426 So.2d 972 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1982), 81-2348, Gmuer v. Garner
|Citation:||426 So.2d 972|
|Party Name:||Rosanne GMUER, Appellant, v. Ambrose GARNER, individually and as President of Hillsborough Community College; The District Board of Trustees of Hillsborough Community College, Florida, a corporate body public; Colleen L. Bevis, as Chairperson of the Board of Trustees; Ron Cacciatore, E.L. Bing, Julia B. Williams, B. Lee Elam, Hillman Bowden, and Je|
|Case Date:||October 15, 1982|
|Court:||Florida Court of Appeals, Second District|
Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1983.
Stevan T. Northcutt of Levine, Freedman, Hirsch & Levinson, Tampa, for appellant.
Richard Candelora and Marvin E. Barkin, of Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye & O'Neill, and W. Reynolds Allen of Hogg, Allen, Ryce, Norton & Blue, Tampa, for appellee Ambrose Garner.
John M. Breckenridge, Jr. and Marian P. McCulloch, of Greene, Mann, Rowe, Stanton, Mastry & Burton, Tampa, for appellee Board of Trustees of Hillsborough Community College.
We affirm the trial court's order dismissing appellant Rosanne Gmuer's third amended complaint against appellees Ambrose Garner and Hillsborough Community College with prejudice. The trial court has ably set forth its findings and followed the applicable case law in support thereof, and we adopt its order as our opinion. The
pertinent portions of that order read as follows:
Each and every count of plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint is founded upon allegations of sexually seductive invitations to plaintiff from defendant Garner. These so-called "propositions" occurred, plaintiff says, while: She was employed by Hillsborough Community College and Garner was President and at a time when the Trustees of the College should have known of Dr. Garner's alleged propensities for lusting after those of the opposite sex in positions as plaintiff, to paraphrase the gravamen of plaintiff's causes of action. None of the allegations against the principal tort reasor [sic] involve a "touching" or any form of battery. They are limited to the use of offensively suggestive and opprobrious words directed, it is alleged, to plaintiff by her superior on the job. Plaintiff's declination of the proposition or propositions is alleged to have resulted in the loss of her job. This Court is asked by plaintiff to find that plaintiff's cause of action should be sustained principally on the thesis that the defendant Garner's actions, if true, support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
... [T]his Court is persuaded that the tort upon which the Third Amended Complaint is constructed is not recognized in Florida.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress had its genesis in the Restatement of Torts, 2d, Sec. 46. It has been applied in Florida but...
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