West v. Conrail, 85-1804
| Decision Date | 06 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1804,85-1804 |
| Parties | Thomas WEST, Petitioner, v. CONRAIL, et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
In enacting the federal labor relations statutes, Congress did not include a statute of limitations expressly applicable to claims against unions for breach of their duty of fair representation. Thus, in DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 this Court "borrowed" from § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act its 6-month statute of limitations period for use in "hybrid" suits that combine unfair labor practice claims with duty of fair representation claims. Section 10(b) provides that no complaint may issue based on an unfair labor practice that occurred more than six months prior to the filing of a charge and the service of a copy thereof on the person against whom the charge is made. Although petitioner's complaint in his hybrid suit against respondents—his employer, his union, and his union representative—was filed less than six months after the § 10(b) statute of limitations began to run, the District Court granted summary judgment to respondents because the summonses and complaints were not mailed nor service acknowledgments made until after the 6-month period. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under DelCostello, § 10(b) requires in hybrid suits that both the filing and service of the complaint be made within the 6-month period.
Held: The action was timely commenced because the complaint was filed within the 6-month period. When the underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of limitations makes it necessary for a federal court to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the action is not barred if it has been "commenced" within the borrowed time period by the filing of a complaint with the court in compliance with Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The mere act of borrowing a statute of limitations to apply to a federal cause of action does not require that that statute's service provisions also be adopted, since Rules 4(a) and (j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure normally require the plaintiff to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint within 120 days. When borrowing a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, this Court borrows no more than is necessary to fill a gap left by Congress. DelCostello simply borrowed § 10(b)'s limitations period, and did not substitute § 10(b) for the Federal Rules. Pp. 38-40.
780 F.2d 361, reversed and remanded.
Paul Alan Levy, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Laurence Gold, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
Petitioner Thomas West brought a "hybrid" suit against his employer, his union, and his union representative under the Railway Labor Act. He alleged that the employer had breached the collective-bargaining agreement and that the union and its representative had breached their duty of fair representation. The parties agree, for the purpose of our review of the Court of Appeals' judgment, that petitioner's cause of action accrued on March 25, 1984, the date petitioner learned of the alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representation. His complaint was filed on September 24, 1984, less than six months after the statute of limitations began to run. The summonses and complaints were mailed to respondents on October 10, 1984. Respondents acknowledged service of the complaint on dates ranging from October 12, 1984, through November 1, 1984. Thus, both the date on which the complaints were mailed and the date when the first acknowledgment of service was made were more than six months after the statute began to run.
Because service was not effected within the 6-month period prescribed in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,1 the District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 780 F.2d 361 (1986). We granted certiorari, 478 U.S. 1004, 106 S.Ct. 3293, 92 L.Ed.2d 708 (1986), because the Third Circuit's decision is at odds with a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Macon v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 779 F.2d 1166 (1985), cert. pending, No. 85-1400.
Congress did not enact a federal statute of limitations that is expressly applicable to federal duty of fair representation claims. In DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), we filled that gap in federal law by deciding that the 6-month period prescribed in § 10(b) should be applied to hybrid claims under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.2 Section 10(b) authorizes the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to issue a complaint when a charging party asserts that an employer or a union has engaged in an unfair labor practice. The statute does not impose any time limit on the issuance of such a complaint, but it does provide that "no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made. . . ." See n. 1, supra.3 Given our holding in DelCostello, the Court of Appeals read this statutory language to require in hybrid suits of this kind that both the filing and the service of the complaint be made within the 6-month period of limitations. We did not, however, intend that result.
The only gap in federal law that we intended to fill in DelCostello was the appropriate limitations period. We did not intend to replace any part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with any part of § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act. Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, and Rule 4 governs the procedure for effecting service and the period within which service must be made. The clerk of the district court must "forthwith issue a summons and deliver the summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, who shall be responsible for prompt service of the summons and a copy of the complaint." Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 4(a). Service must normally be made within 120 days. See Rule 4(j). Although we have not expressly so held before, we now hold that when the underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the action is not barred if it has been "commenced" in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed period.4 See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1056 (1969). We decline respondents' invitation to require that when a federal court borrows a statute of limitations to apply to a federal cause of action, the statute of limitation's provisions for service must necessarily also be followed, even when the borrowed statute is to be applied in a context somewhat different from the one in which those procedural rules originated.5
Inevitably our resolution of cases or controversies requires us to close interstices in federal law from time to time, but when it is necessary for us to borrow a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, we borrow no more than neces- sary.6 Here, because of the availability of Rule 3, there is no lacuna as to whether the action was brought within the borrowed limitations period.7
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
1 Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), provides:
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