Martin v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 03 April 1953
• Citation: 255 P.2d 416,40 Cal.2d 583
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: MARTIN v. HENDERSON et al. REDWINE v. HENDERSON et al. Sac. 6280.

Page 416

255 P.2d 416

40 Cal.2d 583

MARTIN v. HENDERSON et al.

REDWINE v. HENDERSON et al.

Sac. 6280.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

April 3, 1953.

Rehearing Denied April 30, 1953.

Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attys. Gen., and Wilmer W. Morse, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellants.

James H. Phillips, Sacramento, for respondents.

EDMONDS, Justice.

For a number of years, Andrew W. Martin was a traffic sergeant and George H. Redwine a traffic officer of the State Highway Patrol. They worked in excess of regular hours of duty without receiving equivalent time off. After the termination of their employment, Martin and Redwine each filed a petition to compel the respondents, the appropriate state officials, to approve his claim for overtime. The appeal is from a judgment requiring approval and payment of the claims.

The facts are undisputed. During the entire period of service, the monthly salary of each petitioner was fully paid. Martin worked about 500 hours in excess of his regular hours of duty, 100 of them being worked between February 6 and September 29, 1943. Redwine's excess hours of duty totaled 332, all but 33 of them being served before February 6, 1943. Martin retired on April 30, 1947. Redwine's separation from service was on March 16, 1947.

Headquarters General Order No. 295, issued by the chief of the highway patrol, effective October 1, 1939, provided: 'Employees ordered to work beyond the hours ordinarily required or hours overtime in addition to what is considered their regular full day's work, may be allowed time off on the day following or at some other convenient time in lieu of the overtime hours worked. Overtime hours shall be adjusted by the immediate superior of the employee affected and shall not become a part of the Headquarters' record.'

Order No. 295 was canceled by Headquarters General Order No. 394 effective August 5, 1942. The new order read: 'Employees ordered to work beyond the hours ordinarily required and considered as a full days work may be allowed compensating time off in lieu of such overtime worked. Such overtime hours may be granted and adjusted by the immediate superior of the employee affected and shall not become a part of the Headquarters record.'

On June 5, 1945, the chief of the highway patrol issued Information Bulletin No. 323, requiring that any claim for overtime hours accumulated prior to September 29, 1943, must be reported to the department in writing, accompanied by evidence in affidavit form supporting the claim. Failure to present a claim in the form outlined by June 30 would constitute a waiver of any claim for such overtime hours. Each of the petitioners complied with the requirements of this bulletin by timely filing a claim in the specified form.

Thereafter, on August 21, 1945, Headquarters Information Bulletin No. 329 was issued rejecting each and all of the claims presented pursuant to Bulletin No. 323. Following a list of reasons for the rejection of the claims, Bulletin No. 329 stated that 'it is not believed that the State is privileged at this time either to grant compensating time off for overtime hours * * * worked prior to September 29, 1943, or to pay an employee the cash equivalent thereof on separation or otherwise. Accordingly, liability therefor is hereby denied and no such overtime credit will be recognized * * * and any and all overtime hours * * * accumulated or claimed to have been accumulated prior to September 29, 1943, are hereby cancelled.'

Rule 12 of the State Personnel Board, adopted June 17, 1938, with reference to the pay plan for the state civil service provided for pay schedules. Section 2(c) of the rule stated that: 'The rates of pay set forth in the pay schedules, unless otherwise indicated in such schedules, represent the total compensation in every form.' It was also provided in section 2(h) that: 'When the rate of pay is in terms of dollars a month no additional payment for overtime shall be made to any employee for services rendered by him in the same department, whether in the discharge of his ordinary duties or for any other duties which may be imposed upon him or which he may undertake or volunteer to discharge or perform.' On October 18, 1940, section 2(h) of Rule 12 was amended to read: 'When the rate of pay is in terms of dollars a month no additional payment for overtime shall be made to any employee for services rendered by him in the same classification in the same department.'

Effective February 6, 1943, section 150.5 was added to the State Civil Service Act, Stats.1937, ch. 753, providing: 'Upon a separation from service, without fault on his part, a person shall be entitled to a lump sum payment as of the time of separation * * * for any time off to which the person is entitled by reason of previous overtime work where compensating time off for overtime work is provided for by the appointing power or by the rules of the board. Such sums shall be computed by projecting the accumulated time on a calendar basis so that the lump sum will equal the amount to which the employee would have been paid had he taken the time off but not separated from the service.' Stats.1943, ch. 20, § 2, p. 136; now Govt.Code § 18005.

The petition of Redwine, filed March 11, 1948, asked that the respondent state officers be required to approve and pay his claim for overtime on the basis of the amount of salary he was receiving at the time he left the state service. By petition filed on April 21, 1948, Martin sought the same relief. The answer of the respondents denied that any amount was due for overtime. They alleged that any accumulated overtime hours had been canceled by departmental action and that the causes of action are barred by various statutory provisions.

Upon trial the superior court, by writ of mandate, directed that the respondents approve Martin's claim in the amount of $872.95 and Redwine's for $512.44, the respective cash values of the claimed overtime. The appeal is from that judgment.

In support of their appeal, the respondents contend that, insofar as hours worked prior to February 6, 1943, are concerned, Martin and Redwine were paid monthly salaries which, by statute, constituted compensation in full for all services which might be rendered by them. Prior to that date, they say, there was no statutory provision for overtime compensation and none could be allowed in the absence of statute. The respondents also argue that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations, regardless of whether the hours were worked prior or subsequent to February 6, 1943. Even if Martin and Redwine are entitled to a cash payment for overtime worked prior to February 6, 1943, the respondents say, the amount should be computed upon the basis of each officer's salary as of the time the hours were worked, rather than as of the time of separation.

Martin and Redwine rely upon Howard v. Lampton, 87 Cal.App.2d 449, 197 P.2d 69, and Clark v. State Personnel Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499, 133 P.2d 11. These decisions were based, by analogy, upon Pohle v. Christian, 21 Cal.2d 83, 130 P.2d 417, in which it was held that a civil service employee, upon separation from service without fault on his part, is entitled to a cash payment for accumulated vacation time. The basis for the conclusion in the Pohle case was the statutory provision giving each officer and employee of the state a right to a vacation of specified duration. Former Pol.Code § 359c; cf. Govt.Code § 18050. In accordance with former section 359d of the Political Code (now Govt.Code § 18052), the State Personnel Board had provided for payment upon separation for unused portions of vacation time. State Personnel Board Rule 13, § 4. The court held that, because the applicable sections of the Political Code 'do not expressly or otherwise provide that an employee having the right to a vacation loses his right to compensation for that time upon being separated from the service' he is entitled to payment for unused vacation time. 21 Cal.2d at page 90, 130 P.2d at page 421.

The Clark case followed the Pohle decision insofar as payment for accumulated vacation time was concerned. The court then held that, despite the absence of any statutory provision granting time off for overtime work and a rule of the Personnel Board specifically prohibiting payment for overtime, a state employee may be paid upon separation from service for accumulated overtime hours. It said (56 Cal.App.2d 499, 133 P.2d 12): 'We see no difference in principle between allowing an employee a cash payment for accrued vacation time upon his separation from the service, and allowing him, upon such separation, a cash payment in lieu of the compensatory time off to which he may have become entitled because of overtime worked.' The rule regarding payment for overtime hours expressed in the Clark case was applied to retired officers of the highway patrol in the Howard case, which involved a factual situation substantially similar to that here presented.

The basic fallacy in the Howard and Clark cases was the court's assumption that, in the absence of any statutory provision, a civil service employee had a right to compensatory time off for overtime work. Those decisions are clearly distinguishable from the Pohle case, where the employee had a right granted by statute to a specified amount of vacation time.

Prior to February 6, 1943, the effective date of section 150.5 of the State Civil Service Act, supra, there was no statutory provision for overtime compensation. Section 1033 of the Political Code (now Govt.Code § 18000) provided: 'The salaries fixed by law for all state officers, elective or appointive, shall be compensation in full for all services rendered in any official capacity or employment whatsoever, during their terms of office, and no such officer shall receive for his own use any fee or perquisite for the performance of any official duty.' The same limitation was applied to...