State v. Williams

Decision Date15 December 1896
PartiesThe State v. Williams, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Carroll Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. W. Rucker, Judge.

The defendant was fined $ 500, having been found guilty of attempting to bribe one Dickenson who had been summoned and selected as one of a panel of forty, who were summoned in the case of the state of Missouri against Wm. P. and George E Taylor, indicted for the murder of Gus Meeks.

The indictment is founded on section 3675, Revised Statutes 1889, and charges "that on the 25th day of March, 1895 at the county of Carroll and state of Missouri, a certain panel of forty jurors of said county being then and there duly summoned, returned, impaneled, and sworn as to their qualifications to serve as jurors, and the said panel of forty jurors, being then and there qualified to sit on said jury, and being then and there accepted by the court as competent and qualified to serve as jurors on said jury, from which said panel of forty jurors, so returned, summoned, and qualified, and sworn as aforesaid, a jury of twelve jurors was then and there being selected to try a certain criminal cause in which the state of Missouri was plaintiff and Wm. P Taylor and George E. Taylor were defendants, upon the charge of having feloniously killed and murdered one Gus Meeks which said criminal cause was then and there depending and on trial in the circuit court in and for said Carroll county, the said circuit court then and there having jurisdiction of said criminal cause; and one J. S. Williams then and there well knowing the premises and facts aforesaid, and that one Charles Dickenson was one of the said panel of forty jurors as aforesaid, corruptly and wickedly and feloniously intending to hinder and prevent a just and fair trial of said cause and issue by said jury, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly, corruptly, wickedly and feloniously attempt to corrupt the said Charles Dickenson, one of the panel of forty jurors, from which said panel a jury was then and there being selected to try said cause as aforesaid, by offering to give to the said Charles Dickenson a gift and gratuity, to wit, by then and there offering and promising to well pay the said Charles Dickenson if the said Charles Dickenson would return a verdict in favor of the said defendants or hang the jury then and there being selected to try said cause as aforesaid, and by saying to the said Charles Dickenson that he, the said Charles Dickenson, could well afford to leave his farm and sit on said jury and hang it, and that he, the said J. S. Williams would see that the said Charles Dickenson would get well paid for bringing in a verdict for the said defendants or for hanging the said jury as aforesaid, he the said J. S. Williams, then and there and thereby offering to give and intending to give to the said Charles Dickenson money and other valuable things, the amount, kind, value, and character of which is to these jurors unknown, with the felonious intent then and there and thereby to bias the mind of the said Charles Dickenson and induce him, the said Charles Dickenson, to be more favorable to the side of the defendants, William P. Taylor and George E. Taylor, than to the side of the plaintiff, the state of Missouri, in the trial and decision of the said issue so joined and to be tried by and before said jury then and there being selected as aforesaid and to wickedly, corruptly, and feloniously bribe said Charles Dickenson so summoned as juror, against the peace and dignity of the state."

The section of the statute referred to is the following:

"Every person who shall corrupt, or attempt to corrupt, any other person summoned or sworn as a juror, appointed a referee or chosen an arbitrator, by giving or offering to give any gift or gratuity whatsoever, with the intent to bias the mind of such juror, referee or arbitrator, or incline him to be more favorable to one side than the other, in relation to any cause, matter, or proceeding which may be pending in the court to which said juror shall have been summoned, or in which such referee or arbitrator shall have been chosen or appointed, shall on conviction be punished as in the next preceding section is prescribed." Sec. 3675, R. S. 1889.

The testimony in this case establishes the fact that at the March term, 1895, of the Carroll circuit court the case of the State v. Wm. P. and George E. Taylor, who were under indictment for having killed Gus Meeks in Linn county, Missouri, and which case had been brought to Carroll county on defendant's application for a change of venue, was pending and for trial; that both parties had announced ready, and a venire had been issued to the sheriff commanding him to summons one hundred and fifty persons as jurors from which to select a jury to try that cause. It appears from the testimony that among the one hundred and fifty persons summoned and among the panel of forty who were accepted on the voir dire examination were Charles Dickenson and E. A. O'Dell; that after the panel of forty had been selected they were excused by the court and instructed to report three days later; that during this time the defendant in this case who was the father of a young attorney at Tina, Missouri, got into a buggy and started out to the home of both O'Dell and Dickenson with a view to inducing them to remain upon the panel of twelve and to hang the jury or bring in a verdict of not guilty. The testimony shows that he visited O'Dell in the morning before breakfast and that O'Dell refused to permit Williams, the defendant, to discuss the Taylor case with him; that he next paid a visit to Charles Dickenson between 9 and 10 o'clock at night; that Dickenson was partially prepared to retire; that the defendant called to him and asked him to come out; that he dressed himself, went out and got into the buggy with him at Williams' invitation, and they drove away from the house some two or three hundred yards; that Williams began talking to him by asking him if he could deal with him on the square; that he also asked Dickenson whether or not he was an Odd Fellow; that in that conversation he said to Dickenson that if he would keep quiet and was retained on the panel of twelve and would hang the jury or bring in a verdict of not guilty that he would see him well paid; that he could well afford to leave the farm and sit upon that jury and hang it.

The testimony further shows that the defendant made an effort to buy or bribe James F. Sparks and E. A. O'Dell. It is shown that Dickenson had stated to defendant's counsel that he would hang the Taylors unless they scratched him off the jury, and that he asked counsel for defendant to scratch him off the jury.

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, admits going to the home of Dickenson and talking to him about the Taylor trial, and that, too, after he knew that he had been retained on the panel of forty, and excused under the prohibitory instructions of the court, and after he had heard him make that statement to Taylor's counsel. The defendant maintains that he went there for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the juror Dickenson was opposed to capital punishment. Defendant also denied a large portion of what Dickenson had testified to.

At the instance of the state the following instructions were given:

"1. It is the duty of the court to instruct you upon all questions of law arising in this cause, and it is your duty to receive such instructions as the law of the case and to find the defendant guilty or not guilty according to the law as declared by the court and the evidence as you have received it under the direction of the court.

"2. The indictment in this case is a mere formal charge and furnishes no evidence whatever tending to establish the defendant's guilt.

"3. The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the crime charged and this presumption attends him to the close of the trial and at the end entitles him to an acquittal unless it is overcome by evidence proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

"4. If you have a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt you must acquit him, but such doubt to warrant an acquittal must be a substantial doubt of his guilt and not a mere possibility of his innocence.

"5. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. In determining what credit or weight you will give to the testimony of any witness, you may take into consideration his interest, if any, in the result of the prosecution. The defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf, but the fact that he is the defendant and the interest he has at stake in the cause may be considered in determining what weight you will give to his testimony. If you believe that any witness has willfully sworn falsely to any material fact in this case you may disregard the whole or any part of the testimony of such witness.

"6. If you find and believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the twenty-fifth day of March, 1895, the case of State of Missouri against William P Taylor and George E. Taylor wherein they were charged with having feloniously killed and murdered one Gus Meeks was pending in the circuit court of Carroll county, Missouri, and that a panel of forty jurors had been summoned, selected, and qualified, from which panel of forty a jury of twelve jurors was to be selected, and that Charles Dickenson was one of said panel of forty jurors in said cause summoned, selected and qualified and that the defendant on or about March 25, 1895, at Carroll county, Missouri, did unlawfully and knowingly attempt to corrupt the said Charles Dickenson, one of the panel of forty jurors in said cause...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Owens v. Carthage & Western Railway Company
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Kansas
    • March 6, 1905
    ......Collateral facts. for the purpose of proving intent or motive are received in. evidence in both civil and criminal cases. State v. Williamson, 106 Mo. 162; State v. Williams, 136. Mo. 293; State v. Balch, 136 Mo. 103; Gunn v. Thurston, 130 Mo. 339. (6) Appellant's ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT