Laman v. McCord
| Decision Date | 21 October 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 5--4598,5--4598 |
| Citation | 432 S.W.2d 753,245 Ark. 401 |
| Parties | W. F. LAMAN et al., Appellants, v. Robert S. McCORD et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
John T. Harmon, No. Little Rock, and Leon B. Catlett, Little Rock, for appellants.
Rose, Meek, House, Barron, Nash & Williamson, Little Rock, for appellees.
On April 24, 1967, the North Little Rock city council held a regular meeting at the city hall. At the end of the meeting the council voted to go into closed session with the mayor and city attorney to discuss a Public Service Commission proceeding to which the city was a party. All members of the public, including one of the appellees, were excluded from the closed session.
The appellees, then the editor and managing editor of The Times, a North Little Rock newspaper, brought this suit against the mayor, city attorney, and aldermen, for a judgment declaring that the closed session had been in violation of our Freedom of Information Act. Act 93 of 1967; Ark.Stat.Ann., Title 12, Ch. 28 (Supp.1967). This appeal is from a judgment declaring that the meeting was in violation of the act and that the city council cannot meet secretly to discuss legal matters with the city attorney.
The Freedom of Information Act, dealing with public records and public meetings, was passed at the first regular session of the legislature following two decisions of this court defining to some extent a citizen's right to examine public records. Republican Party of Ark. v. State ex rel. Hall, 240 Ark. 545, 400 S.W.2d 660 (1966); Gaspard v. Whorton, 239 Ark. 849, 394 S.W.2d 621 (1965). As far as the case at bar is concerned, the pertinent parts of the act are as follows:
Section 2. Declaration of Public Policy.--It is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public manner so that the electors shall be advised of the performance of public officials and of the decisions that are reached in public activity and in making public policy. Toward this end, this act is adopted, making it possible for them, or their representatives, to learn and to report fully the activities of their public officials.
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Section 5. Open Public Meetings. Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all meetings formal or informal, special or regular, of the governing bodies of all municipalities, counties, townships, and School Districts, and all boards, bureaus, commissions, or organizations of the State of Arkansas, except Grand Juries, supported wholly or in part by public funds, or expending public funds, shall be public meetings.
The time and place of each regular meeting shall be furnished to anyone who requests the information.
In the event of emergency, or special meetings the person calling such a meeting shall notify the representatives of the newspapers, radio stations and television stations * * * at least two (2) hours before such a meeting takes places in order that the public shall have representatives at the meeting.
Executive sessions will be permitted only for the purpose of discussing or considering employment, appointment, promotion, demotion, disciplining, or resignation of any public officer or employee.
Executive sessions must never be called for the purpose of defeating the reason or the Spirit of the Freedom of Information Act.
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Section 10. (Emergency.) It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the proper functioning of a democratic society is dependent upon the public being informed at all times with respect to the operations of government, and public officials shall at all times be held accountable for their public actions and conduct; * * * that many agencies are now holding executive or closed sessions * * * which is contrary to the spirit of the public business being transacted in open public meetings * * *.
At the outset we reject the city's contention that the Freedom of Information Act is a penal statute, to be strictly construed. It is true that the act (§ 7) provides that its willful violation is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine or jail sentence. Such a provision, however, does not make the entire statute penal. For instance, the workmen's compensation act makes it a misdemeanor for an employer to fail to provide compensation coverage for his workmen. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81--1339 (Repl.1960). We have nevertheless held, in passing upon that very duty to provide coverage, that the compensation act is to be liberally construed. Brooks's Inc. v. Claywell, 215 Ark. 913, 224 S.W.2d 37 (1949).
Whether a statute should be construed narrowly or broadly depends upon the interests with which the statute deals. Warfield v. Chotard, 202 Ark. 837, 153 S.W.2d 168 (1941). As a rule, statutes enacted for the public benefit are to be interpreted most favorably to the public. Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Johnston, 238 Ala. 26, 189 So. 58 (1939); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Alexander, 242 Iowa 364, 45 N.W.2d 258 (1950); Hipp v. Prudential Cas. & Surety Co., 60 S.D. 308, 244 N.W. 346 (1932). In the act now before us the General Assembly clearly declared the State's public policy: 'It is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public manner.' We have no hesitation in asserting our conviction that the Freedom of Information Act was passed wholly in the public interest and is to be liberally interpreted to the end that its praiseworthy purposes may be achieved.
The language of the act is so clear, so positive, that there is hardly any need for interpretation. The heart of the act, in its application to this case, lies in Section 5: 'Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all meetings formal or informal, special or regular, of the governing bodies of all municipalities * * * shall be public meetings.' On April 24, 1967, the North Little Rock city council was unquestionably the governing body of a municipality. Its closed session was unquestionably a meeting, formal or informal, special or regular. How, then, can it be said that the closed session was not a violation of the statute?
Counsel for the city base their arguments entirely on the attorney-client privilege. They insist that the statute should not be construed to apply to a meeting between the city council and the city attorney. It is predicted that the city will not be able to prepare its cases for trial without disclosing its strategy and its weaknesses to its adversaries.
We think that, as a practical matter, counsel are unduly apprehensive about the impact of the act upon municipal litigation. The city attorney, with the assistance of the mayor, department heads, and other municipal employees, can certainly prepare a case for trial without discussing his plans in detail with the city council. By analogy, the State of Arkansas is continually engaged in litigation, but there is scant occasion for its Attorney General or its other legal counsel to confer in secret with the members of the General Assembly.
Regardless of such practical considerations, the act itself effectively refutes the appellants' argument. The legislative mandate cannot be misunderstood: 'Except as otherwise specifically (our italics) provided by law, all meetings * * * of the governing bodies of all municipalities * * * shall be public meetings.' The key word is 'specifically,' meaning 'explicitly,' 'definitely,' 'in so many words.' The legislature itself provided a specific exception in Section 5 of the act, having to do with personnel matters. It did not see fit to provide a similar exception for meetings between the city council and the city attorney.
The attorney-client privilege, originally a common-law immunity, now rests upon a section of the Civil Code, adopted in 1869, which provides that an attorney is incompetent to testify about his client's communications without the client's consent. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28--601 (Repl.1962). For us to say that the section just cited, dealing only with a testimonial disqualification, 'specifically'...
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...about legal matters, might readily open the door to repeated and undetectable evasions" of the Sunshine Law. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 406, 432 S.W.2d 753, 756 (1968). See Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 263 Cal.App.2d at 58; 69 Cal.Rptr. at 492; Minneapolis Star, 310 Minn. at 321, 246 S.W......
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State ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren
...must be interpreted favorably to the public. See also Wolfson v. State, 344 So.2d 611, 613 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977); Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968). Finally, a recent amendment to the KOMA is further evidence the act should be liberally interpreted. K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-......
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...different statutes must be qualified. The cited cases appear to represent the majority view. Contra, see Laman v. McCord (1968), 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753, 755.8 See Kanellos v. Cook Co. (1972), 53 Ill.2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240; People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck (1973), 54 Ill.2d 561, 565, 30......
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...Compensation Act did not require that the whole of that act be strictly construed. For an exactly similar analogy, see Laman v. McCord (1968), 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753. When an act requires many different performances, only some of which are coupled with sanctions for noncompliance, it ......
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Public Meeting Statutes and Public Sector Collective Bargaining
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