40 164 DeFunis v. Odegaard 8212 235, No. 73

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtPER CURIAM; DOUGLAS; APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS; Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS
Citation416 U.S. 312,40 L.Ed.2d 164,94 S.Ct. 1704
Docket NumberNo. 73
Decision Date23 April 1974
Parties. 40 L.Ed.2d 164 Marco DeFUNIS et al., Petitioners, v. Charles ODEGAARD, President of the University of Washington. —235

416 U.S. 312
94 S.Ct. 1704.
40 L.Ed.2d 164
Marco DeFUNIS et al., Petitioners,

v.

Charles ODEGAARD, President of the University of Washington.

No. 73—235.
Argued Feb. 26, 1974.
Decided April 23, 1974.

Josef Diamond, Seattle, Wash., for petitioners.

Page 313

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

[Amicus Curiae Information from pages 313-314 intentionally omitted]

Page 314

PER CURIAM.

In 1971 the petitioner Marco DeFunis, Jr.,1 applied for admission as a first-year student at the University of Washington Law School, a state-operated institution. The size of the incoming first-year class was to be limited to 150 persons, and the Law School received some 1,600 applications for these 150 places. DeFunis was eventually notified that he had been denied admission. He thereupon commenced this suit in a Washington trial court, contending that the procedures and criteria employed by the Law School Admissions Committee invidiously discriminated against him on account of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

DeFunis brought the suit on behalf of himself alone, and not as the representative of any class, against the various respondents, who are officers, faculty members, and members of the Board of Regents of the University of Washington. He asked the trial court to issue a mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to admit him as a member of the first-year class entering in September 1971, on the ground that the Law School admissions policy had resulted in the unconstitutional denial of his application for admission. The trial court agreed with his claim and granted the requested relief.

Page 315

DeFunis was, accordingly, admitted to the Law School and began his legal studies there in the fall of 1971. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the Law School admissions policy did not violate the Constitution. By this time DeFunis was in his second year at the Law School.

He then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, and Mr. Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court pending the 'final disposition of the case by this Court.' By virtue of this stay, DeFunis has remained in law school, and was in the first term of his third and final year when this Court first considered his certiorari petition in the fall of 1973. Because of our concern that DeFunis' third-year standing in the Law School might have rendered this case moot, we requested the parties to brief the question of mootness before we acted on the petition. In response, both sides contended that the case was not moot. The respondents indicated that, if the decision of the Washington Supreme Court were permitted to stand, the petitioner could complete the term for which he was then enrolled but would have to apply to the faculty for permission to continue in the school before he could register for another term.2

We granted the petition for certiorari on November 19, 1973. 414 U.S. 1038, 94 S.Ct. 538, 38 L.Ed.2d 329. The case was in due course orally argued on February 26, 1974.

In response to questions raised from the bench during the oral argument, counsel for the petitioner has informed the Court that DeFunis has now registered 'for his final

Page 316

quarter in law school.' Counsel for the respondents have made clear that the Law School will not in any way seek to abrogate this registration.3 In light of DeFunis' recent registration for the last quarter of his final law school year, and the Law School's assurance that his registration is fully effective, the insistent question again arises whether this case is not moot, and to that question we now turn.

The starting point for analysis is the familiar proposition that 'federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.' North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971). The inability of the federal judiciary 'to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Art. III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.' Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 391, 394, 11 L.Ed.2d 347 (1964); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1950, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 50 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1896, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Although as a matter of Washington state law it appears that this case would be saved from mootness by 'the great public interest in the continuing issues raised by this appeal,' 82 Wash.2d 11, 23 n. 6, 507 P.2d 1169, 1177 n. 6 (1973), the fact remains that under Art. III '(e)ven in cases arising in the state courts, the question of mootness is a federal one which a federal court must resolve before it assumes jurisdiction.' North Carolina v. Rice, supra, 404 U.S., at 246, 92 S.Ct., at 404.

The respondents have represented that, without regard to the ultimate resolution of the issues in this case,

Page 317

DeFunis will remain a student in the Law School for the duration of any term in which he has already enrolled. Since he has now registered for his final term, it is evident that he will be given an opportunity to complete all academic and other requirements for graduation, and, if he does so, will receive his diploma regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the merits of this case. In short, all parties agree that DeFunis is now entitled to complete his legal studies at the University of Washington and to receive his degree from that institution. A determination by this Court of the legal issues tendered by the parties is no longer necessary to compel that result, and could not serve to prevent it. DeFunis did not cast his suit as a class action, and the only remedy he requested was an injunction commanding his admission to the Law School. He was not only accorded that remedy, but he now has also been irrevocably admitted to the final term of the final year of the Law School course. The controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be 'definite and concrete' and no longer 'touch(es) the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.' Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240—241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).

It matters not that these circumstances partially stem from a policy decision on the part of the respondent Law School authorities. The respondents, through their counsel, the Attorney General of the State, have professionally represented that in no event will the status of DeFunis now be affected by any view this Court might express on the merits of this controversy. And it has been the settled practice of the Court, in contexts no less significant, fully to accept representations such as these as parameters for decision. See Gerende v. Election Board, 341 U.S. 56, 71 S.Ct. 565, 95 L.Ed. 745 (1951); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57—58, 88 S.Ct. 184, 185—186, 19 L.Ed.2d 228 (1967); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99,

Page 318

107, 91 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 28 L.Ed.2d 625 (1971); cf. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 162—163, 91 S.Ct. 720, 726—727, 27 L.Ed.2d 749 (1971).

There is a line of decisions in this Court standing for the proposition that the 'voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot.' United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 308—310, 17 S.Ct. 540, 546—547, 41 L.Ed. 1007 (1897); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 43, 65 S.Ct. 11, 14, 89 L.Ed. 29 (1944); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376, 83 S.Ct. 801, 806, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963); United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 202—203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 363 364, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968). These decisions and the doctrine they reflect would be quite relevant if the question of mootness here had arisen by reason of a unilateral change in the admissions procedures of the Law School. For it was the admissions procedures that were the target of this litigation, and a voluntary cessation of the admissions practices complained of could make this case moot only if it could be said with assurance 'that 'there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated." United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, 345 U.S., at 633, 73 S.Ct., at 897. Otherwise, '(t)he defendant is free to return to his old ways,' id., at 632, 73 S.Ct., at 897, and this fact would be enough to prevent mootness because of the 'public interest in having the legality of the practices settled.' Ibid. But mootness in the present case depends not at all upon a 'voluntary cessation' of the admissions practices that were the subject of this litigation. It depends, instead, upon the simple fact that DeFunis is now in the final quarter of the final year of his course of study, and the settled and unchallenged policy of the Law School to permit him to complete the term for which he is now enrolled.

It might also be suggested that this case presents a question that is 'capable of repetition, yet evading

Page 319

review,' Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), and is thus amenable to federal adjudication even though it might otherwise be considered moot. But DeFunis will never again be required to run the gantlet of the Law School's admission process, and so the question is certainly not 'capable of repetition' so far as he is concerned. Moreover, just because this particular case did not reach the...

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987 practice notes
  • Hull v. Cason
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 1981
    ...may be no public racial discrimination at all; they side with Justice William O. Douglas in his dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard (1974) 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164, passim : " 'The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state source......
  • Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., No. 95-3055
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • February 16, 1996
    ...required by Article III. See e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604-05, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1707 n. 5, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that appellants have demonstrated any injury, o......
  • Bedford v. Sugarman, No. 55358-1
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • May 4, 1989
    ...an adjudication of the merits of this Page 506 case." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash.2d 11, 24, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 That a beneficiary resides in......
  • Jackson Court Condominiums v. City of New Orleans, Civ. A. No. 84-3466.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Louisiana)
    • July 20, 1987
    ...which, due to the parties' changed circumstances, the court can no longer accord any effective relief to the parties. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). In such a case, a constitutional adjudication would amount to an advisory opinion. This is clearly n......
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981 cases
  • Hull v. Cason
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 1981
    ...may be no public racial discrimination at all; they side with Justice William O. Douglas in his dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard (1974) 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164, passim : " 'The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state source......
  • Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., No. 95-3055
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • February 16, 1996
    ...required by Article III. See e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604-05, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1707 n. 5, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that appellants have demonstrated any injury, o......
  • Bedford v. Sugarman, No. 55358-1
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • May 4, 1989
    ...an adjudication of the merits of this Page 506 case." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash.2d 11, 24, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 That a beneficiary resides in......
  • Jackson Court Condominiums v. City of New Orleans, Civ. A. No. 84-3466.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Louisiana)
    • July 20, 1987
    ...which, due to the parties' changed circumstances, the court can no longer accord any effective relief to the parties. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). In such a case, a constitutional adjudication would amount to an advisory opinion. This is clearly n......
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  • List of Cases Referenced
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 28-1, March 1975
    • March 1, 1975
    ...94 S.Ct. 2114 (1974) Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S.Ct. 1704 Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2140 (1974)Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)Fuller v.......
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    • June 1, 2007
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    • South Dakota Law Review Vol. 67 Nbr. 2, June 2022
    • June 22, 2022
    ...from three years earlier. Croson. 488 U.S. at 493; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). That opinion stated, without any support, that "[a] segregated admissions process creates suggestions of s......
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    • William and Mary Law Review Vol. 63 Nbr. 1, October 2021
    • October 1, 2021
    ...7th ed. 2016). (16.) Id. [section]2.5.1. (17.) See Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per curiam). (18.) See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318 (1974) (per (19.) U.S. CONST, art. III, [section] 2; see Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1......
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