People v. M.L.

• Decision Date: 23 May 2016
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 15SC57
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioners, IN the INTEREST OF Minor Children: J.G., J.P., S.L., and C.L., and J.G., J.P., S.L., and C.L., Children, by and through their Guardian ad Litem, v. M.L., Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

370 P.3d 1151

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioners,

IN the INTEREST OF Minor Children: J.G., J.P., S.L., and C.L.,

and

J.G., J.P., S.L., and C.L., Children, by and through their Guardian ad Litem,

v.M.L., Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 15SC57

Supreme Court of Colorado.

May 23, 2016

Attorney for Petitioner The People of the State of Colorado: Dan Slater Law, Daniel B. Slater, Cañon City, Colorado.

Attorney for J.G., J.P., S.L., and C.L., Children, by and through their Guardian ad Litem: Anna N.H. Ulrich, Attorney at Law, L.L.C., Anna N.H. Ulrich, Salida, Colorado.

Attorney for Respondent M.L.: Davide C. Migliaccio, Attorney at Law, Davide C. Migliaccio, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Colorado Office of the Child's Representative: Colorado Office of the Child's Representative, Sheri Danz, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 We granted certiorari in this case to resolve two points: (1) whether determination of a child's status as dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision of Article 3 of the Colorado Children's Code must take into account each parent's actions or failures to act, and (2) whether findings as to parental fault are required to adjudicate a child dependent or neglected under the same provision. See § 19–3–102(1), C.R.S. (2015)

. Mother ("M.L.") appealed a jury's finding that the environment of four of her five children was injurious to their welfare and the trial court's resulting adjudication that the children were dependent or neglected. M.L. argued that the trial court's jury instructions improperly permitted the jury to determine the status of the children without evaluating each parent's conduct and circumstances. Relying on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), the court of appeals agreed with M.L. and reversed the trial court's adjudication. People in Interest of J.G., 2014 COA 182, ¶¶ 1, 23, ––– P.3d ––––. We now reverse the court of appeals.

¶ 2 We hold that Troxel 's

due process requirements do not necessitate that the State prove that both parents lack the availability, ability, and willingness to provide reasonable parental care before a child may be adjudicated dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision. Additionally, we hold that neither the plain language of the dependency or neglect statute nor Troxel

requires the State to prove parental fault when adjudicating a child dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision. Hence, we conclude that the trial court's jury instructions were consistent with the plain language of the statute and the trial court did not err when it allowed the jury to find that the children's environment was injurious to their welfare without first requiring the jury to make findings of parental fault. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand this case to that court to address M.L.'s remaining issue on appeal.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 M.L. is the mother of five children, J.W.G., J.G., J.P., C.L., and S.L., four of whom are interested parties in this dependency or neglect appeal. The events leading to this case began when S.L. informed her mother and father ("B.L.") that J.W.G., her half-brother, had touched her in a sexual manner while she was trying to sleep. The parents immediately contacted law enforcement officials, who discovered during their investigation that J.W.G. had also inappropriately touched another sister, J.P. As a result, J.W.G. was charged with unlawful sexual contact and sexual assault on a child. Initially, J.W.G. remained in the home while his siblings stayed with family members. Within a week, the Fremont County Department of Human Services ("DHS") placed J.W.G. in an offense-specific foster home, and the remaining children returned to the family home.

¶ 4 In response to J.W.G.'s actions, the State filed a dependency or neglect petition concerning all of the children pursuant to section 19–3–502, C.R.S. (2015)

. The petition named M.L. and the children's fathers as respondents.¹ In pertinent part, it alleged that the children were dependent or neglected under three statutory bases: (1) the children lacked proper parental care, § 19–3–102(1)(b) ; (2) the children were homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with a parent through no fault of the parent, § 19–3–102(1)(e) ; and (3) the children's environment was injurious to their welfare, § 19–3–102(1)(c). M.L. and G.G., J.W.G.'s father, admitted the allegations in the dependency or neglect petition as to J.W.G., but M.L. and the fathers of the remaining four children denied the allegations as to those children and requested a jury trial. The case thus proceeded to jury trial.

¶ 5 At the conclusion of the evidence, the State proffered several jury instructions to which M.L. and the fathers objected. Specifically, M.L. objected to the questions in Jury Instruction 17, the State's proffered instruction regarding the injurious environment provision. Jury Instruction 17 (and a corresponding special verdict form) included a total of thirteen questions, twelve of which asked the jury to decide whether each child was dependent or neglected based on one of the three statutory bases alleged by the State. In objecting, M.L. argued that the trial court should require the jury to find that the children's environment was injurious to their welfare due to the actions or omissions of the parents, as per the pattern instruction for the injurious environment provision. See CJI–Civ. 41:17, Question 4.

¶ 6 The trial court rejected M.L.'s argument and gave the State's proffered instruction, which was consistent with the injurious environment provision's statutory language. See § 19–3–102(1)(c)

. Notably, it excluded the parental fault language found in the pattern instruction. Therefore, the jury was not required to make findings as to parental fault regarding the State's injurious environment allegation.² After the trial court ruled on the disputed jury instructions, the case went to the jury to determine whether each of the four children were dependent or neglected according to the State's evidence.

¶ 7 In reaching its verdicts, the jury responded to the questions in the special verdict form and Instruction 17. Specifically, the jury answered "no" to the questions asking (1) whether the children lacked parental care through the actions or omissions of the parents and (2) whether the children were homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with their parents through no fault of the parents. But, it responded "yes" to the third question for the children, finding their environment injurious to their welfare. Based on the jury's conclusion that the children's environment was injurious, the court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected and continued the case for a dispositional hearing. At that hearing, the court entered an order adopting a treatment plan and granted legal custody of J.W.G. to DHS. It granted the parents legal custody of the four other children subject to DHS's protective supervision.

¶ 8 M.L. appealed. She argued to the court of appeals that the trial court erred by tendering the jury instructions because they did not require the jurors to make findings as to each parent's fault. Instead, according to M.L., the jury instructions improperly permitted the jurors to find that the children were dependent or neglected based on an injurious environment even where at least one parent was available, able, and willing to provide reasonable parental care.

¶ 9 The court of appeals reversed, citing Troxel.³

It recognized that "a fit parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her children, free from state intervention." J.G., ¶ 23. It then held that by failing to require the jury to make findings as to parental fault, the trial court violated the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel that courts must presume that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Id. In so doing, the court of appeals concluded that a child may not be adjudicated dependent or neglected if the child has at least one parent who can provide reasonable care.

¶ 10 After reaching this holding, the court then determined that Instruction 17 and the special verdict form "misstated the law and misled the jury by suggesting that the children could be deemed to be dependent or neglected without considering, for each child, the actions or omissions of each parent and each parent's availability, ability, and willingness to provide reasonable parental care." Id. at ¶ 31

. It agreed with M.L. that Instruction 17 improperly permitted the jury to find that the children's environment was injurious to their welfare without considering the conduct and condition of each parent. Id. at ¶¶ 32–33. The court concluded that the trial court's error in giving Instruction 17 and the special verdict form was prejudicial and required reversal because, if the jury had been properly instructed, then it "might have concluded that the children's environment was not injurious because [M.L] was available, willing, and able to provide reasonable parental care." Id. at ¶ 34.

¶ 11 Both the State and the children's guardian ad litem ("GAL") petitioned for review. We granted certiorari on two issues.⁴

II. Ability, Availability, and Willingness to Provide Reasonable Parental Care

¶ 12 In the first issue, the State argues that the court of appeals improperly applied Troxel

to this case and that in doing so, the court's holding unnecessarily increased the State's burden during the adjudicatory stage of dependency or neglect proceedings. We first examine the statutory due process requirements for the adjudicatory phase of dependency or neglect proceedings. Then, we consider whether Troxel supports the court of appeals' holding that it is improper to adjudicate a child dependent or neglected when, after considering each...