Gilbertson v. Albright

• Citation: 381 F.3d 965
• Decision Date: 03 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-35460.,02-35460.
• Parties: Paul Douglas GILBERTSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stuart H. ALBRIGHT; Keith R. Battleson; Jack W. Burris; Suzanne T. Crane; Charles L. Crump; Yolanda I. Guran-Postlethwaite; Charles W. Hester; Ron A. Hoffine; Robert V. Neathamer; R. Charles Pearson; Ronald E. Stuntzner; David P. Taylor; Robert A. Walker; Richard H. Zbinden, in their individual capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 965

381 F.3d 965

Paul Douglas GILBERTSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stuart H. ALBRIGHT; Keith R. Battleson; Jack W. Burris; Suzanne T. Crane; Charles L. Crump; Yolanda I. Guran-Postlethwaite; Charles W. Hester; Ron A. Hoffine; Robert V. Neathamer; R. Charles Pearson; Ronald E. Stuntzner; David P. Taylor; Robert A. Walker; Richard H. Zbinden, in their individual capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-35460.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted June 22, 2004.^*

Filed September 3, 2004.

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James M. Brown, Enfield Brown Knivila Razor & Cook, Salem, OR, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Richard D. Wasserman, Department of Justice, Civil/Administrative Appeals Unit, Salem, OR, for the defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; Michael R. Hogan, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-01-06282-HO.

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, PREGERSON, O'SCANNLAIN, RYMER, KLEINFELD, SILVERMAN, GRABER, WARDLAW, FISHER, RAWLINSON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

RYMER, Circuit Judge:

May Younger¹ abstention apply in an action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that relates to a pending state proceeding, and if so, should the action be dismissed or stayed?

This is the question that prompted us to go en banc in Gilbertson v. Albright, 350 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir.2003), and American Consumer Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Margosian, 349 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2003). Both opinions have been vacated, and Margosian has since settled.

In Gilbertson, the federal plaintiff, Paul Douglas Gilbertson, was a land surveyor whose Oregon license to survey was revoked and not reinstated by the State Board of Examiners for Engineering and Land Surveying (the Board). Gilbertson appealed both decisions to the Oregon Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Gilbertson filed this action seeking money damages from members of the Board for violating his First Amendment rights, violating his right to due process, and denying him equal protection of the laws. The district court dismissed the action on the basis of Younger abstention.

We conclude that Younger principles apply to actions at law as well as for injunctive or declaratory relief because a determination that the federal plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated would have the same practical effect as a declaration or injunction on pending state proceedings. However, federal courts should not dismiss actions where damages are at issue; rather, damages actions should be stayed until the state proceedings are completed. To this extent we recede from our statements in Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1098, 1102 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc), that direct interference is a threshold requirement, or element, of Younger abstention, and that Younger only precludes, but does not delay, the federal court action.²

The Middlesex³ factors, which guide consideration of whether Younger extends to noncriminal proceedings, indicate that Younger principles apply here because the state proceeding was pending at the time Gilbertson filed his federal action, it was in the nature of a judicial proceeding that implicates important state interests, and it afforded Gilbertson an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges. For this reason, the district court should have deferred to the Oregon proceeding unless that proceeding was conducted in bad faith or some other exception to Younger exists. The district court held that the bad faith exception was inapplicable because the state judicial proceeding was initiated by Gilbertson; however, this exception turns on whether the state prosecuted the disciplinary proceeding in good faith because the appeal process is but an extension of that proceeding.

Accordingly, we reverse dismissal of the action for damages. On remand, the court should reconsider whether any Younger exception applies and, if not, should stay its hand until state proceedings are completed.⁴

I

The problem in this case arises because the Supreme Court has never explicitly approved or disapproved the application of Younger abstention in a damages action,⁵ and we have imposed two conditions on Younger abstention that inhibit—if they do not absolutely prohibit—abstaining when damages are at issue. One such condition is a threshold requirement that the federal relief must directly interfere in the state litigation by "seek[ing] to enjoin, declare invalid, or otherwise involve the federal courts in terminating or truncating the state court proceedings," and the other is that when Younger abstention applies, "it does not merely delay, but precludes, the federal court litigation." Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1098, 1102 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). Upon reflection and in light of the question we must answer here, we are persuaded that both conditions need clarification.

A

To explain why, we start with the evolution of Younger principles in the Supreme Court.

Younger itself involved a state criminal prosecution which the federal plaintiff sought to enjoin on the ground that the state's criminal syndicalism law, under which he was charged, was unconstitutional. The Court held that equitable relief was unwarranted because a proceeding was pending in state court when the federal plaintiff sought to enjoin it, this proceeding afforded the claimant an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims, and there was no showing that the state prosecution was brought in bad faith. In reaching this conclusion the Court observed that Congress over the years has manifested an intent to permit state courts to try state cases free of federal interference. It identified two sources for this policy: the constraints of equity jurisdiction and the concern for comity in our federal system. Courts have long had discretion not to exercise equity jurisdiction when alternatives are available, and narrowly confined ability to do so when the object is a criminal prosecution. In modern times, as Younger explains, equitable principles prevent erosion of the role of the jury and duplication of legal proceedings when a single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted.⁶ Principles of comity, on the other hand, preserve respect for state functions such that the national government protects federal rights and interests in a way that will not "unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."⁷ 401 U.S. at 43-45, 91 S.Ct. 746. Of these two, as the Court continues to make clear, comity is the more "vital consideration." Id. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746; New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (NOPSI) (noting that Younger rested "primarily on the `even more vital consideration' of comity"); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (noting comity as Younger's second and "even more vital" explanation for its decision); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (emphasizing that comity is the "more vital consideration").

The Court was soon called upon to decide whether Younger extends to a federal plaintiff's request for declaratory relief. The federal plaintiffs in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), sought a declaration that the state statute under which they were being prosecuted was unconstitutional. The Court held that Younger applies to requests for declaratory relief because "ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid." Id. at 72, 91 S.Ct. 764. The Court stated that this is so for two independent reasons: a declaration could be the basis for an injunction, and even if it were not used for this purpose, "the declaratory relief alone has virtually the same practical impact as a formal injunction would." Id. As the Court explained by quoting Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247, 73 S.Ct. 236, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952):

Is the declaration contemplated here to be res judicata, so that the [state court] can not hear evidence and decide any matter for itself? If so, the federal court has virtually lifted the case out of the State [court] before it could be heard. If not, the federal judgment serves no useful purpose as a final determination of rights.

Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court recognized that preclusion rules give a declaration of rights the same real effect on a pending state proceeding as an injunction.

Next, the Court held that Younger principles are applicable to a state civil proceeding based on a nuisance statute that the federal plaintiff sought to challenge on federal constitutional grounds. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). In so doing, the Court emphasized that considerations of federalism counsel restraint "since interference with a state judicial proceeding prevents the state not only from effectuating its substantive policies, but also from continuing to perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those policies. Such interference also results in duplicative legal proceedings, and can readily be interpreted `as reflecting negatively upon the state courts' ability to enforce constitutional principles.'" Id. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974)).

In Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), the federal plaintiff sought in an action brought under § 1983 to enjoin use of statutory contempt procedures authorized by state law that he alleged were used by a state court in violation of his due process rights. Holding that the district court could not entertain...