481 U.S. 393 (1987), 85-6756, Hitchcock v. Dugger

• Citation: 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347, 55 U.S.L.W. 4567
• Party Name: Hitchcock v. Dugger
• Case Date: April 22, 1987
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Page 393

481 U.S. 393 (1987)

107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347, 55 U.S.L.W. 4567

Hitchcock

v.

Dugger

No. 85-6756

United States Supreme Court

April 22, 1987

Argued October 15, 1986

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in a separate postconviction proceeding. In that proceeding, the trial judge instructed the advisory jury not to consider, and himself refused to consider, evidence of mitigating circumstances not specifically enumerated in the Florida death penalty statute. Following unsuccessful appeals and state and federal collateral proceedings, petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court, claiming that the advisory jury and the sentencing judge had been precluded by law from considering evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The District Court denied the application, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Petitioner was sentenced to death in proceedings that did not comport with the requirement that the sentencer may neither refuse to consider nor be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586. Under the circumstances of this case, petitioner's death sentence cannot stand. Pp. 395-399.

770 F.2d 1514, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Page 394

SCALIA, J., lead opinion

[107 S.Ct. 1822] JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We have held that, in capital cases, "`the sentencer'" may not refuse to consider or "`be precluded from considering'" any relevant mitigating evidence. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). Certiorari was granted in the present case to consider petitioner's contention that he was sentenced to death under a Florida statute that operated in a manner inconsistent with this requirement.¹ 476 U.S. 1168 (1986).

I

On July 31, 1976, 13-year-old Cynthia Driggers was strangled to death. At the time of the murder, both Cynthia and petitioner resided with Richard Hitchcock, who was Cynthia's stepfather and petitioner's brother. Petitioner initially confessed to the murder, stating that he had killed Cynthia after she threatened to tell her parents that she and petitioner had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. At his trial for first-degree murder, however, petitioner recanted, and testified that it was his brother Richard who murdered Cynthia, after finding out about the intercourse. The State contended that petitioner had sexually assaulted Cynthia and then murdered her to avoid discovery.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After unsuccessful appeals and state and federal collateral proceedings, he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. He argued, among other

Page 395

things, that the advisory jury and sentencing judge had been precluded by law from considering certain evidence of mitigating circumstances that had been introduced, and that additional evidence of mitigating circumstances had been withheld by his counsel in the reasonable belief that it could not be considered under the Florida death penalty statute. The District Court denied petitioner's application, without granting an evidentiary hearing. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 745 F.2d 1332 (1984), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed en banc, 770 F.2d 1514 (1985). This petition followed.

II

Petitioner claims that the advisory jury and the sentencing judge were precluded by law from considering some of the evidence of mitigating circumstances before them. The Florida death penalty statute in effect at the time (which has since been amended in various respects) provided for separate postconviction proceedings to determine whether those convicted of capital felonies should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. Those proceedings were typically held before the trial jury, which heard evidence "as to any matter that the court deem[ed] relevant to sentence." Fla.Stat. § 921.141(1) (1975). After hearing that evidence, the jury was to render an advisory verdict by determining

(a) [w]hether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in [§ 921.141(5)];² (b) [107 S.Ct. 1823] [w]hether sufficient mitigating

Page 396

circumstances exist as enumerated in [§ 921.141(6)],³ which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and (c) [b]ased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death.

§ 921.141(2). The trial court then was to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances itself and enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death. If it imposed a sentence of death, it was required to set forth in writing its findings

(a) [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in [§ 921.141(5)], and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in [§ 921.141(6)], to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

§ 921.141(3).

Petitioner argues that, at the time he was sentenced, these provisions had been authoritatively interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court to prohibit the sentencing jury and judge from considering mitigating circumstances not specifically enumerated in the statute. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 336 So.2d 1133, 1139 (1976) ("The sole issue in a sentencing hearing under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is to...