Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 July 1980
• Citation: 84 N.J. 58,417 A.2d 505
• Parties: , 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3044, 12 A.L.R.4th 520, 101 Lab.Cas. P 55,477, 1 IER Cases 109 Grace PIERCE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ORTHO PHARMACEUTICAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 58

84 N.J. 58

417 A.2d 505, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3044,

12 A.L.R.4th 520,

101 Lab.Cas. P 55,477, 1 IER Cases 109

Grace PIERCE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ORTHO PHARMACEUTICAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Nov. 13, 1979.

Decided July 28, 1980.

Myron J. Bromberg, Morristown, for defendant-appellant (Porzio & Bromberg, Morristown, attorneys; Patricia A. Meyer and Myron J. Bromberg, Morristown, on the brief).

Ruth Russell Gray, Plainfield, for plaintiff-respondent.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

POLLOCK, J.

This case presents the question whether an employee at will has a cause of action against her employer to recover damages for the termination of her employment following her refusal to continue a project she viewed as medically unethical. Resolution of this question involves an examination of the common law doctrine of at will employment to determine whether we should adopt an exception to the rule allowing an employer to discharge an at will employee without cause.

Plaintiff, Dr. Grace Pierce, sued for damages after termination of her employment with defendant, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation. The trial judge granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a full trial. 166 N.J.Super. 335, 399 A.2d 1023 (1979). We granted defendant's petition for certification. 81 N.J. 266, 405 A.2d 810 (1979). We now reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the summary judgment granted by the Law Division.

I

Since the matter involves a motion for summary judgment, we glean the facts from the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions before the court on the motion, giving plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in her favor. R. 4:46-2.

Ortho specializes in the development and manufacture of therapeutic and reproductive drugs. Dr. Pierce is a medical doctor who was first employed by Ortho in 1971 as an Associate Director of Medical Research. She signed no contract except a secrecy agreement, and her employment was not for a fixed term. She was an employee at will. In 1973, she became the Director of Medical Research/Therapeutics, one of three major sections of the Medical Research Department. Her primary responsibilities were to oversee development of therapeutic drugs and to establish procedures for testing those drugs for safety, effectiveness, and marketability. Her immediate supervisor was Dr. Samuel Pasquale, Executive Medical Director.

In the spring of 1975, Dr. Pierce was the only medical doctor on a project team developing loperamide, a liquid drug for treatment of diarrhea in infants, children, and elderly persons. The proposed formulation contained saccharin. Although the concentration was consistent with the formula for loperamide marketed in Europe, the project team agreed that the formula was unsuitable for use in the United States. An alternative formulation containing less saccharin might have been developed within approximately three months.

By March 28, however, the project team, except for Dr. Pierce, decided to continue with the development of loperamide. That decision was made apparently in response to a directive from the Marketing Division of Ortho. This decision meant that Ortho would file an investigational new drug application (IND) with the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), continuing laboratory studies on loperamide, and begin work on a formulation. FDA approval is required before any new drug is tested clinically on humans. 21 U.S.C. § 355; 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.3 et seq. Therefore, loperamide would be tested on patients only if the FDA approved the saccharin formulation.

Dr. Pierce knew that the IND would have to be filed with and approved by the FDA before clinical testing could begin. Nonetheless, she continued to oppose the work being done on loperamide at Ortho. On April 21, 1975, she sent a memorandum to the project team expressing her disagreement with its decision to proceed with the development of the drug. In her opinion, there was no justification for seeking FDA permission to use the drug in light of medical controversy over the safety of saccharin.

Dr. Pierce met with Dr. Pasquale on May 9 and informed him that she disagreed with the decision to file an IND with the FDA. She felt that by continuing to work on loperamide she would violate her interpretation of the Hippocratic oath. She concluded that the risk that saccharin might be harmful should preclude testing the formula on children or elderly persons, especially when an alternative formulation might soon be available.

Dr. Pierce recognized that she was joined in a difference of "viewpoints" or "opinion" with Dr. Pasquale and others at Ortho concerning the use of a formula containing saccharin. In her opinion, the safety of saccharin in loperamide pediatric drops was medically debatable. She acknowledged that Dr. Pasquale was entitled to his opinion to proceed with the IND. On depositions, she testified concerning the reason for her difference of opinion about the safety of using saccharin in loperamide pediatric drops:

Q That was because in your medical opinion that was an unsafe thing to do. Is that so?

A No. I didn't know. The question of saccharin was one of potential harm. It was controversial. Even though the rulings presently look even less favorable for saccharin it is still a controversial issue.

After their meeting on May 9, Dr. Pasquale informed Dr. Pierce that she would no longer be assigned to the loperamide project. On May 14, Dr. Pasquale asked Dr. Pierce to choose other projects. After Dr. Pierce returned from vacation in Finland, she met on June 16 with Dr. Pasquale to discuss other projects, but she did not choose a project at that meeting. She felt she was being demoted, even though her salary would not be decreased. Dr. Pierce summarized her impression of that meeting in her letter of resignation submitted to Dr. Pasquale the following day. In that letter, she stated:

Upon learning in our meeting June 16, 1975, that you believe I have not 'acted as a Director', have displayed inadequacies as to my competence, responsibility, productivity, inability to relate to the Marketing Personnel, that you, and reportedly Dr. George Braun and Mr. Verne Willaman consider me to be non-promotable and that I am now or soon will be demoted, I find it impossible to continue my employment at Ortho.

The letter made no specific mention of her difference of opinion with Dr. Pasquale over continuing the work on loperamide. Nonetheless, viewing the matter most favorably to Dr. Pierce, we assume the sole reason for the termination of her employment was the dispute over the loperamide project. Dr. Pasquale accepted her resignation.

In her complaint, which was based on principles of tort and contract law, Dr. Pierce claimed damages for the termination of her employment. Her complaint alleged:

The Defendant, its agents, servants and employees requested and demanded Plaintiff follow a course of action and behavior which was impossible for Plaintiff to follow because of the Hippocratic oath she had taken, because of the ethical standards by which she was governed as a physician, and because of the regulatory schemes, both federal and state, statutory and case law, for the protection of the public in the field of health and human well-being, which schemes Plaintiff believed she should honor.

However, she did not specify that testing would violate any state or federal statutory regulation. Similarly, she did not state that continuing the research would violate the principles of ethics of the American Medical Association. She never contended her participation in the research would expose her to a claim for malpractice.

Ortho moved for summary judgment on two theories. The first was that Dr. Pierce's action for wrongful discharge was barred because she resigned. The trial judge denied the motion on that ground because he found that there was a fact question whether Ortho induced Dr. Pierce's resignation. However, the trial court granted Ortho's motion on the alternative ground that because Dr. Pierce was an employee at will, Ortho could end her employment for any reason. In reversing the trial court, the Appellate Division ruled that a plenary hearing was necessary before deciding whether to adopt an exception to the common law rule permitting an employer to fire an employee at will for any reason. 166 N.J.Super. at 342, 399 A.2d 1023.

II

A motion for summary judgment is a means for the efficient disposition of a cause of action where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R. 4:46-2. Of course, courts should exercise appropriate caution in deciding issues involving policy considerations. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 53 N.J. 138, 142, 249 A.2d 65 (1969). However, excessive caution would undercut the purposes of a motion for summary judgment, which provides a means for piercing the allegations of the pleadings to determine whether there are issues requiring disposition at trial. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 73-75, 110 A.2d 24 (1954). If, after drawing all inferences of doubt against the movant, a court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact, it should enter summary judgment. Id. at 75, 110 A.2d 24. Applying those principles, we hold that even if she were discharged by Ortho, Dr. Pierce has not alleged facts that would support an action for damages for the termination of her employment.

As previously noted, there was a fact question whether Ortho induced Dr. Pierce to resign. Consequently, the trial judge properly denied summary judgment on the alternative ground that her resignation barred this action. That determination is not challenged on this appeal. Therefore, we do not reach the question whether resignation bars an action for wrongful discharge. See, e. g., ...