Craft v. Commonwealth, 2014–SC–000386–MR

• Decision Date: 17 March 2016
• Docket Number: 2014–SC–000386–MR
• Parties: Ronald Lynn Craft, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellee
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

483 S.W.3d 837

Ronald Lynn Craft, Appellant
v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellee

2014–SC–000386–MR

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

RENDERED: MARCH 17, 2016

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Daniel T. Goyette, Louisville Metro Public Defender of Counsel, Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender, Cicely Jaracz Lambert, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky, Micah Brandon Roberts, Assistant Attorney General

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON

A circuit court jury convicted Ronald Lynn Craft on one count of intentional

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murder and one count of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The jury fixed punishment at twenty years' imprisonment, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. Craft now appeals that judgment to this Court as a matter of right¹ , raising two issues for our review: (1) that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 29A.020(2)(b) unconstitutionally delegates to the judiciary the power to establish the number of peremptory challenges awarded to the Commonwealth and (2) he was entitled to a directed verdict on the intentional-homicide charge. Because we hold Craft's arguments have no merit, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

On Christmas Eve night 2010, Craft stabbed Leonard Dixon in the chest. The wound was six inches deep. Dixon died within hours.

Earlier that night, Tywan Hinkle began his shift as a liquor store cashier. When he began, he saw several intoxicated men congregated in the store lobby. Hinkle was familiar with Craft, whom he knew by the nickname "Smacky." He did not know Dixon but later identified him as among the men gathered in the store. Hinkle later told police that Craft looked agitated that evening, while the unknown man (later to be identified as Dixon) appeared happy. Nevertheless, Hinkle ordered the group of men out of the store.

As the crowd left, Hinkle could see Craft and Dixon arguing in the area outside the store. He was not able to hear what the argument was about, nor could he discern why they were arguing. Soon, Hinkle observed law enforcement officers arriving at the gas station across the street. Apparently Dixon had been stabbed in the chest and staggered into the station, gushing blood, before collapsing in front of the deli case. Dixon was nearly dead when the paramedics arrived at the scene, and he ultimately succumbed to his wounds at the hospital shortly thereafter. A medical examiner would later determine that Dixon suffered a single six-inch deep stab wound to the chest. The cut damaged his heart and caused significant blood loss, which was the ultimate cause of his death.

The blood trail from the station back to the liquor store led the police back to Hinkle. The police used Hinkle's observations to form the basis for a search warrant of Craft's house. Upon executing the warrant, investigators found a bloody knife—eleven inches long with about a six-and-a-quarter inch blade—in a drawer in his bedroom. The blood on the knife's blade would later be confirmed to match Dixon's DNA.

That night, the police interviewed Craft. He initially, denied even being at the liquor store. He then volunteered the statement, "I ain't killed nobody." Craft eventually admitted to being at the liquor store, but repeatedly denied any involvement in Dixon's murder. Days later, a grand jury indicted him on one count of murder, one count of tampering with physical evidence, and one count of being a first-degree PFO.

At trial, Craft's attorney began her opening statement by admitting that Craft had indeed stabbed and killed Dixon. But she then asserted Craft did so in self-defense. Craft also called one witness, Allen Simpson, to testify that he had seen a man walking toward the liquor store carrying a large stick. Simpson could not offer a description of the man's appearance, clothing, or anything that could link the man to Dixon. Hinkle later testified

483 S.W.3d 839

that he did not see Dixon with a stick that night.

The jury found Craft guilty of murder, but not guilty of tampering with physical evidence, and sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment. The jury also found him guilty of first-degree PFO and enhanced the sentence to twenty-five years. Craft later filed a motion under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05, seeking to set aside the enhanced twenty-five year sentence because a murder conviction is not subject to PFO enhancement. The trial court granted the motion and entered an amended final judgment sentencing Craft to twenty years' imprisonment.

Craft presents two issues for our review. First, he contends that trial court discretion with regard to peremptory jury challenges is an impermissible delegation of legislative authority under Kentucky's strong separation of governmental powers principle. And second, he contends the Commonwealth adduced insufficient evidence to support a conviction for murder and Craft was entitled to a directed verdict on the charge. Because we reject his arguments, we affirm Craft's conviction and the trial court's judgment.

II. ANALYSIS.

A. Notice of Constitutional Challenge of Statute was Inadequate.

Craft's first claim of error contends that the trial court erred by granting the Commonwealth nine peremptory challenges. Under his understanding of Kentucky law, he believes the Commonwealth is not entitled to any. This issue was unpreserved at the trial court level, and Craft accordingly asks us to review his claim for palpable error under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.² At the heart of his claim is the assertion that the discretion given to trial courts in setting the appropriate number of prosecutorial peremptory jury challenges runs afoul of the separation of powers principles enshrined in our state constitution.

Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution declares that this Court alone is the final arbiter of our rules of "practice and procedure."³ We exercised this function to set a baseline number of peremptory challenges in RCr 9.40. The General Assembly recognizes this authority through KRS 29A.290(2)(b), which also declares that the number of prosecutorial peremptory challenges is set by this Court.⁴ Essentially, Craft questions whether such a clear rulemaking mandate exists with respect to prosecutorial peremptory challenges. He positions this type of trial procedure as one of legislative creation; a privilege non-existent in the common law and totally dependent on legislative will. Under this view, KRS 29A.290 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the judiciary, and accordingly, RCr 9.40 is an encroachment by the Court on powers reserved to the General Assembly

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alone.⁵ But because Craft failed to comply with the appropriate procedures in raising an appeal based on the constitutionality of a statute, we decline review.

KRS 418.075 declares that notice to the Attorney General is prerequisite to any constitutional challenge.⁶ It is this Court's practice to require strict compliance with this statutorily mandated notification.⁷ And we have also held that this notification cannot be satisfied by simply filing an appellate brief.⁸ In the present case, Craft admittedly did not notify the Attorney General of his intent to challenge the statute's constitutionality. Instead, he asks us to depart from our firm rule of ironclad adherence to KRS 418.075.

On behalf of his argument, Craft invokes...