Com. v. Provost

• Decision Date: 20 July 1994
• Citation: 636 N.E.2d 1312,418 Mass. 416
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Ronald D. PROVOST.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1312

636 N.E.2d 1312

418 Mass. 416

COMMONWEALTH v. Ronald D. PROVOST.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued May 3, 1994.

Decided July 20, 1994.

James G. Reardon, Sr. (James G. Reardon, Jr., with him), for defendant.

Patricia C. Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The defendant was indicted on one count of violating G.L. c. 272, § 29A (1992 ed.). ¹ The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. At the close of his jury-waived trial, the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty was also denied, and he was found guilty and sentenced to a ten year suspended prison term and five years probation with certain restrictions on his activities. ² On appeal, the defendant argues that his conduct did not violate G.L. c. 272, § 29A(a ). He also argues that § 29A(a ) and G.L. c. 272, § 31 (1992 ed.), are constitutionally infirm in that they criminalize the depiction of nudity per se and because they criminalize intent without attendant conduct. We transferred the case here on our own motion and now affirm his conviction.

The evidence would warrant the following findings. The defendant is a Roman Catholic priest who organized outings for the children in his parish. On January 11, 1992, the defendant took ten year old John Doe (an alias) and four or five other children to "swim night" at a recreational facility in a neighboring town. The defendant took photographs of the children as they frolicked in the pool. Afterward John delayed changing until the others were almost through and then asked the defendant to hold up a towel so that he could change without being seen. John and the defendant were in a portion of the locker room that was separated from others by a row of lockers.

As John was changing, the defendant took his camera out of his bag and began to photograph John. John testified that he automatically struck different poses without any instruction from the defendant. John's partially covered scrotal area is visible in two of the photographs. Several of the photographs depict John displaying his bare buttocks ("mooning" the defendant), extending his middle finger in the air, extending his middle finger from his underwear, and flexing his muscles.

A patron of the facility entered the men's locker room and saw the defendant with the camera strapped around his neck. He twice asked the defendant whether he was taking photographs of the children in the nude. The defendant responded, "He's got his clothes on." The patron reported the incident to a lifeguard but when the patron returned to the locker room, the defendant and John were gone. The defendant told John that he would destroy the photographs.

When subsequently interviewed by the police, the defendant gave a signed statement stating that he has "taken pictures of kids in the nude, mooning. When I look at these pictures I have sexual tendencies. I have [fantasies] of having sex with the boys. I sometimes masturbate while looking at these pictures."

The statute. The defendant claims that his activities did not fall within the ambit of § 29A(a ). He first contends that the photographs do not depict a minor in a state of nudity within the meaning of § 31, which defines "nudity" as: "uncovered or less than opaquely covered human genitals, pubic areas, ... or the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state." Although John had his underwear on, in two of the photographs portions of his pubic and genital area are clearly visible. The statute does not require that the areas be completely uncovered. It is enough that a portion of the nude genital area is visible.

The defendant next argues that the evidence did not warrant the finding that the defendant hired, coerced, solicited, enticed, employed, procured, used, caused, encouraged, or knowingly permitted John to be exhibited in a state of nudity for the purpose of reproduction in a photograph as proscribed by § 29A(a ). He asserts that the depiction of John's pubic area was unintentional and that, since John voluntarily struck the various poses without instruction, he did not "knowingly permit" him to pose in a state of nudity.

Whether the defendant "knowingly permitted" John to pose in a state of nudity is a question of fact. "The question of a defendant's knowledge is exclusively within the province of the [fact finder], and [the fact finder is] 'free to draw an inference of guilty knowledge ... "if the inferences drawn from the circumstances [are] reasonable and possible." ' " Commonwealth v. Sama, 411 Mass. 293, 298, 582 N.E.2d 498 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Albano, 373 Mass. 132, 134, 365 N.E.2d 808 (1977). The photographs themselves suggest that the defendant knowingly permitted John to pose with a portion of his pubic region and genitals exposed. He took a series of well-focussed photographs at various points in the process of John's dressing. John's genital area is prominent in many of the photographs. The defendant admitted that he sometimes took photographs of nude boys for sexual gratification. There was sufficient evidence, therefore, for the judge to conclude that the defendant knowingly permitted John to pose in a state of nudity. Furthermore, the fact that the defendant continued to take the photographs as John struck different poses certainly supports the inference that he "encouraged" John to pose in a state of nudity.

Constitutionality of G.L. c. 272, §§ 29A and 31. We have had occasion to examine G.L. c. 272, §§ 29A, and 31 (1986 ed.), in two previous decisions. In the first, Commonwealth v. Oakes, 401 Mass. 602, 604-605, 518 N.E.2d 836 (1988) (Oakes I ), vacated and remanded, 491 U.S. 576, 581, 109 S.Ct. 2633, 2637, 105 L.Ed.2d 493 (1989), the defendant was prosecuted for taking photographs of his minor stepdaughter while she was nude from the waist up. The court held that § 29A, as then written, was constitutionally overbroad in its reach because, for example, it made it a criminal act for a parent to photograph "his or her naked one-year-old running on a beach or romping in a wading pool." Id. at 605, 518 N.E.2d 836. Accordingly, the court struck down the statute. Id. ³

Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Oakes, 407 Mass. 92, 551 N.E.2d 910 (1990) (Oakes II ), the court upheld the same defendant's conviction under the original statute in the face of his constitutional challenge that the statute violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. ⁴ The court concluded that the defendant's activity of photographing his nude stepdaughter was "mixed speech and conduct, or expressive conduct." Id. at 95-96, 551 N.E.2d 910. "Under current First Amendment analysis, '[t]he Government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.' " Id. at 96, 551 N.E.2d 910, quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2540, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). "When ' "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.' " Id., quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). The court noted that the Commonwealth's important interest must be unrelated to the suppression of expression. Oakes II, supra. See Texas v. Johnson, supra, 491 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. at 2541. The court concluded further that the Commonwealth's interest in protecting minors from exploitation was both unrelated to the suppression of expression and sufficiently compelling to meet the standard in United States v. O'Brien, supra. Oakes II, supra, 407 Mass. at 96-97, 551 N.E.2d 910. "[T]he fact that the pictures are not child pornography under New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982), is irrelevant." Id., 407 Mass. at 97-98, 551 N.E.2d 910. Finally, it was determined that, "under Federal constitutional law, the Commonwealth's interest in protecting children permits the application of § 29A to the defendant's conduct." Id. at 98, 551 N.E.2d 910. See id. at 99, 551 N.E.2d 910 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Assuming that the defendant's activity in this case was mixed speech and conduct, under the amended versions of §§ 29A and 31, the same rationale applies. The taking of photographs of a partially nude child with lascivious intent is conduct that § 29A is designed to prevent. See Oakes II, supra at 96-97, 551 N.E.2d 910. The governmental interest in suppressing this type of conduct is unrelated to expression. Id. See Texas v. Johnson, supra, 491 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. at 2541. The Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding the physical and psychological well being of John in this case, therefore, allows the application of §§ 29A and 31 to the defendant's conduct. ⁵

The defendant essentially argues, however, that § 29A imposes more than "incidental" restrictions on his speech and for that reason fails the O'Brien test. We do not agree. Assuming for the purpose of argument that speech is involved, the Commonwealth has a compelling interest in protecting children from exploitation. The defendant makes no argument that § 29A suppresses more speech than is essential to further the Commonwealth's interest. See O'Brien, supra, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679.

To the extent that the defendant claims that the statute is void under the overbreadth doctrine, his argument must fail.

"In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 [93 S.Ct. 2908, 2914, 37 L.Ed.2d 830] (1973), the Court acknowledged that the general rule is that a person to whom a statute may be applied constitutionally will not be allowed to challenge the statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations...