Pittsburg Bridge Co. v. Walker

• Decision Date: 22 December 1897
• Citation: 170 Ill. 550,48 N.E. 915
• Parties: PITTSBURG BRIDGE CO. v. WALKER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

170 Ill. 550

48 N.E. 915

PITTSBURG BRIDGE CO.

v.WALKER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1897.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by John Walker against the Pittsburg Bridge Company. From a judgment of the appellate court (70 Ill. App. 55), affirming a judgment for plaintiff in the circuit court, the defendant appeals. Affirmed.John A. Post and John B. Brady, for appellant.

Arnott Stubblefield and James B. McCracken, for appellee.

BOGGS, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the appellate court affirming a judgment of the circuit court in the sum of $3,000 against the appellant company, in favor of the appellee, for damages sustained by him by reason of a personal injury received, as the declaration alleged, through the negligence of the appellant company. At the close of all the testimony offered in the case, the appellant company moved the court to exclude the evidence and direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, and offered a written instruction to be given the jury to that effect. The court refused to grant the instruction, and this action of the court constitutes an alleged ground of error. In ruling upon the motion the court orally expressed the view that there was no evidence to support any of the counts in the declaration except the second; and counsel for appellant, accepting such remarks of the court as limiting the right of recovery to the second count, has abstracted that count only, and insists that the question presented by the motion to direct a verdict in its favor is whether the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict under that count. The second count avers that appellee, as an employé of the appellant company, was engaged in removing heavy pieces of iron framework, intended to be used in constructing a bridge across the Chicago river, from the bank of the river to the place where such framework should be needed in the construction of the bridge, and that in the process of the removal of such framework it was necessary to the safety of the employés that a ‘tag line’ should be attached to the framework wherewith to steady and control the same while it was being hoisted by a block and tackle, and that one Farnsworth, who occupied the position and discharged the duties of assistant superintendent of the appellant company, refused and neglected to attach such tag line, but undertook to hold and control the framework with his hands, and was unable to, or did not, do so, whereby the heavy iron framework swung around, and struck and injured the appellee. The contention of counsel for appellant is that no proof was introduced tending to show that said Farnsworth was assistant superintendent of the construction of the bridge, and no proof that said Farnsworth refused or neglected to attach a tag line to the framework, or did or said anything about attaching said line. We are unable to agree with counsel in this contention. One Clark was foreman of the force of men with which appellee was connected in the work, but we find abundant testimony tending to show that Farnsworth was a representative of the company, and clothed with authority superior to that of Clark. The appellee testified that one Lyons was general superintendent for appellant company, and that Lyons directed him to obey all orders given by Farnsworth. It appeared from the testimony that, in the execution of the particular work in the course of which appellee was injured, Farnsworth was present, and exercised authority to direct the manner and course of its execution, and that Clark acquiesced in and recognized Farnsworth's right and power to direct and control the work. The trial court would not have been warranted in assuming to declare the evidence on this point insufficient to justify its submission, as a question of fact, to the jury. The testimony of appellee was to the effect that Farnsworth refused to allow the tag line to be attached to the framework in question. It is true that other testimony tended to contradict the statement of the appellee. The conflict thus brought about was settled by the jury adversely to the appellant company. The judgment of the appellate court, approving the finding of the jury, is conclusive that the conflict was...