Cook v. Cooper
Decision Date | 23 March 1901 |
Citation | 38 S.E. 218,59 S.C. 560 |
Parties | COOK et al. v. COOPER et al. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Greenville county; O. W Buchanan, Judge.
Action by Mary J. Cook and others against Liney E. Cooper and others for the recovery of real estate. From a judgment in favor of the defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
Julius H. Heywards, for appellants.
McCollough & Martin, for respondents.
This is an action for the recovery of real estate, and was tried in July, 1900. The plaintiffs are the next of kin of Andrew C Griffin, who was shown to have been the common source of title. The defendants claim under a deed alleged to have been executed and delivered to them for value by the said Griffin. The plaintiffs claim that the said Griffin was so far non compos mentis at the time of the alleged execution of the deed as to have been unable to make a valid contract or conveyance; and, further, that the deed in question is void upon its face, being so worded as to take effect in future and not until the death of the grantor. Upon the trial the plaintiffs proved the death of Andrew Griffin, their heirship, and common source of the title, and rested. The defendants proved their deed and rested. In the reply the plaintiffs introduced testimony to show that at the time the deed was executed the said Griffin was of unsound mind. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants. After service of the notice of appeal, plaintiffs' attorneys gave notice that they would move this court for leave to file an additional exception to the effect that the deed is void for the reason that it is not under seal. It appears that the word "seal" is written near the signature of the grantor, but no scroll is drawn around it, and no mark in the nature of a seal upon the deed. His honor construed the deed to be valid upon its face, and held that it conveyed to the defendants the fee in the land, reserving a life estate to the grantor.
We will next consider the questions presented by the exception as classified by appellants' attorneys, though not in the order in which they were argued by them.
1. They contend "that the alleged deed is void upon its face, being without a seal; that is to say, having nothing but the word 'seal' written below the signature, with no scroll or other symbol of a seal." As it will be necessary to refer to the deed in considering other exceptions, as well as in considering this question, we will set it out at length. It is as follows:
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