R.C. ex rel. Ala. Disabilities Advocacy v. Walley

• Decision Date: 13 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 288CV1170DWO.,Civ.A. 288CV1170DWO.
• Parties: R.C. by his next friend, the ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY, PROGRAM, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Page WALLEY, as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

390 F.Supp.2d 1030

R.C. by his next friend, the ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY, PROGRAM, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Page WALLEY, as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 288CV1170DWO.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

May 13, 2005.

Ashley Lomers, Barbara A. Lawrence, James A. Tucker, Tuscaloosa, AL, Douglas Richard Miller Nazarian, Patrick J. Reynolds, Ralph S. Tyler, Baltimore, MA, Ira A. Burnim, Washington, DC, J. Richard Cohen, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is a motion for dismissal and termination of the Consent Decree which has governed in the case since 1991. (Doc. No. 714.) The motion which is accompanied by a memorandum brief (Doc. No. 715) was filed by the Honorable Page Walley, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR"). The motion is opposed by Plaintiffs. (Doc. Nos. 717, 736.)

Almost seventeen years ago, on November 15, 1988, this class action lawsuit was commenced on behalf of a minor who is known by his initials "R.C." When the lawsuit was filed, R.C. was an eight-year-old boy who allegedly had been abused by his mother and later neglected by his father. Ultimately, R.C. was placed in the custody of DHR. (Compl. at 1-4 (Doc. No. 1).)

While in the custody of DHR, R.C's welfare allegedly was not much better than it was when he lived with his parents. R.C. was subjected to a series of short-term placements, including confinement in psychiatric hospitals. It was alleged that R.C. was heavily medicated with psychotropic drugs and denied visitation with his father. Eventually, R.C. was placed in a long-term residential treatment facility many miles from home. (Id. at 5-6.)

R.C.'s plight was alleged to be symbolic of the fate of numerous other children under the care of DHR. R.C., on behalf of a class, alleged that the conditions and practices in the child welfare system in Alabama were constitutionally deplorable and in violation of federal statutes. Through class certification, R.C. sought to alleviate these systemic deprivations within DHR's child welfare system. (Am. Compl. at 16 (Doc. No. 22).) R.C., whose class ultimately was certified by the court, represents a class of children with diagnosed or perceived emotional or behavioral disorders who are in foster care or DHR custody or who are at imminent risk of placement with DHR. (Order (Doc. No. 73); Order (Doc. No. 130).)

Two years into the lawsuit, the parties negotiated a settlement in the form of a Consent Decree which was approved by the court in December 1991. (Consent Decree, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235)); (Order approving Consent Decree, entered Dec. 18, 1991 (Doc. No. 252).) The Consent Decree averted litigation which DHR conceded would have resulted in "a clear victory for the plaintiffs" and exposed "devastating" facts.¹ The initials "R.C." now have become synonymous with this Consent Decree which has been the catalyst for the overhaul and reform of DHR's child welfare system.

At the core of the Consent Decree is the mandate that DHR reform Alabama's child welfare system by developing a "system of care" which operates with the aim of achieving specified "goals" and in conformity with thirty "principles." (Consent Decree ¶ 31 (Doc. No. 235).) Execution of the "system of care" is governed by specific standards and deadlines set forth in the Implementation Plan, also the product of joint agreement by the parties. (Order approving Implementation Plan (Doc. No. 265).)

Termination of the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan is provided for in paragraph 93 of the Consent Decree, as subsequently amended. (Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by ¶ 10 of Consent Order Extending Time for Compliance at 3, entered Feb. 11, 1999 ("1999 Consent Order") (Doc. No. 511).) Placing the burden on Defendant, the termination clause states that

[o]n or after October 1, 2002, the defendant may move for termination of this Decree upon a showing that DHR is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Decree and of the Implementation Plan and that DHR will remain in substantial compliance after termination of the injunction in this case.

(Id.)

Having presided over the implementation of the Consent Decree for nine years, with the skilled assistance of the court monitor, the undersigned has an intimate understanding of the history and circumstances of this litigation.² The undersigned also is very familiar with all facets of the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan, including the purposes, provisions, and procedures set out therein, as well as with the progress made to date and the obstacles encountered along the way.

Defendant has made great progress and marked improvements in DHR's child welfare system, including but not limited to its staffing directives, its educational requirements for employees, its funding and its overall day-to-day functions. The court also commends Defendant for DHR's ability and willingness to respond immediately to any complaint concerning child safety, as well as to cooperate with municipal, county and state law enforcement in all matters pertaining to child endangerment and the prevention of the same. Moreover, the court recognizes Defendant's recent good faith efforts to comply with the requirements of the Consent Decree, to include Defendant's prompt response to the issues enumerated by the court at the December 2004 status conference.

Notwithstanding the exceptional strides by Defendant, the parties entered into a voluntary agreement in which they, not the court, set out the governing standards for compliance and the provision for termination of the Consent Decree. While the court is ever mindful that consent decrees are "not intended to operate in perpetuity," Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), termination is premature until such time that Defendant has sustained his twofold burden of showing substantial compliance.

Having carefully considered the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant has not submitted evidence sufficient to sustain his burden of demonstrating that DHR "is" and "will remain" in substantial compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan as required for termination of said Decree.³ (Consent Decree ¶ 93, as amended by 1999 Consent Order.) Defendant's motion, therefore, is due to be denied at this time.⁴

II. JURISDICTION

The Consent Decree's provisions bestow upon the court the power to resolve disputed matters, shared authority with the court monitor to determine compliance with the Consent Decree, and sole authority to terminate the Consent Decree upon motion of Defendant. (Consent Decree ¶¶ 86, 91, 93, as amended by 1999 Consent Order.)

Not only is the court's jurisdiction over this matter explicitly set out in the Consent Decree, but also is implicit in the court's inherent jurisdiction over its decrees. See Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir.1994); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1568 (2d Cir.1985) ("Consent decrees are subject to continuing supervision and enforcement by the court."). The court, thus, finds that it acts within its jurisdiction in ruling on the present motion to terminate the Consent Decree.

III. BACKGROUND

The Consent Decree, filed in June 1991, is the product of extensive negotiations and bargaining which occurred between the parties during the weeks preceding the scheduled trial date in this case. (Consent Decree (Doc. No. 235).) In December 1991, after independent consideration, the court approved the Consent Decree, finding that it was fair, adequate and reasonable. (Order approving Consent Decree (Doc. No. 252).)

The Consent Decree contemplated that the parties initially would evaluate DHR's child welfare system to determine its resources, capabilities and needs. Thereafter, the Consent Decree provided that DHR would develop an "Implementation Plan" through which DHR would incorporate into its child welfare system the goals and principles of the Consent Decree within specified timetables. (Consent Decree ¶¶ 64-68 (Doc. No. 235).) An Implementation Plan ultimately was approved by the court on November 1, 1993. (Order approving Implementation Plan (Doc. No. 265).)

Due to the extent of reforms necessary to implement the Consent Decree, the Implementation Plan called for the phased-in "conversion" of Alabama's sixty-seven counties. Each year, for seven consecutive years, specified counties were to be "converted" until all counties were functioning in compliance with the Consent Decree. The Implementation Plan was to be completed by October 1999, at which time the Consent Decree provided that Defendant could move for termination upon a showing of DHR's substantial compliance, both present and future, with the terms of the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan. (See Consent Decree ¶ 93 (footnote omitted) (Doc. No. 235).)

The Consent Decree also mandated the appointment of an independent court monitor who would serve as the court's agent and oversee and assist in the implementation process. (Id. ¶¶ 75-82.) On March 17, 1993, by agreement of the parties, the court appointed Dr. Ivor D. Groves, Ph.D., as the monitor in this lawsuit. (Doc. No. 260.) The court's five-page "order appointing monitor" sets out the monitor's roles and responsibilities which include assessing DHR's compliance with the Consent Decree and Implementation Plan, apprizing the court and the parties of DHR's progress, and mediating disputes between the parties. (Id.) Among other provisions, the order also dictates that the court monitor shall have access to all needed information, establishes guidelines for compensating the...