Moody v. Kearney

• Decision Date: 04 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 01-374-SLR.,01-374-SLR.
• Citation: 380 F.Supp.2d 393
• Parties: Clyde MOODY, Plaintiff, v. Richard KEARNEY, Stanley Taylor, John Doe # 2, John Doe # 3 and John Doe # 4, Prison Health Services, Inc. and its John Doe Employees, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

380 F.Supp.2d 393

Clyde MOODY, Plaintiff, v. Richard KEARNEY, Stanley Taylor, John Doe # 2, John Doe # 3 and John Doe # 4, Prison Health Services, Inc. and its John Doe Employees, Defendants.

No. 01-374-SLR.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

August 4, 2005.

Rodger D. Smith II, Esquire and Leslie A. Polizoti, Esquire of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, DE, Counsel for Plaintiff.

Deborah J. Massaro, Esquire and David R. Zaslow, Esquire of White and Williams, Wilmington, DE, Counsel for Defendant Prison Health Services.

Aaron R. Goldstein, Esquire, Department of Justice, State of Delaware, Wilmington, DE, Counsel for State Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUE L. ROBINSON, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 6, 2001, plaintiff Clyde Moody filed the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,¹ alleging the violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by Sussex Correctional Institution ("SCI"), John Ellingsworth, and John Does # 1, 2, 3, and 4 (collectively, "defendants").² (D.I.2) Plaintiff's original complaint alleged that prison officials locked him in an unventilated room during the summer of 1985, causing him to suffer a severely debilitating heat stroke. (Id.) On March 12, 2002, the court dismissed plaintiff's original complaint sua sponte as frivolous, finding that it was time-barred, as the original complaint indicated that the date of the alleged incident was sixteen years prior to the filing of the complaint. (D.I.8) Plaintiff appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded the matter on May 22, 2003, so that this court could consider "whether [the] federal tolling doctrine should be applied to [plaintiff's] claims under Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir.2000), and, if so, whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled." (D.I.20) The Third Circuit held "that the District Court should address this issue in the first instance if [defendants] raise the statute of limitations as a defense." (Id.)

On March 9, 2004, the court recognized the appearance of an attorney on plaintiff's behalf. (D.I.42) Defendant SCI then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inapplicable to SCI, and the Delaware statute of limitations time bars plaintiff's claims. (D.I.47, 48) On July 21, 2004, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the original pro se complaint, correcting factual errors such as the date of the alleged incident and the names of the appropriate defendants.³ (D.I. 53 at 4) On October 13, 2004, the court granted plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint and denied defendant SCI's motion for judgment on the pleadings as moot. (D.I.59) At the same time, the court considered the Third Circuit's order and found that the equitable tolling doctrine is applicable to the case at bar. (Id.)

Currently before the court is defendant PHS's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.⁴ (D.I.81) For the reasons that follow, defendant PHS's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has been an inmate in the Delaware Department of Correction ("DOC") since October 1985. (D.I. 60 at ¶ 9) Plaintiff has been housed at DOC's various facilities but, during the time period at issue, plaintiff was housed at SCI in Georgetown, Delaware. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10) Throughout his incarceration, plaintiff has been treated for schizophrenia. (Id.)

In 1999 plaintiff's schizophrenia was being treated with anticholinergic drugs which inhibited his ability to sweat, causing an increase in body temperature. (Id. at ¶ 13) These drugs included a warning that patients taking them should not become overheated during hot weather. (Id.) On July 9, 1999, the temperature in Georgetown reached 97° Fahrenheit with a humidity level of 87%; the temperature within SCI was reportedly 120° Fahrenheit. (Id. at ¶ 12) This same day plaintiff was housed in a room with no windows, ventilation or access to running water. (Id. at ¶ 14) Despite his complaints of a headache and dizziness, he was not removed from these conditions. (Id. at ¶ 15) On July 10, 1999, plaintiff was found in a "unresponsive state" with "hot, dry and flushed" skin. (Id. at ¶ 16) Plaintiff was taken to Beebe Hospital; the neurologist who examined plaintiff initially concluded that plaintiff, who was in a coma and had a body temperature of 105.6° Fahrenheit, had suffered a heat stroke and subsequent brain damage. (Id. at ¶ 16) Plaintiff is now wheelchair bound and unable to communicate effectively.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In analyzing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and it must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. See Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir.1998). "A complaint should be dismissed only if, after accepting as true all of the facts alleged in the complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, no relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations of the complaint." Id. Claims may be dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate any set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) The moving party has the burden of persuasion. See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.1991).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Application Of The Statute Of Limitations

Defendant PHS argues that plaintiff cannot assert a medical malpractice claim or a § 1983 claim against it because plaintiff's amended complaint, the first time PHS was named as a defendant, was filed more than two years after the date of the alleged wrongful act.

1. Medical Malpractice Claim

Under Delaware law a claim for medical malpractice must be filed within two years of the time at which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred. See Del.Code Ann. tit. 18 § 6856 (2005); David B. Lilly Co., Inc. v. Fisher, 18 F.3d 1112, 1117 (3d Cir.1994); Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., 401 A.2d 77 (Del.1979). Section 6856 provides three instances under which this limitations period can be tolled:

(1) Solely in the event of personal injury the occurrence of which, during such period of 2 years, was unknown and could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered by the injured person, such action may be brought prior to the expiration of 3 years from the date upon which such injury occurred, and not thereafter; and

(2) A minor under the age of 6 years shall have until the latter of time for bringing such an action as provided for hereinabove or until the minor's 6th birthday in which to bring an action.

(3) A plaintiff may toll the above statutes of limitations for a period of time up to 90 days from the applicable limitations contained in this section by sending a Notice of Intent....

Del.Code Ann. tit. 18 § 6856. None of these exceptions, assuming any of them apply, result in plaintiff's amended complaint being timely filed since it was filed after July 9, 2003. Because in these circumstances there is no basis under Delaware law for tolling the statute of limitations,⁵ the limitations period for plaintiff's medical malpractice claims expired on July 9, 2001.

While plaintiff's amended complaint was filed outside the limitations period, plaintiff's original complaint was timely filed. If plaintiff's amended complaint relates back to the original complaint, then his state law claims would not be precluded. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c),

[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... the amendment changes the party or the name of the party against whom a claim is asserted if [the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading] and, ... the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice ... that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.

This rule requires that the added party have notice of the action within the federal service period of 120 days. In this case, a determination of the timeliness of plaintiff's state law claims, as asserted against defendant PHS in his amended complaint, depends in part on the facts of record. Because discovery has not yet been completed, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice to renew upon the close of the discovery period.

2. Federal Claims

In identifying the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim, courts generally use the statute of limitations for the state where the federal court sits. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir.2000). "Because Delaware's statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years, [p]laintiff's [s]ection 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations." Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State Univ., No. Civ.A. 98-658-MMS, 1999 WL 1250889, at *8 (D.Del. Dec.10, 1999). This two year limitations period begins to run at the time plaintiff should have known about the injury. Carr v. Dewey Beach, 730 F.Supp. 591, 603 (D.Del.1990). Despite the fact that the Delaware statute of limitations applies, "federal tolling doctrine may be applicable to determine whether [plaintiff's] federal claims are timely." Lake, 232 F.3d at 366. The federal doctrine of "[e]quitable tolling stops the statute of limitations from running when the date on which the claim accrued has already passed." Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir.1994)). This doctrine, however, "can [only] be applied to suits...