Bright v. State
| Citation | 265 Ga. 265,455 S.E.2d 37 |
| Decision Date | 17 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. S94P1617,S94P1617 |
| Parties | , 63 USLW 2613 BRIGHT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Thomas M. Flournoy, Jr., Worthington & Flournoy, Douglas L. Breault, Columbus, Charlotta Norby, Atlanta, for Kenneth Dan Bright.
Douglas C. Pullen, Dist. Atty., J. Gray Conger, Julia Anne Fessenden, Susan L. Golomb, Asst. Dist. Attys., Columbus, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Marla Deen Brooks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
The appellant, Kenneth Bright, was convicted of the murder of his two grandparents and of possession of a controlled substance. The jury sentenced Bright to death for the murders, and the trial court sentenced Bright to 15 years in prison on the possession offense. 1 For the reasons that follow we affirm Bright's convictions but reverse his sentence of death.
1. The evidence would have authorized a rational trier of fact to conclude that Bright stabbed his grandmother 21 times, with the fatal wound being a stab wound directly into the heart sac, and that Bright stabbed his grandfather 12 times, with the most severe and probably fatal wound being a stab wound that fractured the 10th and 11th ribs causing the ribs to tear the spleen. The evidence was sufficient to satisfy Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. In his first enumeration of error, Bright contends that the trial court erred by failing to provide him independent expert assistance at state expense for purposes of preparing his defenses at the guilt and punishment phases of the trial. We find no error as to the guilt phase of the trial, but find that Bright made the required threshold showing to obtain assistance at the punishment phase. We therefore reverse Bright's death sentence.
a. Before trial the defense filed a motion requesting funds from the trial court to obtain expert assistance to evaluate Bright's mental health at the time of the offense, to assist the defense in preparing for trial, and to assist in investigating and presenting evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase.
Bright attached records showing that in February 1989 he had been a patient at the Columbus Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse. These records show that Bright sought treatment as a result of his depression, use of crack cocaine, and suicidal thoughts stemming from depression about past actions; that Bright had completed high school and had an average ability to read and write; that although Bright was depressed about past actions, expressed suicidal plans, and had poor impulse control, he had no perceptual disturbances (i.e., no "hallucinations," no "illusions," and no "depersonalization and derealization of ideas"); that he had appropriate continuity of thought and no language impairment; that his behavior was appropriate for the situation; that his memory was good; and that he was aware of his substance abuse and verbalized his need for help. On a form used to evaluate a patient's level of need of treatment for mental illness, mental retardation, or dependency on alcohol or drugs, the clinical worker who evaluated Bright did not list any level of need for mental illness or mental retardation but listed Bright as a patient most-in-need of treatment for cocaine abuse. This classification meant that the substance abuse had caused Bright "social, emotional, developmental, and/or physical disabilities"; that Bright would be "unable to function" without "state supported services"; that he had a long history of dysfunction; that he needed long term treatment; and that he presented a "[s]ubstantial risk of harm to self or others." Bright was treated by social workers and prescribed an anti-depressant drug by a physician.
In support of his motion for funds, Bright also submitted the medical records of the Muscogee County Jail following his booking for the murder of his grandparents. The report indicates that Bright was biting his fingers until they bled; that he was coming off crack cocaine; and that he might need referral to a local psychiatric institute.
Bright further attached to his motion a copy of a study published in the American Journal of Psychiatry that concluded that, of 15 death row inmates chosen for evaluation because of their impending execution dates and not because of evidence of "neuropsychopathology," all 15 had histories of severe head injuries and suffered from some forms of neurological and psychological dysfunctions that could have been significant for purposes of mitigation at their trials. By way of affidavit, Bright stated he had been hit in the head with a brick when he was eleven years old and still has a lump and a loss of hair from that injury; that he ran into a car when he was eight years old and injured his forehead and has a scar from that injury; and that he was hit by a baseball bat on his left eyebrow when he was twelve years old and has a scar from that injury as well. Bright contended that the study appearing in the American Journal of Psychiatry, coupled with the evidence of his head injuries, meant that he might have undiagnosed, unrecognized neurological problems.
Bright also attached copies of two statements he had made to police after the crimes. In both of those statements, Bright stated that he went to his grandparents' house to borrow $20 to buy some crack cocaine. His grandmother would not give him the money because she could tell he had been using drugs and drinking alcohol. Bright got nervous because his grandmother said she was going to call his mother and tell her of Bright's drug and alcohol use and that he was driving her car. Bright contended that when his grandmother started to call his mother, he lost control because of his intoxication and starting stabbing his grandparents. In his first statement, Bright concluded that
Finally, Bright stated in an affidavit that his mother killed his father when he was 6 years old; that he was his father's favorite child; that Bright then went to live with his grandmother until his mother was cleared of charges; and that throughout his life his mother accused him of being just like his father. Bright alleged that he struggled with this accusation and dealt with it by taking drugs in junior high school. Bright further stated that he had no animosity toward his grandparents and had no understanding of how he could have killed them.
Bright contended in his motion that his only defense on the merits of the case was his mental condition at the time of the killings and that he would ask for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity or of guilty but mentally ill. Bright further contended that the foregoing factors demonstrated that at the death penalty phase of the trial he needed to present evidence as to his mental condition, mental history, drug abuse, his social history, and his neurological history as mitigating factors. 2 Bright contended that he needed expert assistance at the guilt and penalty phases of his trial to effectively defend his case.
In his motion, Bright named a neurologist who, according to Bright, was available to give Bright a neurological examination to investigate whether there was physical damage to Bright's brain and that his fee was $120 for a preliminary examination, $500 for a CT scan, and $200 for an EEG test. Bright also named a toxicologist who would be available to testify regarding the effect of crack cocaine on Bright's central nervous system and his mental condition and who would charge $400 to review records and $150 per hour to testify, with the testimony, including travel time, to take approximately six hours. Bright also listed the name of a clinical psychologist who, Bright stated, would conduct a full examination of Bright's mental condition for $640 and testify for $150 per hour, with the testimony to last about two hours. Finally, Bright stated that, without experts in the areas of neurology, psychology, and toxicology, he would not be able to present a defense at the guilt or punishment phases of the trial.
b. Pursuant to Brooks v. State, 259 Ga. 562, 563-566(2), 385 S.E.2d 81 (1989), a defendant who contends that he or she is entitled to obtain expert assistance at public expense is entitled to have an ex parte hearing on the motion. The trial court held an ex parte hearing on Bright's motion on May 18, 1990. Immediately before the ex parte hearing, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.4 and 31.5. Those rules require, among other things, that a defendant give a prosecutor notice of his intent to raise an insanity defense at trial, which Bright did in the instant case. In essence, as a result of the two hearings, the trial court required Bright to submit to an evaluation by a state employed psychiatrist pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130.1 3 (hereinafter referred to as the "court expert" or "court psychiatrist"), but denied Bright's motion to obtain expert assistance at public expense. The court did, however, state that after the court psychiatrist's report came back, the court would consider whether that report contained any information indicating that Bright needed expert assistance at public expense. The court's written order pursuant to § 17-7-130.1 ordered the Department of Human Resources to conduct an examination of Bright and to provide to the court, to Bright's lawyer, and to the District Attorney a report regarding Bright's competency to stand trial and his mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the alleged crimes. 4
Bright refused to cooperate with the court expert and never obtained expert assistance to assist him at trial.
c. Bright contends that he made the required showing for...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Franks v. State
...565, 385 S.E.2d 81 (1989) (indigent defendant's request for funds for expert assistance may be made ex parte); Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265, 276-277, 455 S.E.2d 37 (1995) (error to deny funds for experts to assist in preparing mitigation 37. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (cour......
-
State v. Wood
...(1995), disapproved on other grounds, James G. v. Superior Court , 80 Cal. App. 4th 275, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135 (2000) ; Bright v. State , 265 Ga. 265, 455 S.E.2d 37 (1995) ; People v. Lawson , 163 Ill. 2d 187, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 206 Ill. Dec. 119 (1994) ; State v. Coker , 412 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa ......
-
Raulerson v. State
...findings following a Jackson v. Denno hearing must be accepted by the reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265(5b), 455 S.E.2d 37 (1995). Raulerson contends that his waiver of counsel was unknowing because he is mentally retarded. Whether an accused is capable ......
-
Greene v. State
...Greene also failed to make a threshold showing that his mental health would be an issue in either phase of trial. Compare Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265(2)(e, f), 455 S.E.2d 37 (1995). Instead, his attorneys merely made conclusory statements that they needed assistance to determine whether Gr......
-
Criminal Law and Procedure: a Two-year Survey - James P. Fleissner
...462 S.E.2d 615 (1995). 879. Id. at 754, 462 S.E.2d at 616. 880. Id. at 754-55, 462 S.E.2d at 616. 881. Id. at 756, 462 S.E.2d at 617. 882. 265 Ga. 265, 455 S.E.2d 37 (1995). 883. Id. at 270, 455 S.E.2d at 46. 884. Id. at 271-72, 455 S.E.2d at 47. 885. Id. at 273-74, 455 S.E.2d at 49. 886. I......
-
Chapter 6 Counsel for the Defense
...on battered spouse and post-traumatic stress syndromes); Cade v. State, 658 So.2d 550, 555 (Fla. App.1995) (DNA expert); Bright v. State, 455 S.E.2d 37, 50 (Ga. 1995) (toxicologist); Crawford v. State, 362 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Ga. 1987) (serologist, psychologist, survey expert); Thornton v. Sta......
-
Hope for the Best and Prepare for the Worst: the Capital Defender's Guide to Reciprocal Discovery in the Sentencing Phase of Georgia Death Penalty Trials
...Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. rev. 291, 304 (1989). 107. See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-130.1 (2004); Bright v. State, 455 S.E.2d 37,47 (Ga. 1995). 108. See Bright, 455 S.E.2d at 45-46 (citing Brooks v. State, 385 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1989)). 109. See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 10......