Navarro v. Adams

• Decision Date: 01 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. CV 04-8080-R(RC).,CV 04-8080-R(RC).
• Citation: 419 F.Supp.2d 1196
• Parties: Maximino NAVARRO, aka Maximino Raymond Navarro, Petitioner, v. Derral G. ADAMS, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

419 F.Supp.2d 1196

Maximino NAVARRO, aka Maximino Raymond Navarro, Petitioner, v. Derral G. ADAMS, Warden, Respondent.

No. CV 04-8080-R(RC).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

March 1, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Maximino Navarro, aka Maximino Raymond Navarro, Corcoran, CA, Pro se.

Peggie Bradford Tarwater, Suzann E. Papagoda, Office of Attorney General of California, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REAL, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition and other papers along with the attached Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman, and has made a de novo determination.

IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Report and Recommendation is approved and adopted; (2) the Report and Recommendation is adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law herein; and (3) Judgment shall be entered denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the action with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve copies of this Order, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and Judgment by the United States mail on the parties.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CHAPMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Manuel L. Real, United States District Judge, by Magistrate Judge Rosalyn M. Chapman, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 01-13 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

BACKGROUND

I

On November 21, 2000, in Los Angeles County Superior Court case no. TA039802, a jury found petitioner Maximino Navarro, aka Maximino Raymond Navarro, guilty of first degree murder with the special circumstance of a "drive-by" shooting in violation of California Penal Code ("P.C.") §§ 187(a) and 190.2(a)(21), and the jury also found that, in committing the murder, petitioner personally used a firearm (handgun) within the meaning of P.C. § 12022.5(a), petitioner discharged a firearm (handgun) at an occupied motor vehicle which caused death to another within the meaning of P.C. § 12022.5(b), petitioner personally discharged a firearm (handgun) causing the death of a person other than an accomplice within the meaning of P.C. § 12022.53(c)-(d), and the murder was done for the benefit of a street gang within the meaning of P.C. § 186.22(b)(1). Clerk's Transcript ("CT") 198A-204.¹ Petitioner was sentenced to the term of life without the possibility of parole plus 28 years to life in state prison. CT 224-27.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, CT 228, which affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion filed March 17, 2003, but struck the P.C. § 12022.53 enhancement and remanded the matter to impose an enhancement under P.C. § 12022.5(b)(1). Lodgment nos. 14-15. Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which denied review on June 25, 2003. Motion to Dismiss, Exhs. C-D.

II

The California Court of Appeal, in affirming petitioner's conviction, found the following facts and circumstances underlying it:² Two eyewitnesses testified petitioner, driving a burgundy colored Honda Accord, pulled up alongside Rodney Davis's truck and fired shots at Davis. Two other witnesses testified they saw petitioner driving his burgundy Honda in the vicinity of the shooting immediately before it occurred. Another witness testified he saw a burgundy Honda pull up to Davis's truck and heard three shots fired. This latter witness, Sebron Irby, was threatened by petitioner while they were both incarcerated in the county jail. Petitioner told Irby "I fucked off your home boy" which Irby understood as a reference to Davis. Petitioner's former girlfriend testified he drove a burgundy Honda. Finally, there was evidence petitioner and Davis belonged to rival gangs which were feuding at the time of the shooting.

III

On September 28, 2004, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction and sentence. On October 27, 2004, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the petition is a "mixed" petition, and on December 21, 2004, this Court found the petition to be a "mixed" petition and granted respondent's motion to dismiss with leave to amend. Petitioner moved to strike the unexhausted claims, Grounds Three and Four, and on January 25, 2005, this Court granted that request. On May 13, 2005, respondent filed an answer to the amended petition. Petitioner has not filed a traverse.

Petitioner raises the following claims for federal habeas relief in the amended petition:

Ground One—"Petitioner's right to counsel [was] violated under the Sixth Amendment" when a Deputy Sheriff entered his jail cell at the prosecutor's request and seized materials that were subject to the attorney-client privilege (Petition at 5); and

Ground Two—"Petitioner was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right to fundamental fairness by the admission of evidence ... that [petitioner] was a security risk and of . . . threats [to prosecution witnesses]." Id.

DISCUSSION

IV

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") "circumscribes a federal habeas court's review of a state court decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2534, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). As amended by the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim[¶] (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or [¶] (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Further, under the AEDPA, a federal court shall presume that a determination of factual issues made by a state court is correct, and petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

In determining whether a state court's decision is either "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of AEDPA, this Court must examine the last reasoned decision by the state court. Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 992, 125 S.Ct. 1823, 161 L.Ed.2d 755 (2005); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's claims on the merits when it denied his petition for review without comment. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005); Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 348 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 887, 114 S.Ct. 240, 126 L.Ed.2d 194 (1993). However, federal courts presume "[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground." Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 2594, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944, 122 S.Ct. 324, 151 L.Ed.2d 242 (2001). Thus, in addressing petitioner's claims, this Court will consider the reasoned opinion of the California Court of Appeal denying those claims. Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 925, 124 S.Ct. 2888, 159 L.Ed.2d 787 (2004).

V

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const., amend. VI. This right, which attaches to state court prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), is implicated when the government interferes with the confidential relationship between a criminal defendant and his counsel. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554-58, 97 S.Ct. 837, 843-45, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977); Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088, 106 S.Ct. 1474, 89 L.Ed.2d 729 (1986). However, "`mere government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, although not condoned by the court, is not itself violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rather, the right is only violated when the intrusion substantially prejudices the defendant.'" United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1069 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted)); see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 584-85 (9th Cir.2004) ("When the government deliberately interferes with the confidential relationship between a criminal defendant and defense counsel, that interference violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if it substantially prejudices the criminal defendant"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 419, 163 L.Ed.2d 319 (2005). "Substantial prejudice results from the introduction of evidence gained through the interference against the defendant at trial, from the prosecution's use of confidential information pertaining to defense plans and strategy, and from other actions designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial." Williams, 384 F.3d at 585; Danielson, 325 F.3d at 1069.

In Ground One, petitioner contends his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when a deputy sheriff searched petitioner's cell and seized materials protected by the attorney-client privilege. Petition at 5. The ...