King v. Bobby
Decision Date | 10 January 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 04-3844.,04-3844. |
Parties | Samuel KING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David BOBBY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: Steven S. Nolder, Federal Public Defender's Office, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Stuart A. Cole, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Steven S. Nolder, Federal Public Defender's Office, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Stuart A. Cole, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: GUY and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; EDMUNDS, District Judge.*
Petitioner Samuel King appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. King pleaded guilty in Ohio state court to a number of state charges. King was not accompanied by an attorney during the plea negotiation, plea hearing, or sentencing hearing, and he claims he was unconstitutionally denied his right to counsel. We find that he did execute a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore we affirm.
Samuel King was indicted on April 7, 1999, by an Ohio grand jury for failing to pay child support, providing a false application for a certificate of registration, making false promises through advertising, fraudulent dealings, passing bad checks, theft by deception, and securing writings by deception. Two months later, the Ohio grand jury issued another indictment charging King with failing to file state income tax; filing a false, incomplete, or fraudulent tax return; fraudulent dealings; and theft by deception. King pleaded not guilty.1
The trial court summarized King's attempts to retain counsel as follows:
Defendant began this case claiming that he would be represented by a Lisbon Attorney. Pre-trials were set when the Lisbon Attorney was not retained and Defendant always assured the Court that he would retain that Attorney. After a great deal of wasted time, Defendant eventually declined to retain that counsel and sought new counsel in Columbus, Ohio.
Again, Defendant repeatedly assured the Court that he would retain Columbus counsel and that no further delays would result from his actions. After a considerable time was wasted, Defendant again declined to retain that counsel and chose his current counsel (third Attorney) [Uche Mgbaraho].
Counsel for Defendant appeared on arraignment day for other cases and announced that day that he was being retained in the King case also. While on the record, the Court very clearly explained to counsel all the delays that had occurred with the first two (2) Attorneys and that the Court would not entertain a Motion to Withdraw even if counsel was not paid.
The court had scheduled King's trial for Monday, March 13, 2000. About two months before trial, Mgbaraho moved to withdraw as counsel for King and King's wife, Gloria King, a codefendant. King objected. The trial court denied Mgbaraho's motion because he had been warned that nonpayment would not be grounds for withdrawing.2 On February 25, 2000, Mgbaraho once again moved to withdraw as counsel for Samuel and Gloria King. The basis of Mgbaraho's motion was that King lacked confidence in Mgbaraho and had asked Mgbaraho to perform unethical acts, King had accused him of colluding with the state to abuse King's rights, King had not paid Mgbaraho's legal fees, and Mgbaraho felt there was a conflict of interest in representing both Sam and Gloria King. The trial court granted Mgbaraho's motion as to his representation of Gloria King and granted a continuance in her case to allow her time to retain new counsel. The trial court denied the motion as to Samuel King, however, because of (1) the numerous delays in the case due to King's previous failures to hire counsel; (2) the specific warning the court issued to Mgbaraho before he entered his appearance on behalf of King regarding the court's reluctance to allow him to withdraw; and (3) King's requests for Mgbaraho to perform unethical acts would not be cured by King retaining different counsel.
On March 8, 2000, Mgbaraho moved for the court to reconsider its ruling because King had fired him. He also moved for a continuance to allow King time to retain or be appointed new counsel. The trial court held a hearing on Mgbaraho's motion on Friday, March 10, 2000. At that hearing, King told the trial court that he had discharged Mgbaraho from the case and asked for time to meet with a new attorney, Dennis McNamara, whom King said he had already met several times. The court stated that it already spoke with McNamara, and McNamara told the court that he would not represent King without a large retainer. King told the court that he had recently inherited over $200,000, and as proof that he had the money he pointed through the window to a new car in the parking lot, which he claimed he bought with cash. The court clearly did not believe King:
Instead of granting King's request for a continuance in its entirety, the trial court sua sponte bifurcated King's trial. It ordered that the trial on the factually uncomplicated counts would proceed as scheduled, but that the remaining counts would be tried at a later date. As for Mgbaraho's motion to reconsider his motion to withdraw, the court ordered Mgbaraho to serve as "standby" counsel to King. The court explained Mgbaraho's new role as follows:
Now, that doesn't mean that you have to try the case and that doesn't mean that you have to talk to Mr. King and that doesn't mean that Mr. King has to talk to you. If you — but you need to be available and if he decides he wants to consult with somebody, fine. If he wants you to be fired and he doesn't want to talk with you and he doesn't want you in this case, that's his decision. It will not be my decision, nor will it be yours that you have nothing to do with this case. It will only be Mr. King's decision but I — but you are going to have to be here.
After the court identified which counts of the indictments would be tried first and discussed other matters, he asked if King had any questions. King asked "so, essentially, I'm trying this myself; correct?" The court responded, King then said,
Immediately after the hearing, King met privately with the prosecutor and they reached a plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, on March 13, 2000, King pleaded guilty to four of the six counts that were scheduled for trial that day, and all of the remaining counts of both indictments were dismissed. All of the charges against Gloria King were also dismissed. King was not accompanied by counsel or standby counsel. During the plea colloquy, King stated he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving his rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine his accusers, to compulsory process, to remain silent, and to testify on his own behalf. He stated that he understood the potential penalties the court could impose. The court informed King that he had the right to be represented by counsel and if he could not afford counsel, one would be appointed at no cost. After explaining that right, the court noted that King had recently informed the court that he had inherited more than $200,000, implying that King was ineligible for appointed counsel. King responded, "I don't have it yet, sir." The court did not follow up by asking if King wanted counsel appointed. Before accepting the plea, the following exchange took place:
The Court: ... Now, with respect to Counsel, you had Counsel which you discharged Friday or effective Friday. So, now I need for you — I assume you want to go forward — well, do you want to go forward without counsel?
Mr. King: Yes, sir.
The Court: Okay. And I've already explained to you your right to appointed Counsel. Do you understand that?
Mr. King: Yes, sir.
The Court: I need for you to sign a separate waiver that indicates that you have been told all that and that you waive Counsel but don't sign it until you read it and there's one for each case. That's why you have two of them there.
Okay. Are there any questions that you have about anything we're doing here?
Mr. King: No, sir.
The Court: You sure?
Mr. King: Yes, sir.
The Court: You still want to go through with the plea bargain?
Mr. King: Yes, sir.
At his sentencing hearing later that month, King appeared without new counsel or Mgbaraho. The court sentenced him to serve six months, eleven months, and nine months in prison for three of the offenses, to be served consecutively. He was also sentenced to five years of community control on the fourth offense. Earlier, King admitted that he did not inherit the money or buy the car as he had told the court. The court held King in contempt for lying...
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