Patterson v. South Carolina R. Co.
| Decision Date | 24 March 1873 |
| Citation | 4 S.C. 153 |
| Parties | PATTERSON v. RAILROAD COMPANY. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
The declaration of an agent, made the day after the event occurred to which it related, is no part of the res gestae , and cannot be given in evidence against the principal.
At the trial bye a jury of an action against a railroad company, as common carriers, to recover for the loss of cotton alleged to have been delivered at a depot of defendants, and burned the same day, a declaration of the agent made the next day that " the railroad company was responsible for the cotton," was received as evidence against defendant Held , Error, but no ground for a new trial-the declaration being a mere expression of opinion and irrelevant to the issues.
BEFORE F. W. MCMASTER, SPECIAL JUDGE, RICHLAND, APRIL TERM, 1872.
Action by George W. Patterson, plaintiff, against the South Carolina Railroad Company, defendants, to recover damages for the loss of cotton alleged to have been delivered by plaintiff to defendants, as common carriers, at their depot in Richland County, called Gadsden.
For the plaintiff, evidence tending to show that some time in the year 1864 the cotton of plaintiff was hauled from the plantation of James W. Adams to Gadsden, and delivered there to Flowers, the agent of the defendants, at that depot; that it was deposited on the platform and was burned the same afternoon on the cars of defendants.
During the trial, Goodson, a witness for the plaintiff, was allowed to testify that he had a conversation with Flowers, the agent, the morning after the burning of the cotton. I asked him who lost the cotton, because I felt an interest in it. I did not like to see Capt. Adams lose it, as it had been in my charge. " He said the railroad company were responsible for the cotton." This evidence was objected to by defendants as incompetent, but was received as part of the res gestoe .
The jury found for the plaintiff, and defendants appealed.
Chamberlain , for appellants, contended that the evidence received was no part of the res gestoe , and should have been rejected. He cited 1 Green Ev., § 108, 110, 113; 1 Phil. Ev., 507; Story on Ag., § 134-5; Enos vs Tuttle , 3 Conn. 250; Mitchum vs. The State , 11 Ga. 625; Fairlee vs. Hastings , 10 Ves. 123; Stiles vs. Western R. R. Company , 8 Metc. 44; Cooley vs. Norton , 4 Cush. 93; Corbin vs. Adams , 6 Cush. 93; Robinson vs. Railroad , 9 Gray 92; Parker vs. Green , 8 Metc. 142-3; Lund vs. Tyngsboro , 9 Cush. 36; Baring vs. Clark , 11 Pick. 220; Burnham vs. Ellis , 37 Me. 319; Hannay vs. Stewart , 6 Watts 489; City Bank of Baltimore vs. Bateman , 7 Har. & Johns., 105; Magill vs. Kauffman , 4 S. & R., 317; Bingham vs. Cabbot , 3 Dall. 19, 39; Bank of Monroe vs. Field , 2 Hill 445; Thallhimer vs. Brinckerhoff , 4 Wend. 394; Hubbard vs. Elmer , 7 Wend, 446; Barker vs. Binninger , 14 N.Y. 270; Luby vs. Hudson River R. R. Company , 17 N.Y. 131; Fogg vs. Child , 13 Barb. 246; State Bank vs. Johnson , 1 Mill. 200; Park vs. Hopkins , 2 Bail. 408; Martin & Walker vs. Stribling , 1 Sp. 24; Lark vs. Cunningham , 7 Rich. 57; Pritchett vs. Sessions , 10 Rich. 293; Raiford vs. French , 11 Rich. 367; Garth vs. Howard & Flemming , 8 Bing. 451.
Monteith & Bauskett , contra, cited 1 Green. Ev., § 114; Morse vs. Conn. River R. R. Company , 8 Gray 450; Charleston and Savannah R. R. Company vs. Blake , 12 Rich. 634.
The principle of law contended for by the counsel of the appellants, restricting the admissibility of the declarations, statements or admissions of an agent as evidence, is not disputed by the other side. The agent having authority to act for his principal, either in a special matter or in his general business, stands, as to all transactions, within the scope of his authority as the principal himself. While the admission and confessions of the principal are always received as competent testimony against him, the rule, in the same unrestricted manner, cannot be applied to those of his agent. The reason is plain and obvious; the principal is bound not only by all that he does and says, for he may affect himself as he pleases by act or word, but the declarations of the agent can only bind the principal so far as they are connected with the business in which he represented him.
In the language of Mr. Greenleaf, in his work on evidence, Vol. 1 Sec. 108: " These surrounding circumstances, constituting part of the res gestoe , may always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact." The res gestoe is the act from which the liability of the principal arises, because the authority to bind him by it has been conferred upon the agent; but, when it is completely executed, the connection of the agent terminates, and, therefore, his admission or statements in regard to any of the results or consequences of the transaction may be treated as if made by a stranger. While there...
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