Bacardi v. White
| Decision Date | 31 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 65181,65181 |
| Citation | 463 So.2d 218,10 Fla. L. Weekly 93 |
| Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 93 Adriana BACARDI, Petitioner, v. Robert B. WHITE, Trustee, and Luis Facundo Bacardi, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Joe N. Unger of the Law Offices of Joe N. Unger, P.A., Miami, and Nard S. Helman of Helman & Young, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Steven Naclerio, Miami, for Robert B. White.
Roger D. Haagenson, Fort Lauderdale, for Luis Facundo Bacardi.
Adriana Bacardi seeks review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in White v. Bacardi, 446 So.2d 150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), which expressly and directly conflicts with Gilbert v. Gilbert, 447 So.2d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). 1
The issue presented is whether disbursements from spendthrift trusts can be garnished to satisfy court ordered alimony and attorney's fee payments before such disbursements reach the debtor-beneficiary. The Third District in Bacardi held that a former wife of a spendthrift trust beneficiary may not reach the income of that trust for alimony before it reaches the beneficiary unless she can show by competent and substantial evidence that it was the settlor's intent that she participate as a beneficiary. We quash the decision of the district court and hold that disbursements from spendthrift trusts, in certain limited circumstances, may be garnished to enforce court orders or judgments for alimony before such disbursements reach the debtor-beneficiary. 2 We also hold that an order or judgment for attorney's fees awarded incident to the divorce or the enforcement proceedings may be collected in the same manner.
The facts relevant to this holding are as follows. Luis and Adriana Bacardi were married for approximately two years and had no children. When the marriage ended in divorce, they entered into an agreement whereby Mr. Bacardi agreed to pay Mrs. Bacardi alimony of $2,000 per month until the death of either of them or until she remarried. The final judgment dissolving their marriage incorporated this agreement.
Shortly thereafter Mr. Bacardi ceased paying alimony. Mrs. Bacardi subsequently obtained two judgments for the unpaid alimony, with execution authorized, in the total amount of $14,000. She also obtained a third judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of $1,000 awarded incident to the divorce. In aid of execution on the three judgments, she served a writ of garnishment on Robert White as a trustee of a spendthrift trust created by Mr. Bacardi's father for the benefit of his son Luis. Additionally, she obtained a continuing writ of garnishment against the trust income for future alimony payments as they became due.
The trust instrument contained a spendthrift provision which stated:
No part of the interest of any beneficiary of this trust shall be subject in any event to sale, alienation, hypothecation, pledge, transfer or subject to any debt of said beneficiary or any judgment against said beneficiary or process in aid of execution of said judgment.
Both Luis Bacardi and Mr. White appealed the trial court's garnishment order. They asserted that under this spendthrift provision the trust could not be garnished for the collection of alimony and incident attorney's fees. The district court agreed, reversed the trial court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The district court noted that this state has long recognized the validity of spendthrift trust provisions, Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947), and further that Florida has no statutory law limiting or qualifying spendthrift provisions where alimony payments are involved. In deciding this case, the district court aligned itself with what it believed to be both the modern trend and the best reasoned view. It stated that its holding squares with the public policy of this state as expressed in Waterbury v. Munn. It concluded that the legislature, rather than the courts, should resolve the question whether that public policy should yield to the competing public policy of enforcing support.
Respondents urge that we approve the district court's decision and hold that the settlor's intent prevails over any public policy arguments which would allow the alienation of disbursements from the trust. They contend that an ex-wife's debt is no different than any ordinary debt even though it represents unpaid alimony and related attorney's fees and that, therefore, her claim should be treated the same as the claim of any other creditor. They assert that it is clear from reading the spendthrift provision that the settlor did not intend Adriana Bacardi to participate as a beneficiary and that this intent precludes garnishment.
This case involves competing public policies. On the one hand, there is the long held policy of this state that recognizes the validity of spendthrift trusts. On the other hand, there is the even longer held policy of this state that requires a former spouse or a parent to pay alimony or child support in accordance with court orders. When these competing policies collide, in the absence of an expression of legislative intent, this Court must decide which policy will be accorded the greater weight.
We recognize that spendthrift trusts serve many useful purposes such as protecting beneficiaries from their own improvidence, protecting parties from their financial inabilities, and providing a fund for support, all of which continue to have merit. We acknowledge that one of the basic tenets for the construction of trusts is to ascertain the intent of the settlor and to give effect to this intent. See West Coast Hospital Association v. Florida National Bank, 100 So.2d 807 (Fla.1958). We are also aware that some courts of other jurisdictions have refused to invade spendthrift income for alimony and support solely on the basis that the settlor's intent controls. For example, in Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N.W. 161 (1936), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the ex-wife of a spendthrift trust beneficiary could not reach his interest for alimony and support and stated:
When unrestrained by statute it is the intent of the donor, not the character of the donee's obligation, which controls the availability and disposition of his gift. The donee's obligation to pay alimony or support money, paramount though it may be, should not, in our opinion, transcend the right of the donor to do as he pleases with his own property and to choose the object of his bounty. Our conclusion does not arise out of any anxiety for the protection of the beneficiary. In the absence of statute and within the limits as to perpetuities, a donor may dispose of his property as he fees fit, and this includes corpus or principal as well as income.
Id. at 78, 266 N.W. at 164 (emphasis supplied). Accord Bucknam v. Bucknam, 294 Mass. 214, 200 N.E. 918 (1936); Dinwiddie v. Baumberger, 18 Ill.App.3d 933, 310 N.E.2d 841 (1974).
Other jurisdictions have permitted an ex-spouse to reach the income of a spendthrift trust for alimony and child support on public policy grounds finding that the legal obligation of support is more compelling than enforcing the settlor's intent. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Robertson 192 Md. 653, 65 A.2d 292 (1949) (); Lucas v. Lucas, 365 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Civ.App.1962) (); Dillon v. Dillon, 244 Wis. 122, 11 N.W.2d 628 (1943) (). See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 157 (1959).
This state has always had a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of both alimony and child support orders. For example, in Brackin v. Brackin, 182 So.2d 1 (Fla.1966), we held that the basis of an order awarding alimony or support money is the obligation imposed by law that a spouse do what in equity and good conscience he or she ought to do under the circumstances. We said: "Unlike judgments and decrees for money or property growing out of other actions, alimony and support money may have no foundation other than the public policy which requires the husband to pay what he ought to pay...." Id. at 6 (emphasis supplied). In City of Jacksonville v. Jones, 213 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), the district court stated "[t]he public policy of this state requires that judicial orders providing for payment of child support be enforceable." Id. at 259.
We have weighed the competing public policies and, although we reaffirm the validity of spendthrift...
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