Nolan v. Nolan

• Decision Date: 02 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-361,83-361
• Citation: 462 N.E.2d 410,11 Ohio St.3d 1
• Parties: , 11 O.B.R. 1 NOLAN, Appellant, v. NOLAN, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 1

11 Ohio St.3d 1

462 N.E.2d 410, 11 O.B.R. 1

NOLAN, Appellant, v. NOLAN, Appellee.

No. 83-361.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 2, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case. (State, ex rel. Potain, v. Mathews, 59 Ohio St.2d 29, 32, 391 N.E.2d 343 , approved and followed.)

The parties to this action, Bridget T. Nolan and Edward J. Nolan, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee, respectively, were divorced on August 25, 1981. The final decree provided for child custody, support and visitation, support alimony to appellant and a division of property. With respect to the parties' marital home, the decree stated:

"The Court further finds that as to the marital home located at 1208 Mulberry Lane, Brunswick, Ohio, each party should have an undivided one-half interest in the property with the Plaintiff having exclusive occupancy until January 1, 1982. The Court further finds that during the period of Plaintiff's exclusive occupancy, Defendant should pay the mortgage, taxes and insurance in connection with the property. The Court further finds, however, that after January 1, 1982, each party shall be entitled to occupancy of the home and the parties should divide the mortgage, taxes and insurance, and maintenance costs, etc. The Court further finds that in the event the premises should be sold, the expenses of sale, payment of mortgage and debts of the marriage should be deducted from the gross proceeds of sale and the remaining net proceeds distributed sixty (60) percent to the Plaintiff and forty (40) percent to the Defendant."

Both parties filed timely notices of appeal from this judgment. In her brief, appellant asserted several assignments of error, the first one being that the court erred in granting the parties joint occupancy of the marital home following the divorce. Appellant's remaining assignments of error related to the payment of house expenses, the award of sustenance alimony and the weight of the evidence.

Appellee assigned two errors pertaining to the division of property and award of alimony.

As to appellant's first argument, the court of appeals agreed that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting the parties joint occupancy of the marital home. The court noted from the record that the parties had a significant history of conflict and lack of cooperation in their marital relationship. In particular, appellant had submitted affidavits detailing violent behavior and alcohol abuse on appellee's part. The court therefore held:

"Given this background there appears little chance that the parties can get along if they are allowed to have joint occupancy of the house. The preexisting problems are likely to continue, if not worsen.

"We, therefore, sustain this assignment of error."

Each of the remaining errors assigned by the parties was overruled. The judgment of the trial court was therefore reversed in part and affirmed in part and the cause was remanded for "further proceedings in accordance with law."

Upon remand, the trial court made no finding as to the right of occupancy of the marital home. Instead, the court restructured the real estate settlement as follows:

" * * * it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that a 60% interest therein shall be awarded to plaintiff Bridget T. Nolan in fee simple absolute, and that a 40% interest therein shall be awarded to defendant Edward J. Nolan in fee simple absolute. Further, that in the event of sale, the expenses of said sale, the payment of the mortgage balance, if any, and all debts of the marriage should first be deducted from gross proceeds of sale in the same pro rata share and charged to each of the parties as their ownership interest bears, i.e. 60% to the plaintiff wife and 40% to the defendant husband. Until such sale, if any is made, the plaintiff wife shall pay 60% of all mortgage payments, taxes and insurance and defendant husband shall pay 40% of all mortgage, taxes and insurance."

Upon an appeal from this order the court of appeals affirmed.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Zashin, Rich & Sutula Co., L.P.A., Robert I. Zashin and Carl C. Monastra, Cleveland, for appellant.

Lawrence J. Courtney, Medina, for appellee.

JAMES P. CELEBREZZE, Justice.

The essential question presented in this case is whether the trial court impermissibly exceeded the scope of its authority upon remand.

Appellant argues that an inferior court is bound to execute the mandate of a reviewing court without variation. She claims that the trial court failed to do so in this case and that, as such, its judgment should not have been affirmed by the court of appeals.

Conversely, appellee contends that it is sufficient for the trial court to remain within the general intent of the remand. Based upon the reasoning that the reviewing court is best able to determine its own intent, appellee asserts that the decision below should be affirmed.

A consideration of these arguments requires a brief review of the doctrine of the "law of the case."

Briefly, the doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels. Gohman v. St. Bernard (1924), 111 Ohio St. 726, 730, 146 N.E. 291, reversed on other grounds New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hosbrook (1935), 130 Ohio St. 101, 196 N.E. 888 ; Gottfried v. Yocum (App.1953), 72 Ohio Law Abs. 343, 345, 133 N.E.2d 389.

The doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results. Gohman, supra, 111 Ohio St. at 730-731, 146 N.E. 291. However, the rule is necessary to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution. See State, ex rel. Potain, v. Mathews (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 29, 32, 391 N.E.2d 343 .

In pursuit of these goals, the doctrine functions to compel trial courts to follow the mandates of reviewing courts. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Special Prosecutors, v. Judges (1978), 55 Ohio St. 2d 94, 378 N.E.2d 162 ; Charles A. Burton, Inc. v. Durkee (1954), 162 Ohio St. 433, 123 N.E.2d 432 ; Schmelzer v. Farrar (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 210, 212, 356 N.E.2d 751 ; Miller v. Miller (1960), 114 Ohio App. 234, 235, 181 N.E.2d 282 . Thus, where at a rehearing following remand a trial court is confronted with substantially the same facts and issues as were involved in the prior appeal, the court is bound to adhere to the appellate court's determination of the applicable law. See, generally, Thomas v. Viering (App.1934), 18 Ohio Law Abs. 343, 344; Loyer v. Kessler (App.1925), 3 Ohio Law Abs. 396. For additional authorities, see Williams v. Board of Trustees (1924), 210 App.Div. 161, 205 N.Y.S. 742; Littmann v Harris (1913), 157 App.Div. 909, 142 N.Y.S. 341. Moreover, the trial court is without authority to extend or vary the mandate given. Briggs v. Pennsylvania RR. Co. (1948), 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 1040, 92 L.Ed. 1403; United States v. Pink (S.Ct.1942), 36 N.Y.S.2d 961, 965; Hampton v. Superior Court (1952), 38 Cal.2d 652, 655, 242 P.2d 1; In re Estate of Baird (1924), 193 Cal. 225, 258, 223 P. 974; Puritan Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1977), 76 Cal.App.3d 140, 147, 142 Cal.Rptr. 676.

Appellee maintains that the trial court did conform itself to the appellate court's mandate. Based upon the record before us, however, we do not agree.

On initial review of the instant matter, the court of appeals was faced with a multitude of claimed errors in the original decree. The court used general language in reversing and remanding the matter to the trial court. However, it is manifestly evident from the proceeding portions of the appellate court's opinion that the sole basis for remand was the issue of occupancy of the marital home. The decree was affirmed in all other respects, including the property settlement.

The subject of the remand was not even addressed by the trial court. Instead, the court chose to rework financial aspects of the marital home disposition. One change was the provision that appellant and appellee share the presale expenses of the home on a sixty-forty basis rather than a fifty-fifty basis. The second change required that the marital debts be deducted from the gross proceeds of the sale in the same prorata, rather than on an equal, basis. Both changes adversely affected appellant.

It may be argued that the court of appeals ratified the aforesaid changes by affirming the trial court's...