.2002). By statute, we may not grant Jackson habeas relief from his state-court conviction unless the state court proceedings were "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[,]" or if the state court's conclusions were "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Killian, 282 F.3d at 1207. A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law when "the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (O'Connor, J., writing for the Court). Furthermore, "a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). The relevant law must have been clearly established by the time Jackson's conviction became final in the state courts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Stevens, J.).

IV. Doyle Violation Issues

We now consider Jackson's claim that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on his choice to remain silent in the face of police interrogation. Under the rule announced in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), allowing an "arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial" is "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process...."

In her closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor commented twice on Jackson's invocation of his right to remain silent. In the first instance, the prosecutor...