401 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1966), 51526, In re Coleman Highlands

Docket Nº:51526.
Citation:401 S.W.2d 385
Party Name:In re Condemnation COLEMAN HIGHLANDS, Kansas City, Missouri. Sheridan E. KINDLE et al., Respondents, v. KANSAS CITY, Missouri, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant.
Case Date:April 11, 1966
Court:Supreme Court of Missouri

Page 385

401 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1966)

In re Condemnation COLEMAN HIGHLANDS, Kansas City, Missouri.

Sheridan E. KINDLE et al., Respondents,

v.

KANSAS CITY, Missouri, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant.

No. 51526.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

April 11, 1966

Don M. Jackson, Kansas City, Jackson, Wade & Barker, Kansas City, of counsel, for respondents.

Herbert C. Hoffman, City Counselor, Benj. M. Powers, Sp. Counsel, Kansas City, for appellant.

EAGER, Presiding Judge.

This proceeding is one in condemnation under the provisions of the Kansas City Charter. The proceeding was instituted by the filing of the condemnation ordinance in the Circuit Court on February 12, 1965. Service was made by publication and by certified mail addressed to the various interested property owners; no point is raised regarding the service. The tract involved consists of substantially all of Coleman Highlands, an addition in Kansas City extending, generally speaking, from 31st Street to 35th Street, north and south, and from Summit Street (Southwest Trafficway) to Holly Street, east and west. Its dimensions are approximately 2600 feet by 1300 feet. There are apparently 311 lots in the addition, and several streets run wholly or partially through it; one of these is Karnes Boulevard which runs generally north and south through the easterly portion, it being the next street west of Summit. Since no evidence was heard, we take our information from a map filed concurrently with the ordinance and made a part of our transcript.

The ordinance recites, in substance, the following: that the use of all lots in Coleman Highlands was originally restricted (obviously about 1903) to 'detached residences' and suitable outbuildings, but that such provisions 'were to expire' by their terms on June 1, 1923; that the City extended those provisions 'by ordinance' for

Page 386

an additional twenty years, and again did so by ordinance passed on May 10, 1943, it being further recited that the latter ordinance operated in 'substantially the same manner as is provided in this ordinance'; that all buildings on the various streets in the addition were used exclusively for residential purposes and that 'the overwhelming sentiment and belief of the property owners immediately interested, and of all citizens who desire to make Kansas City a good place in which to live, and of the Council are that the enactment and enforcement of this ordinance will enhance and stabilize the value and utility of each and every piece of property within the district herein described and will maintain property values for the purpose of public taxation and will promote the health and welfare of the city, as well as add to the beautification of the city and of said Coleman Highlands Addition, * * *.' Following the foregoing, it was enacted that: for a period of twenty years from the effective date of the ordinance the lots, tracts and parcels of land in Coleman Highlands (except a group of 23 and a fraction lots at the northwest corner,--with no explanation for the exception) should be restricted in use as therein provided, namely, that 'no house or buildings, other than single detached residences, each for the use of one family only * * * shall be constructed or used * * *.' Other provisions were included concerning the land area for each building constructed, billboards, gasoline tanks and filling stations; these are not immediately material to our discussion. The ordinance further provided that since the owners might 'claim' that their...

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4 practice notes
  • 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969), 53731, City of Kansas City v. Kindle
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 10, 1969
    ...HOUSER, Commissioner. This is the second appeal in a condemnation proceeding. On the first appeal, In re Coleman Highlands, Mo.Sup., 401 S.W.2d 385, a judgment dismissing the proceedings in the pleading state, on motion of certain property owners, was reversed and the cause was remanded to ......
  • 458 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. 1970), 54665, Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Greening
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri
    • September 14, 1970
    ...particular facts of each case. 'There is no fixed or stereotyped definition of the term 'public use. " In Re Coleman Highlands, Mo., 401 S.W.2d 385, 387. From the record before us, we conclude that the taking was reasonably necessary to facilitate the operation of plaintiff's business ......
  • 398 S.W.3d 472 (Mo. 2013), SC 92717, State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri
    • May 28, 2013
    ...deprive it of its public character. 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404, 408 (banc 1923) (citation omitted). See also In re Coleman Highlands, 401 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo.1966) (" We do note that ... [this] Court adopted what it described as a liberal and flexible interpretation of ‘ public use’ whi......
  • 458 S.W.3d 319 (Mo. 2015), SC93816, Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri
    • April 14, 2015
    ...to create some " public advantage" or " public benefit." Dolan, 398 S.W.3d at 476 (citing In re Coleman Highlands, 401 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo. There are two deficiencies in Appellants' argument that section 537.296(2) effectuates a private taking. First, the plain language ......
4 cases
  • 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969), 53731, City of Kansas City v. Kindle
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri
    • November 10, 1969
    ...HOUSER, Commissioner. This is the second appeal in a condemnation proceeding. On the first appeal, In re Coleman Highlands, Mo.Sup., 401 S.W.2d 385, a judgment dismissing the proceedings in the pleading state, on motion of certain property owners, was reversed and the cause was remanded to ......
  • 458 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. 1970), 54665, Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Greening
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri
    • September 14, 1970
    ...particular facts of each case. 'There is no fixed or stereotyped definition of the term 'public use. " In Re Coleman Highlands, Mo., 401 S.W.2d 385, 387. From the record before us, we conclude that the taking was reasonably necessary to facilitate the operation of plaintiff's business ......
  • 398 S.W.3d 472 (Mo. 2013), SC 92717, State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri
    • May 28, 2013
    ...deprive it of its public character. 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404, 408 (banc 1923) (citation omitted). See also In re Coleman Highlands, 401 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo.1966) (" We do note that ... [this] Court adopted what it described as a liberal and flexible interpretation of ‘ public use’ whi......
  • 458 S.W.3d 319 (Mo. 2015), SC93816, Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court of Missouri
    • April 14, 2015
    ...to create some " public advantage" or " public benefit." Dolan, 398 S.W.3d at 476 (citing In re Coleman Highlands, 401 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo. There are two deficiencies in Appellants' argument that section 537.296(2) effectuates a private taking. First, the plain language ......