Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction
| Decision Date | 10 November 1983 |
| Parties | Russell NELSON et al. 1 v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Annette Benedetto, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.
Barry P. Wilson, Boston, for plaintiffs.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.
This case, and three accompanying cases presented by other plaintiffs, raise questions as to the constitutionality of procedures prescribed by State regulations for State prison disciplinary hearings. 2 The plaintiffs, Russell Nelson and Frank Goldman, 3 3 filed a combined pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs contend that their "constitutional right to due process in a prison disciplinary board hearing" 4 was violated in a hearing in which the disciplinary board (board) of the Department of Correction relied solely on informant hearsay information in finding the plaintiffs guilty of offenses committed within a penal institution. Nelson and Goldman sought the removal of the sanctions imposed by the board.
After a hearing on the merits, a Superior Court judge in Norfolk County made findings, rulings, and an order, and entered judgments declaring that the board arbitrarily denied the plaintiffs due process of law. The judgments also set forth standards for the protection of prisoners' minimal due process rights in disciplinary hearings involving informants, and entered judgments ordering the plaintiffs returned to their status prior to the imposition of sanctions by the board and the Commissioner of Correction (Commissioner). 5
The defendant appealed and sought a stay of the judgments pending appeal, which was denied by the Superior Court judge but granted by a single justice of the Appeals Court. The defendant's appeal from the judgments of the Superior Court is before us on our granting of his application for direct appellate review.
The defendant contends that the trial judge erred in not dismissing the complaint to the extent it constituted a petition for habeas corpus relief. The defendant further claims that, in so far as the complaint sought declaratory relief, his motion to dismiss the action should have been granted because judicial review under G.L. c. 231A is not available with respect to administrative prison proceedings. The defendant argues that the only judicial review available to the plaintiffs is an action in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G.L. c. 249, § 4. Finally, the defendant contends that the procedures followed by the board, in accordance with the prison regulations governing discipline, 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.01 et seq. (1978), are constitutionally valid under the principles set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
We conclude that the action for declaratory relief was brought properly, and that the due process rights of the plaintiffs guaranteed by the United States Constitution were violated by the failure of the pertinent State regulations to prescribe adequate precautions in the use of informant information by the board.
We uphold that part of the ruling of the judge pertaining to loss of statutory good time credits. However, for reasons we set forth later in this opinion, the judgments entered must be set aside, new judgments declaring the rights of the parties must be entered, and the judge, on motion of the defendant, is to remand the matter to a disciplinary board for further hearings.
The facts are these. The plaintiffs are inmates lawfully committed to the custody and control of the Department of Correction. At the time of the disciplinary actions underlying this appeal, both plaintiffs were inmates of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (M.C.I., Norfolk), a medium security institution. Both Nelson and Goldman were accused by Deputy Superintendent Terrance Holbrook in disciplinary reports of possession of a firearm in violation of 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.22(15) (1978), and of "[v]iolating any law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or United States," in violation of 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.22(30). Nelson was also accused of stealing in violation of 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.22(26).
The deputy superintendent made these allegations based on information he had received from a The disciplinary reports further stated that Nelson had sold the firearm to another inmate and that Goldman knew the whereabouts of that weapon. Both reports designated the offenses as major disciplinary matters. See 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.09(2) (1978).
Each plaintiff received a copy of his respective disciplinary report and notice of an impending disciplinary hearing before the board. The notice to each plaintiff indicated that he could request legal representation at the hearing, request the presence of the reporting officer, or call witnesses. Nelson formally asked for the presence of another inmate, Kenneth Courtney. Goldman did not request any witnesses.
On March 15, 1978, the board heard the charges against the plaintiffs in separate, consecutive hearings. Both plaintiffs were represented by counsel, and both pleaded not guilty. The disciplinary hearing procedures were governed by 103 Code Mass.Regs. § 430.00 et seq. (1978). 6
A. Russell Nelson's hearing. After being told that he had a right to remain silent because of the possibility of reference of the matter to the district attorney and after a reading of the disciplinary report, the chairman of the board told Nelson that it would determine in executive session if disclosure of the information would create a substantial risk of harm to the informant or informants (hereinafter, "informants"), to another person, or to institutional security. He was told also that the board would rule on the reliability of the informants and the information. The chairman indicated three factors that would be considered by the board in assessing reliability. The three factors stated were possible corroborating evidence, possible motives of the informants, and previous reliable information that had been provided in the past. The board then went into an executive session.
No informant appeared in camera before the board, and Deputy Superintendent Holbrook withdrew after presenting the informant information. Upon returning from executive session, the chairman announced that the informant was determined to be reliable and that the information was reliable and independently corroborated. Declaring that disclosure would jeopardize the informants and institutional security, the board summarized the informant information, heard in camera, by repeating the disciplinary report. Although admitting that the informants had a motive for supplying the information, the board, on request of plaintiff's counsel, refused to reveal the number of informants, the type of firearm stolen, whether the information was the personal knowledge of the informants or hearsay, and whether the informants had proved reliable in the past. The board also declined to disclose when Deputy Superintendent Holbrook had received the information from the informants.
No physical evidence, including the allegedly stolen gun, was produced. The only corroboration offered by the board was an incident report and testimony by Correctional Officer Duval that, at an unspecified time, he saw Nelson with another inmate near the office allegedly entered on the day of the break-in. Nelson testified that he left his unit only once that day to deliver his and another inmate's laundry. His testimony was supported by his requested witness.
Based on the informant information, and the incident report and testimony, the disciplinary board found Nelson guilty. The sanctions imposed were thirty days of isolation, forfeiture of 120 days of good time, referral of the matter to the district attorney, and recommendation of reclassification. 7
Nelson received a written statement by the board summarizing the evidence on which it had relied. Again, the board refused to disclose any information about its executive session, contending that disclosure would create a substantial risk of harm to the informants, and would threaten institutional security. 8
Nelson's appeal to the Commissioner was denied. He served his isolation time and, on May 22, 1978, was reclassified to M.C.I., Walpole, a maximum security institution, where he is presently an inmate.
B. Frank Goldman's hearing. Goldman's disciplinary hearing was conducted in a manner similar to Nelson's hearing. However, there was one difference in that no evidence was offered other than the informant information. The judge found that, in Goldman's hearing, the board did indicate that there was more than one informant and that one informant corroborated the information of the other or others.
Again, the chairman summarized the executive session by repeating the disciplinary report. The written statement received by Goldman contained the same language the board used in Nelson's statement of the evidence. 9
Based on Deputy Superintendent Holbrook's report, Goldman was found guilty of the offense charged. The sanctions imposed were fifteen days in isolation, forfeiture of 100 days of good time, referral to the district attorney, and recommendation of reclassification. Goldman's appeal to the Commissioner was also denied. After serving the isolation time, Goldman was also reclassified and transferred to M.C.I., Walpole. 10
We turn to the defendant's claims of error. We consider first the procedural issues raised by the defendant.
1. Declaratory relief. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is appropriate where the petitioner alleges that he is...
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