Primock v. Hamilton

Decision Date01 April 1969
Docket NumberNo. 22421,22421
Citation452 P.2d 375,168 Colo. 524
PartiesDavid PRIMOCK, Plaintiff in Error, v. E. Bentley HAMILTON, Defendant in Error.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Howell W. Cobb, Durango, William W. Downs, Cortez, for plaintiff in error.

Bradford, McDaniel & Maynes, L. W. McDaniel, Durango, for defendant in error.

KELLEY, Justice.

Plaintiff, proprietor of a furniture store in Durango, sued his landlord, the defendant, for damages to a part of his inventory on February 25 and March 10, 1964, caused by the bursting of hot water pipes which were a part of the heating system of the building. The complaint was based upon the negligence of the defendant (1) in failing to keep the pipes 'in a safe condition, although he knew, or should have known, of the unsafe condition of said pipes'; (2) in failing 'to inspect, repair, and maintain said metal pipes and said metal pipes became defective and unsafe, although the defendant knew or should have known, of the defective and unsafe condition' of the pipes; and (3) in that he 'retained full control of said metal pipes and negligently and carelessly permitted said pipes to be and become and remain out of repair and in a defective and unsafe condition; and defendant knew, or should have known of such condition.'

The defendant answered by way of a general denial and, in addition, specifically alleged that (1) 'the injuries complained of were contributed to by the negligence of the plaintiff'; that (2) 'plaintiff failed to inspect the premises at the time he entered into the lease agreement * * * and assumed the risk of injury to his property'; and that (3) 'the injuries complained of were proximately caused by the sole negligence of the plaintiff.'

The defendant, having taken the deposition of the plaintiff, filed a motion for summary judgment, based upon the statements of the plaintiff made in the deposition and defendant's own affidavit attached to his motion. The plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit. The court then entered judgment for the defendant, stating:

'Under the undisputed material facts, liability of defendant can only be predicated upon the theory that defendant is liable to plaintiff as an insurer, since it cannot be said defendant knowingly permitted this condition to exist. Plaintiff had an equal means of knowledge with the defendant.

'The law does not impose the liability of an insurer upon a landlord in favor of his tenant. * * *'

A concise statement of the factual matters contained in the supporting documents before the court will suffice for an understanding of our disposition of the case.

On December 1, 1959, plaintiff entered into a written lease with defendant's predecessor in interest, the Twentieth Century Investment Company, concerning a main floor storeroom and the basement of the Century building. The remainder of the building contained another store, offices and apartments. A single heating system provided heat for the whole building. The furnace was situated in the basement. Pipes which supplied hot water to the upper floors extended both vertically and horizontally through the plaintiff's storeroom, and were exposed in part and concealed in part by the walls. Upon the sale of the building in September 1963, the lease was assigned to the purchaser, the defendant here.

The lease contained these provisions, which are pertinent to our discussion: (Lessor is defendant--Lessee is plaintiff.)

'The Lessor agrees to furnish heat free of charge for said premises. * * *

'Lessee further agrees to furnish Lessor or its officers, with one key to the front door of said premises, in order to allow Lessor access to the plumbing affecting said premises and the rest of the building in which the said premises are located, and Lessor covenants and agrees not to disturb any of the inventory or property belonging to Lessee located in said premises, except to move such stock or inventory as is necessary to gain access to said plumbing.'

In its judgment the trial court found certain facts to be 'uncontroverted,' among which were these:

'2. Until the moment when the water pipes in question broke, neither plaintiff nor defendant knew or had reason to believe that these particular pipes were defective.

'4. Some years prior to the time defendant became the owner of the building, other pipes located in this general area had broken and the then owner had paid plaintiff for the damage. This defendant had not agreed to pay for any such damages.

'5. Prior to the breaking of these pipes, plaintiff did not notify defendant of the existence of any defect in them, as he knew of none.

'7. There was no duty on plaintiff to keep these pipes in repair.

'8. There was no active negligence on the part of the defendant which resulted in the alleged damage to plaintiff.

'10. The lease does not require the defendant to keep plaintiff's premises in a safe condition.

'11. Defendant inspected the premises about six months before the break in the company of plaintiff and an architectural and engineering firm. Such inspection did not reveal the defective condition of these pipes.

'12. Plaintiff has never notified defendant that any of the pipes were defective including the ones here in question.

'13. There is no genuine issue of any material fact.'

Before proceeding to an analysis of the foregoing findings of the trial court, it is advisable to set forth the guidelines by which we test the correctness of the court's disposition of the controversy.

Summary judgment, under R.C.P.Colo. 56, is a drastic remedy and is never warranted except on a clear showing that there is no genuine...

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19 cases
  • Gleason v. Guzman
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 5 January 1981
    ...are clearly established. E. g., McKinley Construction Co. v. Dozier, 175 Colo. 397, 487 P.2d 1335 (1971); Primock v. Hamilton, 168 Colo. 524, 452 P.2d 375 (1969); Flanders v. Kochenberger, 118 Colo. 104, 193 P.2d 281 (1944); Hatfield v. Barnes, 115 Colo. 30, 168 P.2d 552 (1946). Having due ......
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    ...the moving party. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d at 1276; Ginter, 196 Colo. at 206, 585 P.2d at 584; Primock v. Hamilton, 168 Colo. 524, 528, 452 P.2d 375, 378 (1969). A party against whom summary judgment is sought is entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be d......
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    ...426 P.2d 884, 886; Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal.3d 176, 89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689, 44 A.L.R.3d 615.8 168 Colo. 524, 452 P.2d 375. ...
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    ...the moving party, Abrahamsen v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 177 Colo. 422, 494 P.2d 1287 (1972); Primock v. Hamilton, 168 Colo. 524, 452 P.2d 375 (1969), and the party against whom the motion is made is entitled to all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from ......
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