State v. Fuller
| Decision Date | 26 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 44172 |
| Citation | 163 Idaho 585,416 P.3d 957 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Antonia Kate FULLER, Defendant-Respondent. |
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Sally J. Cooley argued.
In this appeal, the State challenges the Kootenai County district court's decision to grant Antonia Kate Fuller's motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. Because we conclude the traffic stop was unconstitutional, we affirm the district court's order suppressing the evidence.
On December 6, 2015, Deputy Harvey Ballman of the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department was patrolling the area near the intersection of Highways 95 and 53 in Kootenai County. At approximately 10:50 p.m., Deputy Ballman was traveling westbound on Highway 53 when he observed a vehicle, driven by Fuller, traveling a few car lengths in front of him. As Deputy Ballman followed Fuller, the roadway began to make a right-hand curve. When Fuller continued on the roadway and drove her vehicle around the right-hand curve, Deputy Ballman observed the front passenger-side tire of Fuller's vehicle drive onto and temporarily across the solid white line on the right-hand side of the roadway (i.e., the fog line). Deputy Ballman then initiated a traffic stop, citing Fuller's failure to maintain her lane of travel as required under Idaho Code section 49-637(1).
During the traffic stop, Deputy Ballman discovered that Fuller did not have a valid driver's license or liability insurance. Deputy Ballman placed Fuller under arrest for violations of Idaho Code sections 49-301(1) and 49-1232 before conducting an inventory search of her vehicle. That search revealed methamphetamine, prescription drugs, and drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, he expanded the arrest for violations of Idaho Code sections 37-2732(c)(1) () and 37-2734A (possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia). Fuller was never cited for a traffic offense.
Fuller's preliminary hearing was held on January 28, 2016, at which Deputy Ballman testified that he observed Fuller's tire "touch[ ] the [fog] line multiple times and cross[ ] the [fog] line." He explained that he initiated the traffic stop due to Fuller's failure to maintain her lane of travel under section 49-637(1) when her tire crossed the fog line.1 Fuller was thereafter charged with two felony counts of possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, failure to purchase a driver's license, and failure to provide proof of insurance.
Fuller moved to suppress the seized evidence on the grounds that it was fruits of an unlawful traffic stop in violation of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. During a hearing on the motion, the parties stipulated that the front passenger-side tire of Fuller's vehicle crossed the fog line once and that she did not have her turn signal on at the time. Although the district court accepted the parties' stipulation, the district court reviewed a dashboard camera video recording from Deputy Ballman and explained as follows:
I have to say that I'm balancing that against the Court's observations of the dash-cam. I could not exactly tell whether there was a complete crossing of that fog line. I mean, it looked pretty close, but whether, you know, some of the tire remained touching the fog line or not, the tires, I was just unsure, but it was pretty close to crossing the whole line.
After considering the parties' arguments, the district court ultimately concluded Deputy Ballman did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that section 49-637(1) was violated. The district court thus granted Fuller's motion to suppress. The State now appeals.
We apply a bifurcated standard when reviewing a motion to suppress. State v. Danney , 153 Idaho 405, 408, 283 P.3d 722, 725 (2012). The trial court's findings of fact are accepted if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. Conversely, we will freely review the application of constitutional principles to the factual findings. Id.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause so as to apply to the states, guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV ; see also Idaho Const. art. I, § 17. "Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Henage , 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007) (citing Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ). Yet, "[l]imited investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." State v. Morgan , 154 Idaho 109, 112, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2013). As such, two possible justifications for a traffic stop exist: (1) the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver has committed an offense, such as a traffic offense, or (2) the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in other criminal activity, such as driving under the influence. State v. Neal , 159 Idaho 439, 442, 362 P.3d 514, 517 (2015).
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Morgan , 154 Idaho at 112, 294 P.3d at 1124. "Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.’ " Id. at 112, 294 P.3d at 1124 (quoting State v. Bishop , 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) ). The "whole picture" must yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a violation of the law. State v. Haworth , 106 Idaho 405, 406, 679 P.2d 1123, 1124 (1984) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ). "The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop." Neal , 159 Idaho at 443, 362 P.3d at 518. Moreover, "[t]he suspicion for the stop must be based upon objective information available to the officer when he decided to make the stop, and cannot be bolstered by evidence gathered following the stop." Id. (quoting State v. Emory , 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct. App. 1991) ).
The factual record before the district court consisted of the parties' stipulation and the dashboard camera video recording of the traffic stop. Since no argument is made on appeal concerning the district court's factual record or findings, the only issue before this Court is whether the district court's legal conclusion that Deputy Ballman did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop was correct. The State challenges that conclusion by arguing the stop was constitutional because Deputy Ballman had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Fuller violated either Idaho Code section 49-637(1) or Idaho Code section 49-630(1). We analyze each code section in turn.
The State first contends that Deputy Ballman had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Fuller violated section 49-637(1) when he observed her front passenger-side tire cross the fog line. The statute reads as follows:
The parties' arguments focus primarily on our decision in Neal , where we analyzed whether the fog line itself was within the "lane of travel" under section 49-637(1). 159 Idaho at 444–47, 362 P.3d at 519–22 ; id. at 447, 362 P.3d at 522 (Horton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (). Neal concerned a defendant who drove his pickup's tires onto, but not across, the roadway's right-hand fog line. Id. at 441, 362 P.3d at 516. After observing the defendant do so, law enforcement initiated a traffic stop. Id. The traffic stop ultimately led to the defendant's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. The defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during the traffic stop, contending the traffic stop was unconstitutional. Id. The State countered that law enforcement had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant had violated section 49-637(1) by driving his pickup onto the fog line. Id. The magistrate court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, but the district court reversed that ruling on the State's appeal to the district court. Id. at 441–42, 362 P.3d at 516–17.
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