In re Lipsky
| Citation | 460 S.W.3d 579 |
| Decision Date | 24 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 13–0928,13–0928 |
| Parties | In re Steven Lipsky, Relator |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
Matthew J. Kita, Michael G. Guajardo, Guajardo & Marks, LLP, Dallas, Peter M. Kelly, Kelly, Durham & Pittard, L.L.P., Houston Amicus Curiae, for The Texas Trial Lawyers Association
Andrew D. Sims, Russell R. Barton, Troy Douglas Okruhlik, Harris Finley & Bogle, P.C., Elizabeth Fitch, John H. Cayce Jr., Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, Fort Worth, for Range Resources Corporation and Range Production Co.
Donald E. Godwin, George Read Carlton Jr., Shawn Malcolm McCaskill, Godwin Lewis, P.C., Dallas, for Alisa Rich
Alicia Calzada, Haynes & Boone, LLP, San Antonio, Allen M. Stewart, Allen Stewart, P.C., Brent M. Rosenthal, Rosenthal Weiner LLP, Dallas, James R. Claunch, The Claunch Law Firm, Kirk Matthew Claunch, Fort Worth, Joseph David Sibley IV, Camara & Sibley LLP, Houston, Laura Lee Prather, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Austin, for Steven Lipsky
The Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA)1 protects citizens who petition or speak on matters of public concern from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 27.001 –.011. The protection consists of a special motion for an expedited consideration of any suit that appears to stifle the defendant's communication on a matter of public concern. Id . § 27.003. In reviewing that motion, the trial court is directed to dismiss the suit unless “clear and specific evidence” establishes the plaintiffs' “prima facie case.” Id . § 27.005(c). When applying the Act's requirement for clear and specific evidence, however, the courts of appeals disagree about the role of circumstantial evidence.
Some courts hold that only direct evidence is relevant when considering a motion to dismiss under the Act, while others have concluded that relevant circumstantial evidence must also be considered. The court of appeals here considered circumstantial evidence, and we agree that clear and specific evidence under the Act includes relevant circumstantial evidence. 411 S.W.3d 530, 546 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2013). We further agree, generally, with the court of appeals's disposition of the proceedings below and accordingly deny all relief requested here.
Steven and Shyla Lipsky own several acres in Weatherford, Texas. In 2005 they drilled a well on their property to a depth of about two hundred feet to provide water to a cabin and boathouse. In 2009 they finished a house on the property, connecting the well to their new home. That same year, Range Resources Corporation and Range Production Company drilled two gas wells about a half-mile from the Lipskys' property.
A few months after moving into their new home, the Lipskys experienced mechanical problems with their well. They contacted a well-servicing company, which identified the problem as “gas locking,” a condition typically associated with an excess of natural gas in the ground water. A submersible pump's ability to transport water from a well can be affected when too much gas is in the water.
Concerned about the gas in their well water, the Lipskys contacted local health officials who referred them to Alisa Rich, an environmental consultant with Wolf Eagle Environmental. After tests, Rich confirmed the presence of methane and other gases in the well. About this time, Lipsky made a video of himself lighting gas escaping from a garden hose attached to his well. To produce this effect, Lipsky connected the hose to a vent on his water well. He shared his video with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the media, which reported on the flammable nature of Lipsky's water well. He also complained about the gas in his well to the Texas Railroad Commission. Lipsky's own investigation led him to believe that Range, the oil and gas operator closest to his property, had some responsibility for contaminating his ground water.
Both the EPA and Railroad Commission began investigating Lipsky's complaints. The EPA initially concluded that Range's production activities had contributed to the gas in the Lipskys' well water and that the situation could be hazardous to health and safety. The federal agency ordered Range to provide the Lipskys potable water and to install explosivity meters at their property.
The Railroad Commission completed its investigation a few months later. Although invited to participate in the Commission's evidentiary hearing, the Lipskys declined. The Commission thereafter concluded that Range's operations in the area were not the source of the contamination. Lipsky immediately denounced the Railroad Commission's decision in the media and continued to blame Range, pointing to the EPA's action and his expert's opinions.
The Lipskys thereafter sued Range and others involved in developing their residential area. As to Range, they alleged that its fracking operations near their property were negligent, grossly negligent, and a nuisance. They asserted that Range's operations contaminated their water well, causing the water to become flammable and their home uninhabitable. Range answered the suit and moved to dismiss all claims as an improper collateral attack on the Railroad Commission's ruling. Range also filed a counterclaim against the Lipskys and a third-party claim against Rich (the Lipskys' environmental consultant) alleging defamation, business disparagement, and a civil conspiracy. The Lipskys and Rich responded by moving to dismiss Range's counter-attack as an improper attempt to suppress their First Amendment rights guaranteed under the Constitution and protected by the Texas Citizens Participation Act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005.
The trial court granted Range's motion to dismiss, agreeing that the Lipskys' claims were an improper collateral attack on the Commission's determination. The court also declined to dismiss Range's claims against the Lipskys and Rich by denying their motions to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The Lipskys and Rich attempted an interlocutory appeal from this latter ruling, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.2 See Lipsky v. Range Prod. Co., No. 02–12–00098–CV, 2012 WL 3600014, at *1 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The court, however, allowed the challenge to proceed as an original proceeding. 411 S.W.3d at 536. Meanwhile, the EPA withdrew its administrative order against Range without explanation. See Joint Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice, United States v. Range Prod. Co. , No. 3:11–CV–00116–F (N.D.Tex. Mar. 30, 2012).
The court of appeals thereafter determined that the Texas Citizens Participation Act required the dismissal of Range's claims against Lipsky's wife, Shyla, and his environmental consultant, Rich, and that the trial court had accordingly abused its discretion in not dismissing those claims. 411 S.W.3d at 554. The court further determined that the TCPA did not similarly require dismissal of all of Range's claims against Lipsky.3 Id . at 546. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief to Lipsky's wife and consultant, while denying similar relief to Lipsky, prompting both Lipsky and Range to seek mandamus relief in this Court. In their respective petitions, Lipsky argues that the TCPA required the trial court to dismiss all claims against him also, while Range argues that the TCPA did not require the dismissal of any claims. The Lipsky petition accordingly concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his TCPA motion. The Range petition, on the other hand, concludes that the court of appeals abused its discretion in granting mandamus relief to Lipsky's wife, his environmental consultant, and Lipsky himself (in part) because the TCPA did not require it.
As already mentioned, the Texas Citizens Participation Act or TCPA protects citizens from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them on matters of public concern. See House Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2973, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011). The Act provides a special procedure for the expedited dismissal of such suits. A two-step process is initiated by motion of a defendant who believes that the lawsuit responds to the defendant's valid exercise of First Amendment rights. Under the first step, the burden is initially on the defendant-movant to show “by a preponderance of the evidence” that the plaintiff's claim “is based on, relates to, or is in response to the [movant's] exercise of: (1) the right of free speech;4 (2) the right to petition;5 or (3) the right of association.”6
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(b). If the movant is able to demonstrate that the plaintiff's claim implicates one of these rights, the second step shifts the burden to the plaintiff to “establish [ ] by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” Id . § 27.005(c).
In determining whether the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed, the court is to consider the pleadings and any supporting and opposing affidavits. Id. § 27.006(a). Moreover, the motion to dismiss ordinarily suspends discovery, id . § 27.003(c), although the statute leaves the possibility for a court to order limited discovery for “good cause” as it relates to the motion itself, id . § 27.006(b). Within defined time limits, the court must then rule on the motion and must dismiss the plaintiff's claim if the defendant's constitutional rights are implicated and the plaintiff has not met the required showing of a prima facie case. Id . § 27.005. The determination is to be made promptly, ordinarily within 150 days of service of the underlying legal action. See id. §§ 27.003(b), .004(a), .005(a).
In this proceeding, only the second step is at issue–the question being whether the...
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