Feliciano v. Puerto Rico State Ins. Fund
| Citation | 818 F.Supp.2d 482 |
| Decision Date | 13 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11–1012 (DRD). |
| Parties | Lilliam Davila FELICIANO, Plaintiff(s), v. PUERTO RICO STATE INSURANCE FUND, et. al., Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bamily Lopez–Ortiz, Lopez Toro, Law and Notary Offices, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Joanna B. Matos–Hicks, Jose F. Benitez–Mier, O'Neill & Borges, Yadhira Ramirez–Toro, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, Pedro R. Vazquez, III, Pedro R. Vazquez Law Office, Guaynabo, PR, for Defendants.
Pending before the court is Defendant Vanessa Jiménez Cuevas' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“motion to dismiss”), Docket No. 10, and plaintiff's opposition, Docket No. 17. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Vanessa Jiménez Cuevas (“Jiménez”), is GRANTED.
On January 7, 2011, plaintiff Lilliam Dávila Feliciano (“Dávila” or “plaintiff”) filed suit against the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund (“PR–SIF”); Zoimé Alvarez Rubio, Saul Rivera Rivera, Vanessa Jiménez Cuevas (“Jiménez” or “defendant”), Jane Doe and John Roe, still unknown alleged defendants conspirators, all in their individual and official capacities. Dávila alleges that she has been deprived of her rights of free speech and free association, in violation of sections 1983, 1985 and 1986 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, Docket No. 1. Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and punitive damages under the supplemental causes of action, Puerto Rico Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959 (“Law 100”), as amended, including the double damages' provision, for political discrimination, and the general tort law for direct and vicarious liability, Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 5141–5142.1
On February 28, 2011, Jiménez filed a motion to dismiss, Docket No. 10, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P.”). Jiménez asserts that she is protected by absolute immunity, as she was the hearing examiner that presided the administrative proceeding requested by Dávila at the PR–SIF.
Defendant Jiménez is an attorney and was designated by Zoimé Alvarez Rubio, Administrator of the PR–SIF and co-defendant, herein, as the official examiner to conduct administrative hearings of all managerial employees of the PR–SIF. Hence, Jiménez moves the court to dismiss the instant complaint, with prejudice, on the grounds of absolute immunity and qualified immunity based on her quasi-judicial position as official examiner of an administrative hearing.
On March 25, 2011, Dávila opposed Jiménez' dismissal request under Rule 12(b)(6), Docket No.17. Plaintiff argues that the complaint does survive the Iqbal and Twombly standard of review of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff requests that Jiménez motion to dismiss be granted solely on the Conspiracy Claim and denied as to all other claims. See Docket No. 17, p. 12.
Plaintiff Dávila further alleges that Jiménez together with the known and still unknown defendants have devised a scheme to remove and/or terminate from employment all personnel appointed in the PR–SIF during the years of the PDP administration from January 1, 2001 until December 21 2008. See Docket No. 1, ¶ 2.9.
During the year 2002, Dávila was temporarily assigned to the position of Administrative Officer I, in which she collaborated in the development of the newly created Corporate Security Area. This position was posted in an internal job announcement as a career position for which the plaintiff applied. On October 16, 2003, Dávila was appointed to a career position as Administrative Officer II. Due to PR–SIF steps by merits norm, Dávila was subsequently reclassified to the position of Administrative Officer III, effective January 13, 2006. See Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 4.7, 4.8, 4.9.
On May 4, 2009, plaintiff filed a federal complaint, Lilliam Dávila–Feliciano v. Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund Corporation, et als., Civil No. 09–1405(FAB). In said complaint the plaintiff affirmatively alleged that she was a member of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”), and had been discriminated by a different faction of the same political party. During the time of filing and litigation of the federal complaint defendants, Zoime Alvarez Rubio (“Alvarez”) and Saul Rivera Rivera (“Rivera Rivera”) held the same positions as Administrator of the PR–SIF and Associate Director for the Human Resources within the PR–SIF, respectively.
On January 8, 2010, Alvarez Rubio notified plaintiff by letter of the intention of declaring her managerial position legally null. The legal basis for the declaration of nullity was alleged to be a lack of “technical analysis” to justify the exclusion of the Administrative Officer I position from the regular procedure of an open job announcement. The notice further indicated that this conclusion was reached after multiple audits regarding personnel transactions that took place during the period of January 1, 2001 until December 31, 2008. Alvarez Rubio also informed Dávila of her “right to request an informal administrative hearing prior to receiving the Administrator's final decision.” Docket No. 1, ¶ 4.16. Dávila requested an administrative hearing, which was set for March 5, 2010, Docket No. 1, ¶ 4.18. However, upon Dávila's attorney's request, plaintiff appeared in writing in lieu of the administrative hearing, on March 19, 2010. See Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 4.19, 4.20.
Plaintiff Dávila alleged in her written appearance that Article 14 of the Personnel Regulations did not require the “technical analysis” to which Alvarez Rubio alleges. Consequently, Dávila alleges that Alvarez Rubio's insistence on additional requirements is used as a pretext for discrimination.
Defendant Jiménez, the designated official Examiner, issued a report which was received by the Human Resources Area on April 5, 2010. The report sustained that the PR–SIF's decision was based upon Articles 13, Section 13.2 and Article 14, Section 14.1 of the Personnel Regulations. Alvarez Rubio issued a letter on the same date, but notified to Dávila on April 9, 2010, informing plaintiff that her managerial position had been declared null based on the official examiner's Report. Dávila was immediately reinstated to her previous career position in Finances on the same day she received the letter. See Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 4.29, 4.30.
The Court notes that Dávila is still working at the PR–SIF, and that she holds a career position. Furthermore, Dávila filed an administrative appeal with the Board of Appeals for Managerial Employees of the PR–SIF, Case No. JA–10–29, which is still pending, Docket 1, ¶ 4.34.
Failure to state a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P.”) provides that a complaint will be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, fall short of a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’ ” (Citations omitted). Bell Atlantic Corporation, et al. v. Twombly, et al., 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 and 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, the Court held:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations ... (citations omitted) ... a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235–236 (3d ed. 2004).
...
Here, in contrast, we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed. (Emphasis ours).
See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) () (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (emphasis ours).
In Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, the Court further held:
We could go on, but there is no need to pile up further citations to show that Conley's “no set of facts” language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough. To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should be understood in light of the opinion's preceding summary of the complaint's concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief. But the passage so often quoted fails to mention this understanding on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. (Emphasis ours).
Thus, the new standard under Twombly is that a claim for relief must contain allegations that “are plausible on its face.” See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In Sepúlveda–Villarini v. Department of Education of Puerto Rico, 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.2010), J. SOUTER, as Associate Justice (Ret)., the Court held:
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the...
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