APPLICATION OF CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY, Patent Appeal No. 7863.
Decision Date | 11 April 1968 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 7863. |
Citation | 156 USPQ 514,390 F.2d 747 |
Parties | Application of CONTINENTAL BAKING COMPANY. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Warren H. Rotert, New York City (Morgan, Finnegan, Durham & Pine, Granville M. Pine, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D. C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents.
Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, CLARK, Justice,* and RICH, SMITH, and KIRKPATRICK,** Judges.
Continental seeks registration of "County Fair" for fresh bread, cake and sweet goods — namely cinnamon sticks, sweet rolls and assorted pastries. Registration has been refused on the ground that applicant's mark so resembles the mark "County Fair," previously registered for frozen fruit and cream pies, as to be likely to cause confusion. In so holding, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board stated, 147 USPQ 333:
We have found nothing in the record to refute that reasoning and conclusion.
During proceedings below appellant introduced a document signed by an officer of Carnation Co., present owner by assignment of the registered mark "County Fair." In evaluating that instrument the board stated:
Appellant argues that In re National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 297 F.2d 941, 49 CCPA 854, does control in the present circumstances. Certainly there is nothing in National Distillers to justify the controlling effect appellant seeks here. There a majority1 expressly found the competing marks and goods to be different, stating:
We shall first consider whether the differences in the marks and in the goods are such that confusion or mistake or deception of purchasers is likely. The marks MARQUÉS DEL MÉRITO and MERITO do not look alike, sound alike nor evoke the same psychological responses. Wines and rum are goods whose differences are clearly recognized by the purchasers thereof. These differences are sufficient to raise a doubt as to likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception of purchasers arising from the common use of the word MERITO. Under these circumstances, we think the alleged agreements between applicant and the owner of the reference registration are of evidentiary value.
It may well be that individual agreements regarding use and registration of trademarks are of "evidentiary value," as the board here has demonstrated. However, in enacting Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act2 Congress clearly charged the Patent Office with the initial responsibility of determining whether certain trademarks are entitled to registration, as distinguished from use, within the scope of that section. To hold that the present consent to register should control would be to allow individuals to take the law in their own hands, thus usurping the responsibility that Congress has placed in the Patent Office. Should there be any language in National Distillers intimating that individuals have such rights regarding registration of trademarks, then to that extent that decision is hereby expressly overruled. See also In re Wilson Jones Company,3 337 F.2d 670, 52 CCPA 805.
The decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.
The majority has no basis for disparaging the opinion for the court in National Distillers as that of a "nominal" majority. The majority in that case consisted of Judge Smith, who wrote the opinion, Judge Kirkpatrick, who joined it, and myself.1 I have just reread my concurring opinion of six years ago and there is not a word in it in conflict with Judge Smith's opinion with which I then fully agreed, as I do now. My only purpose in writing a concurring opinion was, as I stated, to examine the Patent Office Solicitor's concepts, as there stated in his brief, about the Patent Office duty to protect the public by refusing registrations and to show that this not only does not protect the public but actually interferes with the normal protection of the public through the enforcement of private rights.
The same reasoning, some of which appellant quotes in its brief, is equally applicable here.
Lest I again be relegated to a nonparticipating status for lack of an explicit statement, I declare by present full agreement with Judge Smith's dissenting opinion herein.
In no event can I subscribe to an opinion which speaks of "expressly" overruling a prior decision of this court on a hypothetical or "if" basis that it may contain "language" "intimating" something or other. We know what is in our opinions. We can say whether or not we will or will not follow decisions as precedents. Overruling is serious business, not to be confused with distinguishing prior cases or the reasoning in prior opinions. Judge Smith has pointed out how it upsets the business community. The decision in National Distillers stands. "Overruled" is not a term to be bandied about in a casual manner.
For reasons I stated in the National Distillers case, I think we must not be so literal minded about section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946 that we defeat its basic purpose, as the majority is doing here. It follows the reasoning of the board which categorized the goods of both parties as "bakery products." To leave it at that is to leave a false impression and to ignore the evidence in the affidavit of Mr. Boote, the food industry expert employed by appellant, which points out the manufacturing and marketing differences respecting the fresh bakery products of the applicant and the frozen food techniques of production and distribution of the consenting registrant's frozen fruit pies and frozen cream pies.2 It is these differences which support the affidavit form of consent (construed by the board to be a consent to both use and registration) by the owner of the reference registration in which the Vice President of that company expresses the view that confusion, deception, or mistake is unlikely.
The facts of this case are, I believe, such as to bring it clearly within the principles expressed by Judge Smith in the three-judge majority opinion in National Distillers as well as the further views of my concurring opinion therein. This calls for reversal.
On the record here, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority and disagree with some of the reasons stated by the majority in support of that conclusion.
In order to place this appeal in its proper perspective, it should be noted that, as an appellate court, we are charged by Congress with the responsibility to "hear and determine" an appeal from a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board "on the evidence produced before the Patent Office." The statute requires that our decision shall be...
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