Tarter v. Tarter

• Decision Date: 23 June 2020
• Docket Number: S-19-0258
• Citation: 466 P.3d 829
• Parties: Cheryl A. TARTER, Appellant (Defendant), v. Charles Q. TARTER, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

466 P.3d 829

Cheryl A. TARTER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.Charles Q. TARTER, Appellee (Plaintiff).

S-19-0258

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

June 23, 2020

Representing Appellant: Sue Davidson, Aspen Ridge Law Offices, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Andrew D. Bailey, Bailey Stock Harmon Cottam Lopez LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Cheryl A. Tarter appeals an order denying her motions to amend or set aside the default divorce decree (Default Decree) entered against her on May 10, 2018. Ms. Tarter contends, as relevant to this opinion, the decree is void due to invalid service by publication. Because we agree the Default Decree is void, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate.

ISSUE

[¶2] Is the Default Decree entered against Ms. Tarter void for failure of service by publication?

FACTS

[¶3] Ms. Tarter and Charles Q. Tarter were married in Cheyenne in 1998. They have no children together. She and Mr. Tarter separated in August 2016, when she moved to a home the parties owned in Michigan. Following their separation, Ms. Tarter and Mr. Tarter occasionally discussed how and when they would dissolve their marriage and address the support she would need due to serious health issues that had prevented her from working full time since February 2014.

[¶4] Mr. Tarter filed for divorce in Laramie County, Wyoming in March 2017, sooner than Ms. Tarter expected. A Michigan process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve Ms. Tarter with the divorce complaint on five different occasions in March and April. Mr. Tarter filed an affidavit in support of service by certified mail in May. The certified mailing to Ms. Tarter at her Michigan address was returned unclaimed.

[¶5] In June, Mr. Tarter filed an affidavit in support of service by publication and published legal notice in the Pine Bluffs Post over four weeks spanning parts of June and July.¹ Ms. Tarter did not answer.² At Mr. Tarter's request and on receipt of the required documentation, the district court clerk entered default on November 14, 2017.

[¶6] Mr. Tarter filed a motion to enter a default divorce decree and a supporting affidavit on April 27, 2018. He asserted that because he had "completed his twenty years of creditable military service," Ms. Tarter was qualified to "receive the military 20/20/20 benefit"; he wanted her to receive that benefit; and he and Ms. Tarter had settled all property matters. The court entered the Default Decree, summarily finding that Ms. Tarter was properly served by publication. The court divided the couple's property and debt, ruling that "[e]ach of the parties shall retain sole and exclusive ownership of any and all retirement he or she is to receive." The court made no ruling concerning Ms. Tarter's 20/20/20 benefit. Mr. Tarter remarried on September 7, 2018.

[¶7] In December 2018, Ms. Tarter filed a motion to amend or set aside the Default Decree claiming it inequitably denied her any share of Mr. Tarter's military retirement. She relied on W.R.C.P. 60(a) or, alternatively, Rule 55 and Rule 60(b)(1), (3), or (6). She argued good cause existed to set the Default Decree aside because her failure to answer Mr. Tarter's complaint "was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect."

[¶8] On May 6, 2019, the day before the court was to hear her motion, Ms. Tarter filed an amended motion asserting the Default Decree was void because Mr. Tarter had failed to comply with the service by publication requirements in W.R.C.P. 4 ; however, she did not cite Rule 60(b)(4) as grounds for relief. The May 7 hearing was unreported. The court denied Ms. Tarter's motions by order entered July 17, 2019, succinctly ruling she had not established good cause under Rule 55(c), nor grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), or (6). Ms. Tarter timely appealed.³

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶9] Both parties suggest we should review the alleged failure of service under W.R.C.P. 4 for plain error. Neither party, however, cites to pertinent authority nor explains why the plain error standard should apply when Ms. Tarter brought Mr. Tarter's alleged Rule 4 failings to the district court's attention prior to the hearing on her motions to amend or set aside the Default Decree.

[¶10] It is well established we review the denial of a W.R.C.P. 60 motion for an abuse of discretion unless the judgment is attacked under Rule 60(b)(4). State ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP , 772 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 1989). "When [a] judgment is attacked pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), ... there is no question of discretion" in granting or denying relief—"either the judgment is void or it is valid" and "the trial court must act accordingly." Id. ; Essex Holding, LLC v. Basic Properties, Inc. , 2018 WY 111, ¶ 69, 427 P.3d 708, 728 (Wyo. 2018) ; Matter of Guardianship of MKH , 2016 WY 103, ¶ 15, 382 P.3d 1096, 1100 (Wyo. 2016).

[¶11] The question here is whether Ms. Tarter attacked the Default Decree under Rule 60(b)(4). Although Ms. Tarter requested relief, in relevant part, under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), or (6),⁴ and the district court understandably ruled on those grounds, her amended motion clearly asserted Mr. Tarter failed to strictly comply with W.R.C.P. 4 service requirements as the law requires. If Mr. Tarter failed to strictly comply with Rule 4, the Default Decree is void and the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Ms. Tarter. Rosty v. Skaj , 2012 WY 28, ¶ 22, 272 P.3d 947, 955 (Wyo. 2012). Under these circumstances, we believe it appropriate to consider the district court's ruling akin to one declining to set aside the Default Decree as void under Rule 60(b)(4) and we review the ruling accordingly.⁵ See MKH , ¶ 15, 382 P.3d at 1100 (deciding the court's order was "more akin to a Rule 60(b)(4) order setting aside a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction" even though Father challenged the order in the form of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss).

DISCUSSION

[¶12] Ms. Tarter claims that Mr. Tarter failed to comply with numerous W.R.C.P. 4 service by publication requirements. Her amended motion specifically claimed that the publication notice did not include her Michigan address as known to Mr. Tarter, or set forth the exact date by which her answer was due. She also claimed Mr. Tarter did not file the affidavit following publication as Rule 4 requires.⁶ Mr. Tarter responds that he substantially complied with those requirements and Ms. Tarter was not prejudiced by any of the alleged failures.

[¶13] Prejudice does not factor into our analysis because we have long required strict compliance with rules governing service by publication. Goss , 780 P.2d at 312 (The requirements of W.R.C.P. 4 concerning service by publication "are minimal and demand strict compliance."); Emery v. Emery , 404 P.2d 745, 748 (Wyo. 1965) ; see also Rosty , ¶ 22, 272 P.3d at 955 ("Strict compliance with the requirements of service of process is mandatory. Any omissions of statements that are required under W.R.C.P. 4 are fatal and such omission prevents the trial court from obtaining jurisdiction of the defendant." (quoting Hoke v. Motel 6 Jackson & Accor N. Am., Inc ., 2006 WY 38, ¶ 7, 131 P.3d 369, 374 (Wyo. 2006) )). Any failure to comply with those requirements "deprives the district court of jurisdiction over the person to be served and prevents it from entering a valid and binding judgment." Goss , 780 P.2d at 312. Stated differently, defective service by publication is invalid and "any judgment purportedly grounded upon that service is rendered void." Id. (citations omitted).

[¶14] The record substantiates that Mr. Tarter failed to comply with W.R.C.P. 4 in several respects. First, Mr. Tarter did not comply with the Rule 4 requirements with respect to Ms. Tarter's Michigan address. Those requirements differ depending on whether Ms. Tarter's address was known or unknown. See W.R.C.P. 4(l).⁷ Mr. Tarter's Affidavit in Support of Service by Publication did not clearly state whether Ms. Tarter's address was known or unknown. It instead presented Mr. Tarter's knowledge of her last known address and facts related to the failed efforts to serve Ms. Tarter at that address in person or by certified mail.

[¶15] If Mr. Tarter knew Ms. Tarter's Michigan address, he was required to state that address in both the affidavit in support of service by publication and the published notice. W.R.C.P. 4(l)(1)(B), (2)(A). As noted above, the affidavit equivocally stated: Ms. Tarter's "last known address is [***] [***] Street, Manistee, Michigan"; "[a]ffiant's knowledge of the last known address of [Ms. Tarter] was obtained from [Mr. Tarter][.]" The published notice did not include Ms. Tarter's address. Consequently, if Mr. Tarter knew Ms. Tarter's Michigan address, he failed to comply with W.R.C.P. 4(l)(1)(B) and (2)(A).

[¶16] Even if we accept Mr. Tarter's argument he did not know Ms. Tarter's address with certainty due to her repeated avoidance of service and her failure to claim the certified mailing, the affidavit in support of service by publication was deficient. It did not state that Ms. Tarter's address was unknown and could not with reasonable diligence be ascertained, nor detail the efforts made to obtain an address for her, as W.R.C.P. 4(l)(1)(B)–(C) plainly requires.

[¶17] We further note the affidavit in support of service by publication failed to strictly comply with W.R.C.P. 4(l)(1)(D), in that it erroneously referenced Rule 4(e) instead of Rule 4(k), as the basis on which service by publication was proper in this case. When the Rule 4 replacement took effect on March 1, 2017, subsection (k) became the provision that identifies those cases in which "[s]ervice by publication may be had[,]" including "suits for divorce [and] alimony ... when the defendant is a nonresident of the state, or the defendant's residence cannot be ascertained, or the defendant keeps concealed in order to avoid service of process[.]"...