Nader v. Maine Democratic Party

Decision Date19 April 2012
Docket NumberDocket No. Was–10–678.
Citation2012 ME 57,41 A.3d 551
PartiesRalph NADER et al. v. The MAINE DEMOCRATIC PARTY et al.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Harold Burbank, II, Esq., Canton, Connecticut, Lynne A. Williams, Esq., Bar Harbor, and Oliver B. Hall, Esq. (orally), Washington, District of Columbia, for appellants Ralph Nader, Christopher Droznick, Nancy Oden, and Rosemary Whittaker.

Stephen E.F. Langsdorf, Esq. (orally), Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Augusta, for appellees The Maine Democratic Party, The Democratic National Committee, Kerry–Edwards 2004, Inc., Dorothy Melanson, Terry McAuliffe.

Peter J. Brann, Esq., and Stacy O. Stitham, Esq. (orally), Brann & Isaacson, Lewiston, for appellees The Ballot Project, Inc., and Toby Moffett.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.

Concurrence: SILVER, and JABAR, JJ.

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶ 1] In this appeal we consider whether the Maine anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2011), 1 may be invoked to deprive a minor-party candidate of his day in court on a suit in which he alleges that he was subject to abuses of process, damaging to his candidacy, by organizations and individuals who conspired to take actions to prevent or complicate his inclusion on the ballot in Maine and other jurisdictions during the 2004 presidential election. We conclude that the Maine anti-SLAPP statute may not be invoked to achieve dismissal of claims alleging abuses of process without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to establish a prima facie case to support the claims.

[¶ 2] Ralph Nader, Christopher Droznick, Nancy Oden, and Rosemary Whittaker (collectively, Nader) appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court (Washington County, Cuddy, J.) granting the opposing parties' special motions to dismiss Nader's complaint pursuant to the Maine anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556. The opposing parties are (1) the Maine Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee, Kerry–Edwards 2004, Inc., Dorothy Melanson, and Terry McAuliffe (collectively, MDP); and (2) Toby Moffett and The Ballot Project, Inc. (collectively, Moffett).

[¶ 3] Nader argues that the court erred in interpreting and applying the anti-SLAPP statute when it granted MDP's and Moffett's special motions to dismiss; that the anti-SLAPP statute, as applied by the court, improperly abrogates common law tort law; and that the anti-SLAPP statute is unconstitutional as applied by the court. Moffett, as cross-appellant, appeals from the court's separately entered order on his motion for attorney fees, arguing that the court abused its discretion when it awarded him only one dollar in costs and attorney fees following the grant of his special motion to dismiss. Concluding that a legal standard different from that applied by the trial court applies in this anti-SLAPP matter, we vacate the judgment granting MDP's and Moffett's special motions to dismiss and granting Moffett's motion for attorney fees.

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶ 4] Ralph Nader was an independent candidate for President in the 2004 presidential election. His presidential electors in Maine included Christopher Droznick, Nancy Oden, and Rosemary Whittaker. Nader and his Maine presidential electors are collectively referenced as “Nader” in this opinion.2

[¶ 5] In November 2009, Nader filed a six-count complaint against MDP and Moffett based on actions that were alleged to have occurred prior to the 2004 presidential election. The complaint contains counts alleging (I) civil conspiracy; (II) conspiracy to commit abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings/malicious prosecution; (III) abuse of process in Maine proceedings; (IV) wrongful use of civil proceedings/malicious prosecution in Maine; (V) abuse of process in eighteen other jurisdictions; and (VI) wrongful use of civil proceedings/malicious prosecution in those eighteen jurisdictions.

[¶ 6] The Nader complaint alleged that MDP and Moffett took direct action, and conspired with others, to prevent Ralph Nader from appearing on the ballot as a candidate in the 2004 presidential election and deprive voters of the opportunity to vote for him. Nader alleged that MDP and Moffett attempted to accomplish these ends primarily by filing, and conspiring with others to file, twenty-nine “objectively baseless” complaints with courts and administrative bodies in seventeen states, including Maine, and with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in the District of Columbia, all within a twelve-week period.3 Nader alleged that the complaints challenged Nader's nomination papers and requested that Nader not be certified to run in the 2004 general election, but that MDP's and Moffett's actual and admitted purpose in filing the twenty-nine complaints was to “neutralize” the Nader campaign by distracting it and by draining it of money, time, and resources.

[¶ 7] The Nader complaint alleged that MDP's and Moffett's complaints were found to be baseless by a majority of the tribunals that considered the complaints, although it acknowledged that MDP and Moffett were successful in certain jurisdictions, at least at some stage of the proceedings. Nader's complaint, as well as subsequently submitted affidavits, contain numerous paragraphs alleging specific instances when MDP and Moffett acted and took coordinated actions with alleged co-conspirators for the sole purpose of harassing, distracting, and draining the resources from his campaign.

[¶ 8] With respect to the State of Maine, Nader alleged that MDP and Moffett filed two baseless complaints with the Secretary of State “raising technical objections to the form of [Nader's] nomination papers”; that the Secretary of State found the complaints lacked merit and dismissed them; and that MDP and Moffett exhausted all appeals to the Superior Court and to this Court, in which they were unsuccessful. See Melanson v. Sec'y of State, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641; Melanson v. Dep't of the Sec'y of State, 2004 WL 3196784, 2004 Me.Super. LEXIS 233 (Sept. 27, 2004).

[¶ 9] Finally, the Nader complaint alleged that Nader was damaged by MDP's and Moffett's actions by, among other things, being drained of time, money and other resources, being prevented from gaining ballot access in several states, and sustaining injury to Nader's financial resources and reputation.

[¶ 10] MDP and Moffett each filed motions to dismiss the Nader complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b). MDP included with its motion to dismiss, and Moffett separately filed, a special motion to dismiss Nader's complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556. Nader opposed the motions.

[¶ 11] The court held a hearing in November 2010 on the special motions to dismiss and entered a judgment granting MDP's and Moffett's special motions to dismiss. The court concluded that MDP and Moffett satisfied their initial burdens under the anti-SLAPP statute of showing that “their activity of challenging nomination petitions in several states is activity manifesting their right of petition under the” United States and Maine Constitutions and is protected by section 556. The court then concluded that Nader had failed to meet his burden of showing that “the Defendants' efforts in the 17 states and before the Federal Election Commission were devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law,” even if MDP and Moffett often were not successful. Accordingly, the court granted MDP's and Moffett's special motions to dismiss pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute and dismissed the Rule 12(b) motions as moot. Nader filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's judgment.

[¶ 12] Moffett filed a motion for costs and attorney fees pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, which Nader opposed.4 On December 28, 2010, the court entered a four-page judgment granting Moffett's motion and awarding one dollar in fees and costs. The court stated that [t]he broad interpretation and application of [the anti-SLAPP statute] by the Law Court, compels the decision [the court] reached” in its judgment. The court further stated, “But for the impact of legal authority in this State relating to 14 M.R.S. § 556, this [c]ourt is of the opinion that [Nader's] action warranted further analysis and development through the evolution of normal civil litigation process.” The court thus concluded that “the special circumstances of this case warranted a grant of fees and costs to Moffett, but that the same considerations persuaded the court that an award of one dollar was appropriate. Moffett cross-appeals from the court's December 28, 2010, order.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Anti–SLAPP Statute; Historical Interpretation and Application

[¶ 13] Title 14 M.R.S. § 556, known as Maine's anti-SLAPP statute, states in relevant part:

When a moving party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaims or cross claims against the moving party are based on the moving party's exercise of the moving party's right of petition under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Maine, the moving party may bring a special motion to dismiss. The court shall advance the special motion so that it may be heard and determined with as little delay as possible. The court shall grant the special motion, unless the party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party's exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and that the moving party's acts caused actual injury to the responding party. In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleading and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.5

[¶ 14] The anti-SLAPP statute is designed to allow a defendant to file a special motion to dismiss a lawsuit that a plaintiff brings “with the...

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