Sanders v. District Court In and For Montrose County

• Decision Date: 19 August 1968
• Docket Number: No. 23537,23537
• Citation: 444 P.2d 645,166 Colo. 455
• Parties: C. C. SANDERS, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MONTROSE, and the Honorable George V. Kempf, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 645

444 P.2d 645

166 Colo. 455

C. C. SANDERS, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF MONTROSE, and the Honorable George V. Kempf, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents.

No. 23537.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Aug. 19, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1968.

William J. Knous, Montrose, for petitioner.

Petrie, King, Woodrow & Roushar, Montrose, for respondents.

McWILLIAMS, Justice.

This is an original proceeding wherein one C. C. Sanders, an 'associate county judge' in Montrose County, filed a petition in this court seeking the issuance of a rule to show cause. Specifically, Sanders asked that we direct and require the district court in and for the County of Montrose and the Honorable George V. Kempf, one of the judges thereof, to show cause, if such they could, why certain judgments theretofore entered by the respondent judge should not be vacated and set aside. According to Sanders, who will hereinafter be referred to as the petitioner, the judgments here under attack are 'void' for the reason that the respondent court is claimed to have 'lacked jurisdiction' to enter the same.

We granted petitioner's request and issued a rule to show cause. The respondents have filed their response thereto and the matter now awaits our determination.

A bit of background information is in order. Pursuant to 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 37--14--8 and 9(2) the petitioner on January 12, 1965 was appointed by the Board of County Commissioners for Montrose County to the position of associate county judge. Thereafter petitioner served in that particular judicial position until March 8, 1968. It was on this latter date that the respondent judge decreed that the aforementioned statute creating the position of associate county judge in Montrose County was unconstitutional. Whereupon the respondent judge, among other things, then proceeded to 'permanently prohibit' the petitioner from 'attempting to exercise such powers' of that office.

Those judgments by the respondent judge which are here under attack were entered by the respondent judge in two actions which had been filed in the respondent court and which were consolidated for purposes of trial. The first of these two actions was entitled 'People ex rel. Bennett v. Sanders.' Bennett was the defendant in a traffic case then pending before the petitioner, and Bennett brought an action in the respondent court to enjoin and prohibit the petitioner from trying his case.

The second action filed in the respondent court was a habeas corpus proceeding entitled 'Reed v. Howlett, sheriff.' Reed had theretofore been convicted by the petitioner of drunk driving and was sentenced to 90 days in the county jail. While serving this sentence, Reed sought his release from jail and accordingly instituted the aforementioned habeas corpus action. Reed claimed that he was entitled to be released from custody on the ground that the proceedings before the petitioner wherein he was given a 90 day jail sentence were allegedly 'null and void' because the statute creating the position of associate county judge in Montrose County was unconstitutional.

As indicated above, these two actions were consolidated for trial and culminated in judgments and decrees which specifically prohibited petitioner from proceeding further in the Bennett matter and directed Howlett, the sheriff, to discharge Reed from the county jail. Each judgment then went on to 'permanently prohibit' the petitioner from 'attempting to exercise such powers' of an associate county judge. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the judgments thus entered, alleging therein that the respondent court 'lacked jurisdiction to entertain either action' and that its judgments were therefore void and to no effect. After the motion to vacate was denied, petitioner instituted the present original proceeding, alleging, among other things, that the 'matter involved herein is of great public importance and not only concerns petitioner and his official acts, but all other associate and assistant county judges in the State of Colorado and their official acts.'

In his formal written judgments the respondent judge merely held that the statute creating the 'Associate County Court in Montrose County was in violation of the Colorado Constitution. (T)he court being non-existent,' the respondent judge reasoned that the petitioner was accordingly 'without authority to exercise any powers as judge thereof.' However, in his informal findings and conclusions, which were apparently orally delivered from the bench at the conclusion of the trial, the respondent judge quite clearly stated that in his view 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 37--14--9(2) was unconstitutional solely because it constituted 'local and special' legislation of a type expressly forbidden by Article V, § 25 and Article VI, § 19 of the Colorado Constitution. We conclude that the respondent judge erred in thus holding the statute to be unconstitutional.

At the outset it should be noted that Article VI, § 1 of the Colorado Constitution declares that the judicial power of the state shall be vested in certain designated courts and 'such other courts or judicial officers with jurisdiction inferior to the supreme court, as the general assembly may, from time to time establish * * *.' Hence, the General Assembly is specifically empowered by our constitution to establish 'other courts or judicial officers,' as long as such other courts or judicial officers are inferior, jurisdictionally speaking, that is, to the supreme court.

However, this constitutionally granted power to the General Assembly to thus establish inferior courts and judicial officers is subject to certain limitations which are themselves embedded in the Colorado Constitution. In this regard Article VI, § 19 of the Colorado Constitution provides as follows:

'All laws relating to state courts shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state, and except as hereafter in this section specified the Organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and Practice of all Courts of the same class, and the force and effect of the proceedings, judgments and decrees of such Courts severally shall be uniform. County courts may be classified or graded as may be provided by law, and the Organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and Practice of county courts within the same class or grade, and the force and effect of the proceedings, judgments and decrees of county courts in the same class or grade shall be uniform, provided, however, that the organization and administration of the county court of the city and county of Denver shall be provided in the charter and ordinances of the city and county of Denver.' (Emphasis added.)

Also, Article V, § 25 of the Colorado Constitution, which is said to have some bearing upon the disposition of this controversy, provides, Inter alia, as follows:

'The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say; for * * * regulating the practice in courts of justice; * * * providing for changes of venue in civil or criminal cases; * * * summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries * * *. (I)n all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.'

As indicated, the respondent judge held that 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 37--14--9(2) ran afoul of the two constitutional provisions set forth immediately above.

Let us now examine the statute which the trial court declared to be in violation of our constitution. Reference should first be made, however, to 1965...