Depuy v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company
| Decision Date | 19 December 1904 |
| Parties | GEORGE DEPUY, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Daviess Circuit Court.--Hon. J. W. Alexander, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cause reversed and remanded.
Platt Hubbell, George Hubbell and Boyd Dudley for appellant.
(1) The servant that defendant authorized to perform these duties is a vice-principal--defendant's alter ego. O'Hare v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 667; Butts v. Bank, 99 Mo.App. 173; Ruth v. Transit Co., 98 Mo.App. 14; Connolly v. Ptg. Co., 166 Mo. 463; James v. Mut R. F. L., 148 Mo. 16; Ballard v. Railroad, 51 Mo.App. 457; Grace v. Railroad, 156 Mo. 301; Creighton v. M. W. A. 90 Mo.App. 387. (2) Franklin was plaintiff's vice-principal. Foster v Railroad, 115 Mo. 179; Tabler v. Railroad, 93 Mo. 87; Fox v. Packing Co., 96 Mo.App. 183; Glover v. Bolt & Nut Co., 153 Mo. 342; Grattis v. Railroad, 153 Mo. 407; Dayharsh v. Railroad, 103 Mo. 575; Steube v. Iron and Foundry Co., 85 Mo.App. 637; Hutson v. Railroad, 50 Mo.App. 305; Bane v. Irwin, 172 Mo. 317; Slaughter v Railroad, 116 Mo. 277. (3) In Iowa, the authority to hire and discharge is not the test of vice-principalship. Newbury v. L. & M. Co., 100 Iowa 441, 69 N.W. 745; Foley v. Packing Co., 93 N.W. 287, 119 Iowa 246; Fink v. Ice Co., 84 Ia. 321; Baldwin v Railroad, 75 Ia. 297, 9 Am. St. Rep. 479; Brann v. Railroad, 53 Ia. 595. (4) The fact that Franklin worked part of the time at physical labor, does not relieve the defendant of liability for his acts as vice-principal. Haworth v. Railroad, 94 Mo.App. 224. (5) Franklin negligently ordered Depuy into a dangerous place to work, and, Franklin negligently prescribed a dangerous method of performing the work. Fink v. Ice Co., 84 Ia. 321; Foley v. Packing Co., (No. 2), 93 N.W. 284 (Ia.), 119 Ia. 246; Beattie v. Bridge Works, 109 F. 233; Hall v. Water Co., 48 Mo.App. 356; Halliburton v. Railroad, 58 Mo.App. 27; Monahan v. Clay & Coal Co., 58 Mo.App. 68; Fogus v. Railroad, 50 Mo.App. 250; Young v. Shickle, 103 Mo. 328; Lore v. Mfg. Co., 160 Mo. 626; Kane v. The Falk Co., 93 Mo.App. 209; Hester v. Packing Co., 95 Mo.App. 16. (6) Defendant's negligence in the original construction of the bent proximately contributed to Depuy's injury. Ashby v. Road Co., 99 Mo.App. 186; Lore v. Mfg. Co., 160 Mo. 627; Brash v. St. Louis, 161 Mo. 438; Vogel v. West Plains, 73 Mo.App. 592; Newcomb v. Railroad, 169 Mo. 423.
M. A. Low and Harber & Knight for respondent.
(1) Where a contract of employment was made in one State under which the work to be done by the employee, and the work which he did in that State, and the accident happened in that State in the course of his employment, the liability of the employer will be determined by the laws of that State in a suit against the employer in another State to recover damages therefor." Fogarty v. Transfer Co., 79 S.W 664. (2) Under the provisions of the Iowa statute, section 2071 of the supplement to the code of Iowa for the year 1902 as well as under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa and as interpreted by our own courts--it is clear that any work in connection with bridges such as was engaged in by plaintiff in this case, does not come within the provisions of the statute exempting one employee from the negligence of another, but for all work not in the movement of trains--the negligence of a fellow-servant still precludes a recovery. Callahan v. Railroad, 170 Mo. 481; Williams v. Railroad, 79 S.W. 1167; Deppe v. Railroad, 36 Iowa 52; Foley v. Railroad, 64 Ia. 644; Malone v. Railroad, 65 Iowa 417; Reddington v. Railroad, 108 Ia. 96; Akeson v. Railroad, 106 Ia. 54; Conners v. Railroad, 111 Ia. 384; Meatly v. Railroad, 9 Am. & Eng. Railroad Cases (New Series), 1 and note. (3) The "dual capacity doctrine" obtains both in Iowa and Missouri. Fogarty v. Transfer Co., 79 S.W. 664. The case of Haworth v. Railroad, 94 Mo.App. 224, cited by appellant is not the law and should therefore be no longer followed. The following cases fall within the second class stated to-wit, where the vice-principal acted as a colaborer. Hanna v. Granger, 18 R. I. 507. 28 A. 559; DiMarcho v. Foundry, 18 R. I. 516, 27 A. 318, 38 A. 661; Frawley v. Sheldon, 20 R. I. 258, 38 A. 370; Gann v. Railroad, 101 Tenn. 380, 47 S.W. 483, 70 Am. St. Rep. 687; Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. St. 51, e1 A. 159, 23 Am. St. Rep. 160; Railroad v. Charles, 162 U.S. 364, 16 S.Ct. 848, 40 L.Ed. 999; Barnicle v. Conner, 110 Iowa 240, 81 N.W. 452; Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N.Y. 516, 37 Am. Rep. 521; Reed v. Stockmeyer, 74 F. 186, 20 C. C. A. 581; Meeker v. Remington, 65 N.Y.S. 1116; Gall v. Beckstein, 173 Ill. 187, 50 N.E. 711; Drainage Co. v. Fitzgerald, 21 Colo. 533, 43 P. 210; Railroad v. Torrey, 58 Ark. 217, 24 S.W. 244; Railroad v. May, 108 Ill. 283; Clay v. Railroad, 56 Ill.App. 233; Railroad v. Massig, 50 Ill.App. 666; Railroad v. Handman, 13 Lea 423; Allen v. Goodwin, 92 Tenn. 385, 21 S.W. 760; Soutar v. Electric Co., 68 Minn. 18, 70 N.W. 796; Sayward v. Carlson, 1 Wash. 29, 23 P. 830; Klochinski v. Lumber Co., 93 Wis. 419, 67 N.W. 934; Holtz v. Railroad, 69 Minn. 524, 62 N.W. 805; Fertilizer Co. v. Travis, 102 Tenn. 16, 49 S.W. 832; Railroad, v. Schwabbe, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 573, 21 S.W. 706; Quinn v. Lighterage Co., 23 Blatchf. 209, 23 F. 363; The Miami, 93 F. 218, 35 C. C. A. 281; Drwyer v. Express Co., 82 Wis. 312; 52 N.W. 304; 33 Am. St. Rep. 44. The following cases fall under the first class stated, towit, where the vice-principal acted as such and not as a colaborer. Coal Co. v. Wombacher, 134 Ill. 57, 24 N.E. 627; Fanter v. Clark, 15 Ill.App. 470; Brick Co. v. Sobkomeak, 148 Ill. 573, 36 N.E. 572; Railroad v. Dwyer, 162 Ill. 482, 44 N.E. 815; Steel Co. v. Schymanowski, 162 Ill. 447, 44 N.E. 876; Bridge Co. v. Walker, 170 Ill. 550, 48 N.E. 915; Offutt v. Exposition, 175 Ill. 472, 51 N.E. 651; Railroad v. Atwell, 198 Ill. 200, 64 N.E. 1095. In Norton v. Nadebok, 190 Ill. 595, 60 N.E. 843, 54 L. R. A. 842, there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the operator of a machine was a vice-principal or a fellow-servant with a helper who worked around the machine. (4) The adoption of a plan is one thing, the negligence in carrying it out is another. The negligence alleged is the hammering down of the cap without giving the plaintiff warning or time to get therefrom. Beside, the master in this case furnished competent workmen and suitable material for scaffolding and the work in hand, and left to the workmen the manner of its construction. In such case they are all fellow-servants, and the master is not liable to one of them for the negligence, if any, of his fellow workmen, in the matter of construction. Bridge Co. v. Castelberry, 131 F. 181; 12 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 956; Bowen v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 277; Livengood v. Lead & Zinc Co., 77 S.W. 1077. (5) Plaintiff either knew or had the opportunity to know every fact that defendant knew or had opportunity to know. In fact plaintiff knew every condition existing about this work that any person could know. Where the servant knows and appreciates the danger or has equal means of knowledge with the master, there can be no recovery. Fugler v. Bothe, 117 Mo. 493; Thomas v. Railroad, 109 Mo. 187; Flyn v. Bridge Co., 42 Mo.App. 529; Williams v. Railroad, 119 Mo. 316; Watson v. Coal Co., 52 Mo.App. 366; Breeden v. Mining Co., 76 S.W. 731; Livingood v. Lead & Zinc Co., 77 S.W. 1077; Grattis v. Railroad, 153 Mo. 380; Minnier v. Railroad, 167 Mo. 99; Harrington v. Railroad, 78 S.W. 662; Bradley v. Railroad, 138 Mo. 302; Berning v. Medart, 56 Mo.App. 433; Beckman v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 98 Mo.App. 555; Sinburg v. Falk Co., 98 Mo.App. 546; Holmes v. Brandenbaugh, 172 Mo. 64; Jackson v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 448; Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64; Epperson v. Cable Co., 155 Mo. 378; Roberts v. Tel. Co., 166 Mo. 379; Cordage Co. v. Miller, 126 F. 513; Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 241, 13 S.Ct. 298, 37 L.Ed. 150; Railroad v. Railroad, 122 U.S. 194, 7 S.Ct. 1166, 30 L.Ed. 1114; Gibson v. Railroad, 63 N.Y. 449, 20 Am. Rep. 552; Sweeney v. Envelope Co., 101 N.Y. 520, 5 N.E. 358, 54 Am. Rep. 722; Buckley v. Mfg. Co., 113 N.Y. 540, 21 N.E. 717; Cole v. Sav. & Loan Society (C. C. A.), 124 F. 122; Brady v. Railroad, 114 F. 105, 52 C. C. A. 53, 57 L. R. A. 712; Railroad v. Belliwith, 83 F. 441, 28 C. C. A. 362; Association v. Wilson, 100 F. 370, 40 C. C. A. 413; Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U.S. 284, 24 L.Ed. 59; Railroad v. Bank, 123 U.S. 733, 8 S.Ct. 266, 31 L.Ed. 287; Railroad v. Converse, 139 U.S. 469, 11 S.Ct. 569, 35 L.Ed. 213; Mfg. Co. v. Inspection & Ins. Co., 60 F. 354, 9 C. C. A. 4; Gowen v. Harley, 56 F. 973, 6 C. C. A. 190; Motey v. Granite Co., 74 F. 157, 20 C. C. A. 368. The "scintilla" doctrine does not obtain in Missouri. Powell v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 80 and authorities there cited. (6) Where the servant has knowledge of the condition of a given piece of work or of a structure, the law will most usually infer his comprehension of the risks arising therefrom. Labatt on Master and Servant, sec. 279b, notes 1 and 3; Watson v. Coal Co., 52 Mo.App. 366; Convey v. Railroad, 86 Mo. 635; Bering v. Medart, 56 Mo.App. 443; Apple v. Railroad, 111 N.Y. 553, 19 N.E. 93; Anderson v. Clark, 155 Mass. 368, 29 N.E. 589; Scharenbroich v. St. Cloud Co., 59 Minn. 116, 60 N.W. 1093; Ragon v. Railroad, 97 Mich. 265, 56 N.W. 612; Electric Co. v. Laughlin, 45 Neb. 390, 63 N.W. 941; Yates v. Iron Co., 68 Md. 370, 16 A. 280; Meaney v. Oil Co., 47 A. (N. J. L.), 803; Ford v. Railroad, 110 Mass. 243, 14 Am. Rep. 598; Railroad v. Hughs, 119 Pa. 301, 13 A. 286; Anderson v. Lumber Co., 47 Minn. 128, 49 N.W. 664; Dorsey v. Phillips Co., 42 Wis. 593; Pierce v. Clavin, 27 C. C. A. 227, 53 U. S. App. 492, 82 F. 550; Thompson v. Railroad, ...
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