Lee v. George

• Decision Date: 21 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011–SC–000265–MR.,2011–SC–000265–MR.
• Citation: 369 S.W.3d 29
• Parties: John David LEE, Appellant, v. Hon. Stephen M. GEORGE, Judge, Jefferson Family Court, Appellee. and Jill Leanne Lee (now Stanley); and Christopher Harrell, Guardian Ad Litem, Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

369 S.W.3d 29

John David LEE, Appellant,
v.
Hon. Stephen M. GEORGE, Judge, Jefferson Family Court, Appellee.
and
Jill Leanne Lee (now Stanley); and Christopher Harrell, Guardian Ad Litem, Real Parties in Interest.

No. 2011–SC–000265–MR.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

June 21, 2012.

[369 S.W.3d 30]

John David Lee, Louisville, KY, for Appellant.

Hon. Stephen M. George, Judge, Jefferson Family Court, Division Nine, Louisville, KY, for Appellee.

Louis Irwin Waterman, Scott E. Karem, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Real Party in Interest, Jill Leanne Lee (now Stanley).

Christopher M. Harrell, Louisville, KY, Counsel for Real Party in Interest, Christopher Harrell, Guardian Ad Litem.

OPINION OF THE COURT

This is an appeal of the Court of Appeals' denial of John David Lee's petition

[369 S.W.3d 31]

for a writ of mandamus or prohibition.¹ The underlying case is a divorce action. In his writ petition, Appellant asked that the trial judge be required to disqualify himself from further involvement in the case because of his bias against Appellant. In addition, Appellant asked that the guardian ad litem and opposing counsel be disqualified because he claimed they engaged in fraud and conspiracy against him. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

I. Background

Appellant and Jill Stanley were married in 1991 and divorced in 2009. They have three minor sons. Judge Stephen George of the Jefferson Family Court heard the divorce proceedings, including a trial in December 2009 to determine custody, parenting time, and related issues, and a trial in July 2010 to determine property and debt distribution. As of April 2011, when Appellant's writ petition was filed, Stanley had full custody of the children, and Appellant had unsupervised visitation with the children on a regular schedule each week and on various holidays.²

The parties' divorce has been highly contentious. The trial court believed that much of this contentiousness was initiated by Appellant. In the January 2010 judgment deciding custody and parenting time, the court characterized Appellant's behavior after the parties' separation as “reprehensible” and “emotionally abusive” and discussed specific instances of this behavior. Over the next year, there were constant disputes between the parties about the children's activities, conditions of visitation, and child support, among other issues. Although Appellant was briefly represented by an attorney early in the divorce case, he proceeded pro se for most of the litigation before the trial court and all of the appellate litigation. Appellant filed a large number of motions with the trial court, many of which were found to be baseless. Stanley filed several motions for CR 11 sanctions, but the trial judge was hesitant to impose such a sanction because Appellant was self-represented.

In January 2011, Stanley filed a motion to require Appellant to post a bond prior to any future motions being called. Stanley argued that Appellant had engaged in a pattern of vexatious litigation in an attempt to harass her and harm her financially. The court agreed and issued an order imposing a bond. Appellant had filed thirty-six new motions between July 15, 2010 and January 10, 2011, only five of which the court found to be grounded in law and fact. The court devoted five pages of its order detailing some of the meritless motions that Appellant had filed, as well as comments Appellant had made to the court and the other parties indicating he intended to continue his pattern of litigation. The court ordered Appellant to post a $7,500 bond before any further motions would be called or taken under submission.³

[369 S.W.3d 32]

In April 2011, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. He asked the Court of Appeals to order Judge George to disqualify himself because he had not acted impartially. The petition also asked the court to disqualify Stanley's counsel, Louis Waterman, and the guardian ad litem, Christopher Harrell, because they had “engaged in fraudulent activity and nefarious conduct, including conspiracy to harass the Petitioner in this case, disrupting and biasing the Court with falsified evidence and false testimony.” Appellant argues that he will receive fair proceedings only once Judge George, Waterman, and Harrell are no longer involved in the case.

In his writ petition, Appellant discusses the $7,500 bond primarily as an example of Judge George's alleged bias against him. However, he also includes a brief argument that the bond violates his due process rights and his right of access to the courts. The Court of Appeals construed Appellant's discussion of the bond issue as an additional basis for Appellant's request for extraordinary relief.

The Court of Appeals denied Appellant's petition, finding that the bias, fraud, and conspiracy issues raised by Appellant are properly the subject of direct appeals. The Court of Appeals also determined that the $7,500 bond was “reasonably limited in scope so as not to deprive petitioner meaningful access to the court.” Thus, the Court of Appeals found that there was no basis for extraordinary relief.

II. Analysis

Extraordinary writs may be granted in two classes of cases. The first class requires a showing that “the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court.” Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky.2004). The second class requires a showing that “the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise,” and it usually requires a showing that “great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted.” Id. However, there are “special cases” within the second class that do not require a showing of great injustice and irreparable injury. In those special cases, a writ is appropriate when “a substantial miscarriage of justice” will occur if the lower court proceeds erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary “in the interest of orderly judicial administration.” Independent Order of Foresters v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610, 616 (Ky.2005) (quoting Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky.1961)). Even in these special cases, the party asking for a writ must show that there is no adequate remedy on appeal. Id. at 617. Satisfying these tests, however, does not guarantee that a writ will issue. They are merely “a practical and convenient formula for determining, prior to deciding the issue of alleged error, if petitioner may avail himself of this remedy.” Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky.1961). And even upon examining the merits of a claim, issuance of the writ is still within the sound discretion of the appellate court. Id. at 800.

Appellant argues that he should be allowed to proceed under both the first and second classes described above, as well as the subclass of “special cases.”

[369 S.W.3d 33]

This Court reviews appeals from the denials of writs based on questions of law de novo. Shafizadeh v. Bowles, 366 S.W.3d 373 (Ky.2011).

A. First Class of Writs.

Appellant argues that Judge George acted outside his jurisdiction by being biased against Appellant. Appellant's argument is that a biased judge is necessarily acting outside of his jurisdiction when he acts as a biased individual and not as a truly neutral judge.

Appellant's argument is essentially that the trial court was acting contrary to law and therefore was acting outside its jurisdiction. Such an understanding of jurisdiction would effectively gut our procedures for appellate review because, under such an approach, the lower court would be proceeding outside its jurisdiction every time it made an erroneous decision, and so an extraordinary writ would be available for every alleged error. In the context of the extraordinary writs, “jurisdiction” refers not to mere legal errors but to subject-matter jurisdiction, e.g.,Goldstein v. Feeley, 299 S.W.3d 549 (Ky.2009), which goes to the court's core authority to even hear cases. See, e.g., Petrey v. Cain, 987 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky.1999) (defining subject-matter jurisdiction as “a court's authority to determine ‘this kind of case’ as opposed to ‘this case’ ” (quoting Duncan v. O'Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Ky.1970))).

Here, the family court clearly has the jurisdiction to hear divorce cases and to issue and enforce orders related to the cases. There is no statute or rule applicable to this case that would limit the trial court's jurisdiction on the issues raised by Appellant. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that “it is clear beyond dispute that the family court is acting within its jurisdiction” and that this case does not fall into the first class of cases in which extraordinary writs are available. For the same reasons, Appellant's claim that the trial court acted outside of its jurisdiction because of its order prohibiting Appellant from filing any lawsuits on behalf of his children (because he did not have legal custody of the children) is without merit.

B. Second Class of Writs.

To qualify for the second class of cases in which extraordinary writs are available, Appellant must show that there is no adequate remedy by appeal for the trial court's error. “No adequate remedy by appeal” means that Appellant's injury “could not thereafter be rectified in subsequent proceedings in the case.” Independent Order of Foresters, 175 S.W.3d at 615 (quoting Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 802). The Appellant must also then show either great injustice and irreparable injury or that his case fits into the narrow “certain special cases” exception. We first consider Appellant's general claims that the trial court is biased against him and that the guardian ad litem and opposing counsel have acted fraudulently, and then we turn to the issue of the $7,500 bond.

1. Bias, Conspiracy, and Fraud Claims.

On the bias, conspiracy, and fraud issues,...