R.C. ex rel. Ala. Disabilities Advocacy v. Walley
Decision Date | 16 January 2007 |
Docket Number | Civil Action 2:88cv1170-ID. |
Citation | 475 F.Supp.2d 1118 |
Parties | R.C. by his next friend, THE ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY, PROGRAM, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Page WALLEY, as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Ashley Lomers, Barbara A. Lawrence, James A. Tucker, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, Tuscaloosa, AL, Douglas Richard Miller Nazarian, Patrick J. Reynolds, Ralph S. Tyler, Hogan & Hartson LLP, Baltimore, MD, Ira A. Burnim, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Troy Robin King, Attorney General's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.
Lisa Marie Mardis, Birmingham, AL, pro se.
DE MENT, Senior District Judge.
This cause is before the court on the second motion for order terminating Consent Decree (Doc. No. 761), filed by the Honorable Page Walley, Ph.D., who by virtue of his position as the commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR") is the defendant in this long-running litigation involving institutional reform of DHR's child welfare system.1 The first motion for order terminating Consent Decree was denied by the court in a memorandum opinion and order entered on May 13, 2005. See R.C. v. Walley ("R.C.I'), 390 F.Supp.2d 1030 (M.D.Ala.2005). In R.C.I, the court found that "Defendant ha[d] not submitted evidence sufficient to sustain his burden of demonstrating that DHR .`is' and .`will remain' in substantial compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan as required for termination of said Decree." Id. at 1033.
As grounds for his second motion, Defendant asserts that he has submitted an adequate evidentiary record to support termination of the Consent Decree, which has governed in this case since 1991, and that this evidence addresses and cures the deficiencies outlined by the court in R.C.I. Conversely, Plaintiffs, who opposed the first motion and likewise oppose the instant "second" motion, argue that there is no evidentiary basis for termination of the Consent Decree and that continued judicial oversight is necessary to bring Defendant in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree.
After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that DHR successfully has reformed its child welfare system by developing a system of care which substantially complies with the requirements of the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan and that judicial oversight is no longer necessary to avoid return to the depraved conditions that led to the commencement of this lawsuit in 1988 and to the court's intervention.2 The court finds that Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating DHR's substantial compliance under the Consent Decree's two-pronged termination clause and that, accordingly, Defendant's motion is due to be granted.3
The Consent Decree bestows upon the court shared authority with the court monitor to determine compliance with the Consent Decree, but sole authority to terminate the Consent Decree upon motion of Defendant. (Consent Decree ¶:¶ 86, 91, 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235)), as amended by 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511); R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1034. A court also maintains inherent jurisdiction over its decrees. See Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir.1994); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1568 (2d Cir.1985) (). The court, thus, acts within its jurisdiction in ruling on the present motion to terminate the Consent Decree.
The court begins with the principles, duly emphasized by Defendant, that Consent Decrees "are not intended to operate in perpetuity," Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248, 111 S.Ct. 630, 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), and that "[r]eturning governmental entities to the...
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