Slingerland v. Slingerland

• Decision Date: 10 September 1888
• Citation: 39 N.W. 146,39 Minn. 197
• Parties: Teunis Slingerland v. Teunis S. Slingerland
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

39 N.W. 146

39 Minn. 197

Teunis Slingerland v. Teunis S. Slingerland

Supreme Court of Minnesota

September 10, 1888

A motion for reargument of this case was denied October 10 1888.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Dodge county to compel the defendant to convey to him a certain farm in that county in specific performance of the agreement stated in the opinion. The action was tried by Buckham, J., who ordered judgment for defendant. The plaintiff appeals from an order refusing a new trial.

Order reversed, and new trial ordered.

Geo. B Edgerton, Burt W. Eaton, Gordon E. Cole, and Davis, Kellogg & Severance, for appellant.

Chas C. Willson, for respondent.

OPINION

Gilfillan, C. J.

The parties stand in the relation of father and son. The defendant, the father, owned a large farm in the county of Dodge. On the 5th day of March, 1886, there were pending in the district court in said county five several actions or proceedings, -- one an action by plaintiff against this defendant to recover about $ 15,000, for services rendered between June, 1879, and January, 1886; one an action by plaintiff against defendant to recover $ 850, the value of five shares of the capital stock of the First National Bank of Kasson, claimed by plaintiff to have belonged to him, and to have been wrongfully converted to his own use by defendant, January 29, 1886; one against said bank, of which this defendant was the president, to recover $ 850, the value of five shares of the stock of the bank claimed by plaintiff to have belonged to him, and to have been converted and disposed of by the bank January 29, 1886, which stock was also claimed by this defendant to belong to him; one against said bank to recover $ 190, money deposited by plaintiff in the bank prior to January 30, 1886, and which money this defendant claimed belonged to him; and one a proceeding by mandamus, on the relation of this defendant, against the county auditor of Dodge county, to compel him to issue to the relator his warrant upon the county treasurer for the payment to the relator of certain moneys which had been paid into the treasury in redemption of lands sold for taxes, both this plaintiff and this defendant claiming to be entitled to such moneys. These actions and proceedings were all defended, the controversy in each being really between this plaintiff and defendant. They were all on the calendar of the March term, 1886, of the court for trial, and the first was on trial, when, on said 5th day of March, 1886, the defendant orally offered to plaintiff that if he would dismiss said actions brought by him, and turn over to defendant said money in the county treasury, he (defendant) would convey said farm to him, with the stock, machinery, and personal property, on the day when he should be married to a certain young lady, to whom he was then, and for some time had been, engaged to be married as soon as his pecuniary circumstances would warrant his assuming the support of a family, which engagement, and the reasons for delay in it, were known to and approved of by defendant. Plaintiff thereupon orally accepted said offer, and forthwith dismissed said actions, and withdrew his claim to the money involved in said mandamus proceeding, and such money was thereupon paid over to defendant, and the proceeding dismissed. On the 31st of March, 1886, plaintiff and said young lady were married. From March 5th till some time after the marriage defendant intended to carry out his agreement, but on December 8th following, on a formal demand by plaintiff for a conveyance, he refused to execute it, and denied any agreement or obligation to do so.

It is not found by the court below that plaintiff's marriage, or that any agreement by him to marry, formed any part of the consideration for defendant's agreement to convey. The marriage is therefore to be left out of account in considering the matter of part-performance. So is the matter of possession; for, although plaintiff worked on the farm under the direction of the defendant after the agreement, it is not found that such working was because of the agreement, and it is found that plaintiff never was at any time in the possession or control of the premises, or any part thereof, and never made any improvement thereon. The question, then, is, was the doing by the plaintiff of the things which we have mentioned, to wit, dismissing the various suits and proceedings, and permitting the money in the county treasury to be paid to defendant, such part-performance as to take the agreement out of the operation of the statute of frauds?

The principle that must control the decision of the question is stated (in accordance with all the authorities) in Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, (29 N.W. 135,) thus: " The doctrine of part-performance rests on the ground of fraud. The underlying principle is that where one of the contracting parties has been induced or allowed to alter his situation on the faith of an oral agreement within the statute, to such an extent that it would be a fraud on the part of the other party to set up its invalidity, equity will make the case an exception to the statute." That is, equity will not permit the statute, the purpose of which was to prevent fraud, to be used as a means of committing it. The difficulty is in applying the principle to the facts of the particular case, and in determining whether a fraud will result unless the agreement be enforced. Acts of part-performance may be done which will not take the case out of the statute. Thus, though the purchasers pay a part or the whole of the purchase-money, it will not suffice; because (although some authorities give a different reason for it) a recovery may be had of the money paid, and that is, in law deemed an adequate remedy to prevent fraud. And so where the consideration is paid in services of such a character that their value may be estimated and liquidated in money, so as measurably to make the vendee whole. And it may be stated, generally, that where the party has another remedy that will restore him substantially and adequately to the situation he was in before, the statute will avoid the agreement. In case of payment in services, if their character be such that it is impossible to estimate their value by any pecuniary standard, and it is evident they were not intended to be measured by any such standard, the performance of them is a part-performance. Instances of that kind are furnished in Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sandf. Ch. 305; Davison v. Davison, 13 N.J.Eq. 246; Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37; Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101; Hiatt v. Williams, 72 Mo. 214, in...