Johnson v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company

Decision Date27 February 1890
Citation44 N.W. 884,43 Minn. 53
PartiesRichard W. Johnson, Administrator, v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Kelly, J., presiding, granting a new trial after a verdict of $ 5,000 in his favor in an action for the death of his intestate caused by alleged negligence of defendant.

Order affirmed.

Richard K. Boney, for appellant.

M. D Grover and Flandrau, Squires & Cutcheon, for respondent.

Vanderburgh J. Gilfillan, C. J., concurring and dissenting.

OPINION

Vanderburgh, J.

The general propositions of law applicable to this case are that a railroad company is bound to place signal-posts or other structures used in connection with its road, or the operation thereof, at a reasonably safe distance from the track, so as not to be dangerous to brakemen or other employes who work on its trains; but if, for any reason, it is found necessary to erect or place such structures so close as to be hazardous to its employes, it is in such case its duty to warn them of the danger, so that they may understand the nature of the risks to which they are to be subjected, and may govern themselves accordingly; and, in the absence of such notice, they have a right to assume that the company has performed its duty in this respect. They are presumed to have knowledge of the ordinary perils of the employment, but not of special or extra hazards, such as may arise from the unsafe proximity of signal-posts, bridges, etc., of the presence of which they have not been informed, or of the dangers incident to which they have not learned. If, in case of an accident to an employe, the master's failure to perform his duty in these respects is clearly established, -- that is to say, if such structures are obviously so near the track as to be dangerous; or if, on the other hand, they are shown to be so far removed as to make it apparent that employes or operatives can discharge their duties in the exercise of ordinary prudence, with reasonable safety; or if it is clear that the plaintiff has negligently exposed himself to danger, or knew, or in the exercise of ordinary prudence ought to have known, and avoided it, -- in all such cases the question of negligence or the exercise of reasonable care, on the part of either or both parties, will be for the court; otherwise it will be for the jury. These propositions are so generally accepted that they hardly need to be referred to. The chief difficulty lies in their application to the facts of particular cases.

In the case at bar, plaintiff's intestate was employed as a switchman in defendant's yard at St. Paul, near the Union depot, where there is a great number of tracks, over which numerous trains from different lines enter and depart from the depot. The defendant has constructed, and for several years has operated, at that place, a system of interlocking switches, worked in connection with semaphores or signal-posts, of which there are 30 in its yard. The deceased, while discharging his duty, was in the act of climbing up or down the side ladder of a box-car in a moving train, when it was drawn past one of these signal-posts which struck his body, and he...

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